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The dating of letters and documents is 
that of the originals. This means that Swedish 
documents are dated Old Style, whereas 
the English ones are usually dated according 
to both Old and New Styles. Where only 
one style is used this can be assumed to be 
the Old Style, which in the seventeenth cen-
tury was for both England and Sweden ten 
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land the year began officially on Lady Day, 
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someone abroad, indicated the year between 
Jan. 1 and March 25 by double dating. For 
the sake of clarity I have always taken the 
year to begin on Jan. l. 
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Preface 
Northern Europe provides us with a sector of English foreign policy during 
the 17th and 18th centuries in which elements of power politics and commer-
cial policy came together in an interesting way. Interests of trade and power 
were closely entwined in the political relations between England and the 
Nordic Kingdoms. The commercial element in England's Baltic policy during 
these critical years, especially at the beginning of the 18th century, has 
already been strongly emphasised by historians.1  
So far, however, research has principally been concerned with connections 
between England and Russia and their economic aspects. Thereby, an 
interesting phase of England's Baltic policy has been bypassed. During the 
latter part of the 17th century, Sweden, the leading political and economic 
power in the Baltic, played as England's political and economic partner a 
role which strongly reminds one of that of Russia after 1700. This was based 
partly on the same political and economic factors, the control of important 
Baltic harbours and products. This applies particularly to the period after 
1670, when England intensified her trading with Sweden's Baltic dominions. 
From the mid-1600's to the end of the century, Sweden's command of 
important export harbours and production areas caused trade with areas 
under Swedish domination to occupy a more central position in England's 
Baltic trade than at any time before or after. The period from the middle 
of the 17th century up to the wars of Charles X I I might well be called the 
'Swedish period' in the history of England's Baltic policy. After this turn-
ing-point it became more and more concentrated on Russia, whose acqui-
sition of Swedish territory in Carelia, Ingria, Estonia and Livonia in 1721 
offered her completely new opportunities for direct trade with the West. 
Russia was able gradually to put on the market products (such as iron, tar 
and pitch) which at one time had almost been a Swedish monopoly. 
An investigation of this nature ought to have been carried out by an 
English or a Swedish historian, as such a person could make full use of the 
extensive archives either in London or in Stockholm. But relations bet-
ween England and Sweden in the latter half of the 17th century have, on 
the whole, been touched upon to an insignificant extent by research in 
1 
 E.g., J. J. Murray, "Baltic Commerce and Power Politics in the Early Eighteenth 
Century", Huntington Libr. Quart., New Ser. VI (1942-43), 293 ff. J. J. Murray, 
"Robert Jackson's Mission to Sweden (1709-1717)", fourn. Mod. Hist. XXI (1949), 
1 ff. 
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the two countries concerned. Consequently, I have been encouraged to 
attempt to map out at least the commercial side of these political relation-
ships, using far-off Finland as my starting-point. My subject is, in fact, only 
one aspect of English-Swedish relations, although it is a very important one. 
It is to be hoped that some day the connections between England and Swe-
den during the latter part of the 17th century will receive the comprehensive 
and penetrating investigation they deserve. 
I am fully aware that I have not been able to make such use of the material 
in the archives of England and Sweden — not to mention those of Denmark, 
Brandenburg, Poland and Russia — as even this undertaking would seem to 
demand, especially from the point of view of an orthodox diplomatic historian. 
Unfortunately also, Birger Steckztn's excellent Guide to the Materials for 
Swedish Historical Research in Great Britain (1958) had not yet appeared when 
I was carrying out my researches in London in 1956 and 1957. This book 
shows how rich the English diplomatic source materials are, and at the same 
time how scattered they are over many places and collections. The Swedish 
ones are considerably more centralised in Riksarkivet in Stockholm. But I 
by no means wish to claim that when in Sweden I was able to exhaust the 
relevant sections of, for example, that great collection, the Diplomatica 
Anglica, in their entirety. 
Finland, though part of the Swedish state, seems at a superficial glance 
to stand outside these Anglo—Swedish relations. In 1675, the young English 
observer William Allestree wrote in his description of 'The King of Swedens 
Havens', "We have no merchants in the Botnick Sea, because those people 
as far as to a great city call'd Abo bring their comodities to Stockholm, 
and so are look'd upon as its dependants". And he adds that "All those 
of the Sinus Finnicus on the north East side come to Stockholm ..."'- But 
what Allestree does not mention in this connection is the fact that, as the 
main tar-producing area, Finland indirectly played an important part in 
English imports of naval stores. 
I should not have been able to carry out my researches in English archives 
without the financial help I received in 1956 from the Foundations of Ella 
and Georg Ehrnrooth, Waldemar von Frenckell, and Oskar Öflund. I should 
therefore like to express my deep gratitude to the trustees of these funds 
for their sympathetic attitude towards my project. In this connection I am 
especially grateful to Professor Hugo E. Pipping, Chancellor of Åbo Akademi,  
for his valuable help in furthering my plans. 
1  S.P., For. 95/9, f. 238 ff. 
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Professor E. G. Dickens, of the University of Hull, gave me the encourage-
ment a historian needs in order to break free from the one-sided study of 
his own country. I am deeply indebted to him for his help. 
I owe a very special debt of gratitude to Dr Ragnhild Hatton, of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. I am sorry that I have 
only been able to make belated use of her outstanding knowledge of the 
period under discussion and its problems, as my own presentation was 
already completed in manuscript. Unfortunately, ill-health has prevented 
me from incorporating many of the amplifications and elucidations which 
Dr Hatton has recommended to me, and I should be the last person to dis-
pute the justness of her suggestions. I have only been in a position to put 
right certain errors and omissions in my treatment of the theme. 
Mr Michael Webster, of the Swedish School of Economics, Helsingfors,  
and Miss Diana Colman, of Helsingfors University, have carefully and 
competently translated this work from Swedish. I thank them both. On 
behalf of the publishers, The Finnish Historical Society, Dr Hatton has 
checked the English translation from the terminological point of view. 
Finally, I should like to thank Dr W. R. Mead, of University College, 
London, for the kindness and helpfulness he showed to my wife and myself 
during our research trips to England. His great interest in present day Anglo-
Scandinavian relations has also proved to be of great help to those who 
wish to study these relations in the past. 
The manuscript was completed in the Spring of 1960, when it was read 
by Professor Aulis J. Alanen and Professor Eino Jutikkala and accepted 
for publication by The Finnish Historical Society. For this, too, I should 
like to express my gratitude. 
I alone am responsible for any defects in this presentation, and likewise 
for the fact that my illness has made it impossible to check quotations and 
references. 
I hope to be able to publish in another connection the results of my re-
searches on the geographical expansion and economic organisation of England's 
trade with the Baltic during the Seventeenth Century, as well as a critical 
analysis of the most important source-material on which these studies are 
based, the Customs accounts.  
Helsingfors, September, 1961. 
Sven- Erik Åström 
/ 
) 
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The Staple Products of the Baltic Area, 
their Colonial Substitutes, and the 
English Market 
At the end of the 17th century, trade with Northern Europe formed a 
sector of English foreign trade which was quite modest from the point of 
view of the money concerned.1  About 1700, lawful imports from Northern 
Europe comprised only 10 % of total English imports. Exports to Northern 
Europe were of an even more modest nature, amounting to only 5 % of the 
total exports. Northern Europe played, relatively speaking, an even smaller 
role in the import and export trade of London than in that of England as 
a whole. If we confine ourselves to the import side, however, it is worth noting 
that imports from North Europe to London showed a slow increase during the 
course of the 17th century. For example, in 1634 imports of commodities from 
Northern Europe formed slightly over 6 % of the capital's total imports. In 
1663 and 1669 (on the average) they were nearly 8 %, and at the end of the 
century they touched 10 %.2 But this gradual relative growth can partly be 
explained by the fact that some North European imports which had previ-
ously come via Holland (the United Provinces) and Germany were now com-
ing straight from North European ports because of the increase in direct 
trading. Bearing in mind the enormous development in the transoceanic 
sector of England's foreign trade, we can hardly expect as violent an ex-
pansion in her trade with the plains and forests of Northern Europe as in 
that with her new rich overseas markets; for this north-eastern corner, 
though nearer, was poor both in purchasing power and in range of products? 
Ever since the trade offensive which had begun in the reign of Elizabeth I, 
the North European market had been monopolised by two privileged trading 
companies, the Muscovy Company (later known as the Russia Company) and 
1 
 Scotland, Ireland and the Channel Islands, which were quite separate customs 
areas, have been disregarded in this presentation. 
2 Percentages from the tables in A. M. Millard, The Import Trade of London 
1600-1640, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1956, P R 0, Round Room 15:87 
D) and R. Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700", Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd Ser,  
VII (1954-55), 164-165. 
3 Cf. Davis, 150 ff., 161-162. 
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the Eastland Company.' At that time the two concepts 'Russia' and 'East-
land' were also used in connection with both trade policy and commercial 
statistics. When the Muscovy Company was founded in 1553, 'Russia' con-
sisted of the Russian White Sea harbours and the port of Narva (in Estonia), 
which then belonged to Russia. The concept of 'Eastland' embraced Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, Copenhagen and Helsingör (Elsinore) in Denmark, 
and the whole Baltic coast from Estonia to the Oder, where 'Germany' 
began. Within this sphere the following ports were of interest to England: 
the Norwegian timber ports, Gothenburg, Stockholm, Riga, Königsberg and 
Danzig. The rest of Denmark and the coastal belt west of the Oder (Pome-
rania and Mecklenburg) were divided between the Eastland Company and 
the Merchant Adventurers. Commercial contacts between England and Baltic 
ports in Denmark and in Germany west of the Oder were practically non-
existent after 1660. Consequently, the Eastland Company became, in reality, 
England's 'Baltic Company', while the Merchant Adventurers functioned 
as a kind of 'North Sea Company' centred on Hamburg (the 'Germany' 
of contemporary trade statistics). One should not forget that Narva belonged 
to the Russia Company's sphere of interest, and that Gothenburg and the 
Norwegian timber ports had not only been allotted to the Eastland Company 
by privilege, but were also included in 'Eastland' in matters of economic 
geography and statistics. 
When English imports from Sweden proper and Denmark-Norway were 
freed from company monopoly in 1673, this caused the break-up of the old 
concept of 'Eastland' as a legal and geographical entity. 'Sweden', 'Den-
mark-Norway' and the 'East Country' began to be used instead as smaller 
entities. The 'East Country', the coastal strip between the rivers Narova and 
Oder, was all that now remained of the area in which the Eastland Company 
had held its privilege. The Southern Baltic region was thus divided politi-
cally into several states, but it was unified by an export structure which the 
region had in common. After the Russian conquest of Estonia and Livonia 
during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Reval (Tallinn) and Riga 
were still considered as belonging to the East Country. It is necessary to 
note these changes in the division of the North European market in order 
to interpret the trade statistics on which we must principally base our know-
ledge of England's imports from North Europe in the latter part of the 17th 
century and the beginning of the 18th. 
The heart of this extensive trading area was the Baltic sea, its ports and 
1  See, e.g. E. Lipson, The Economic History of England II, London 1948 (5th 
ed.), 318, 334. 
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the districts they served. The 'Sweden', 'East Country' and 'Russia' of the 
trade figures can roughly be defined as the 'Baltic Area'. Its outlet was the 
Sound (Öresund). Gothenburg and Archangel could in theory offer the same 
products as the Baltic ports. But the products of the Russian market could 
not all be sent via Archangel,' and the natural export harbour for the Swedish 
iron deposits was Stockholm, which was merely supplemented by Gothenburg.2 
II 
The export goods of the Baltic area consisted to a large extent of heavy 
and bulky staple products. The factors of production in the plains and forests 
of the North directed production towards raw materials and semi-manufac-
tured goods. If we proceed from the three traditional production factors, land, 
labour and capital, it is quite clear that land and labour were relatively cheaper 
in the Baltic area than in Western Europe, whereas capital was the most 
scarce and valuable of the three. This combination of production factors 
determined the character of exports to distant lands. Because of low rents 
and wages, heavy and bulky commodities could be produced at prices low 
enough to bear the cost of transport to the West European market. England 
lacked all the climatic factors and raw material resources necessary to pro-
duce iron and timber products on a greater scale than was already done. 
But cheap production factors enabled Swedish iron, copper, and brass, 
Russian potash and hemp, Polish flax, and Prussian oak planks to compete 
on the English market in spite of the high transport costs. 
It was oak planks and copper and brass wire which, along with iron, hemp, 
flax, potash and tar-pitch, came for the most part directly from the Baltic 
area.3 But in terms of value, oak planks played an extremely modest role in 
the import trade from the Baltic area. Nor did copper and brass manage to 
maintain their position on the import list, because of increased domestic 
production.`' 
1 
 A. Öhberg, "Russia and the World Market in the Seventeenth Century", Scand. 
Econ. Hist. Rev. III (1955), 127-162. 
2 E. F. Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa [Economic 
history of Sweden from the reign of Gustavus Vasa] 1:2, Stockholm 1936, 389. 
3 These conclusions are based on the official trade figures for the closing years 
of the 17th century, and refer to both London and the outports. Customs 3/1, 
3/2, 3/3, 3/4, P R G. On the nature of the statistical material, see G. N. Clark, 
Guide to English Commercial Statistics 1696-1782. R. Hist. Soc. Guides and Hand-
books 1, London 1938, XV, 33 ff. Cf. Davis, 155. 
4 See Appendix I. 
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Consequently, we have good reason to confine our interest to the other 
above-mentioned bulk products, typical of the Baltic area, which had a real 
importance both in actual value and over a long period. This means that 
we must first study the imports of these commodities in relation to England's 
total imports from the various regions within this area. The average imports 
of iron, flax, hemp, potash and tar-pitch for 1699 and 1700, expressed as 
percentages of the total imports from each region, were as follows:' 
'Sweden' 86 % 	 'Russia' 77 % 	 'East Country' 54 % 
It appears that the five bulk products in question dominated England's 
imports from 'Sweden' and 'Russia', whereas the 'East Country's' exports 
to England were of a more heterogeneous nature. It is also worth analysing 
the more detailed distribution (according to place of origin) of England's total 
imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar-pitch. The part played by Holland 
in this connection is of particular interest. 
England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar-pitch for 1699 and 1700 
(averaged) distributed according to place of origin.2  
Iron Hemp Flax Potash Tar-pitch 	 Total 
'Sweden' 	  81.8 5.l 15.2 0.0 87.2 44.2 
'Russia' 	  0.6 38.1 45.3 72.9 1.8 24.4 
'East Country' 	  0.7 54.1 35.3 27.1 1.0 22.2 
'Denmark-Norway' 	  1.8 0.2 - - 8.4 1.3 
'Holland' 	  l.8 2.3 3.7 - 0.0 2.0 
Other 	 areas 	 (including 
colonies) 13.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.6 5.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The information given by this table may be briefly summarised as follows. 
The Baltic area obviously enjoyed a monopolistic position as the supplier of 
iron, hemp, flax, potash, tar and pitch. 'Sweden' stood practically alone as 
For sources and absolute figures, see Table 1. 
2 For sources and absolute figures, see Table 1. Because of differences in the 
quality and price of the same commodity as supplied by different areas, the per-
cental distribution has been calculated on the basis of import values rather than 
of quantities. Values rather than quantities have been consistently used in the 
tables because this is the only possible way of making a comparison between differ-
ent commodities. Smuggling has not been taken into account and the compara-
tive figures are merely approximate, just as the underlying statistics of goods are 
also approximate both in respect of values and quantities. 
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the exporter of tar and pitch, a commodity which was for the most part 
produced in Finland, but which was shipped abroad via Stockholm. 'Sweden' 
also had an undisputed lead in iron. The share which fell to other countries 
consisted principally of Spanish iron (11.9 %). Hemp and flax were the 
characteristic staple products of the 'East Country' and 'Russia', and were 
Polish and Russian in origin. Smaller quantities of hemp and flax were also 
exported via ports in Sweden proper. Potash was a typically Russian product.1  
Because of the fact that part of the staple products of Russia and Poland 
went out through the Swedish-owned ports of Riga and Narva (assigned 
respectively to the 'East Country' and 'Russia' in the trade figures), Sweden 
at the time of her full territorial extension was more important as a transit 
country in this trade than the table shows. On the other hand, as the table 
shows, Holland played an extremely modest role in the transit of Baltic 
products to England. To some extent, Sweden had assumed the mantle of 
Holland. Towards the end of the 17th century this fact became apparent 
to influential circles in England. 
Ill 
Sir Francis Brewster says in his Essays on Trade and Navigation (of 1695): 
"That there is nothing of greater consequence to a people that live by Trade, 
than to be makers of their own Tools by which they work, none will deny; 
now Shipping are the Tools and Utensils of the Nation; to fetch them from 
abroad is to Trade by Licence; Whenever our Northern Neighbours please, 
we must lye still, or pay such rates as they please ...". Similar arguments 
can easily be found in the economic pamphlet literature of the period. 
As is well known, during the whole of the 17th century and for some time 
afterwards it was a standing aim of England's commercial and colonial policy 
to free herself from her dependance for 'naval stores' on the Baltic market. 
It was principally in her colonies on the mainland of North America that 
she saw, on the basis of their climate and raw material resources, the chief 
alternative to the Baltic.2 
1 
 Potash is used by the glass industry, in the dyeing of cloth, and in the making 
of soap. 
2 General review of policy in C. M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American 
History IV. England's Commercial and Colonial Policy, New Haven 1938, passim. 
R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power. The Timber problem of the Royal Navy 1652 
—1862. Harv. Econ. Stud. XXIX, Cambridge, Mass. 1926, chapter VI, particularly 
with regard to the provision of timber. E. L. Lord, Industrial Experiments in the 
British Colonies of North America. John Hopkins Univ. Stud. Hist. Pol. Sc. Extra 
vol. XVII, Baltimore 1898, passim. C. Nettels, "The Menace of Colonial Manu- 
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Hakluyt had already cast glances at North America's potentialities in this 
respect. Several other writers discussed the same problem round about 1600. 
One of the objects in view when Virginia was founded was its possibilities as 
a source of naval stores. Its iron ore was to be utilised, and moreover, it was 
intended that this densely wooded colony should produce tar, pitch and potash. 
The climate was thought to offer good prospects for the cultivation of flax 
and hemp. But all the early experiments came to a premature end. Labour 
turned out to be dear, transport over the Atlantic was costly, and there 
was no working tradition to build upon. As late as 1679, the newly appointed 
governor of Virginia, Lord Culpepper, was instructed to promote the produc-
tion of hemp, flax, pitch and potash. Lord Culpepper himself pointed out 
that hemp and flax did well there, but that the inhabitants were devoting 
themselves to the cultivation of tobacco. Some years later he asked for hemp 
and flax seed to distribute among the poor so as to encourage cultivation. 
But instead tobacco came to occupy the position that had been intended 
for staple products of the Northern European type.' Virginia is an excellent 
example of the inability of colonial policy to shape reality according to the 
pattern prescribed by wishful thinkers in the mother country. 
New motives and new colonial regions were drawn into the discussion 
towards the close of the 17th century. One argument was that there was a 
danger that the northern colonies would reach a high degree of industriali-
sation and so begin to compete with the mother country, instead of acting 
as a market for English manufactured goods. New England lacked suitable 
commodities to send in exchange so as to pay for her surplus imports from 
the motherland. The production of naval stores would therefore enable the 
colonies to solve their payments problems. Another related argument was 
the unfavourable balance of trade with North Europe, which had been 
caused by increased imports of the great staple products of the Baltic area, 
coupled with export difficulties in the opposite direction.2 The instructions 
facturing 1690-1720", New Engl. Quart. 4 (1931), 230-269 (The author has limited 
himself to purely American problems, and has consequently failed to appreciate 
the justified anxiety at that time over the monopoly enjoyed by Northern Europe). 
1  T. J. Wertenbaker, Planters of Colonial Virginia, Princeton 1922, 7-20. 
G. Adler, "England's Versorgung mit Schiffsbaumaterialien aus Englischen und 
Amerikanischen Quellen vornemlich im 17. Jahrhundert", Viert. Soz. Wirtsch. Gesch., 
Beiheft 16, Stuttgart 1929, 48-65, 84 ff. W. F. Craven, The Southern Colonies 
in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689. A History of the South 1, s.l. 1949, 35, 48, 
69, 140-141, 313. Council of Trade and Plantations, Colonial Papers 6/12 1679 
(C. 0. 1/47, p. 272), Journals 19/11, 13/12 1681 (C. 0. 391/3). 
2 K. E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories 1570-1850, Toronto 1944, 50-59, 
81-105. J. F. Rees, Mercantilism and the Colonies. The Cambridge History of the 
British Empire I, Cambridge 1929, 569 ff. Cf. Nettels, passim. 
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for the new Board of Trade (1696) emphasised the desirability of obtaining 
naval stores from the colonies. In the same year, one of the Customs Com-
missioners, Charles Godolphin, investigated the unfavourable balance of 
trade with Northern Europe and its causes. His memorandum on this end-
ed with the same old recommendation to let the colonies furnish the moth-
er country with naval stores? It was now principally the northern colo-
nies, and especially New England, which he had in view. In the 1660's these 
had begun to supply ships' necessities, principally masts, to the Navy. 
The South had begun to adapt itself to a production system of a different 
character, a plantation economy, in which tobacco, rice and cotton were to 
become the main commodities. 
The outbreak of war in 1689, coupled with rising prices and difficulties 
in obtaining strategically important commodities from the Baltic area, led to 
an increased interest in the resources of the colonies. In the 1690's there was 
a stream of applications for monopolies in the production of naval stores 
in some colony or other, for the right to form a company for the mining 
of copper or iron, and so on.2 Officials of the colonial administration held 
out to the central authorities the prospects of possible North American 
substitutes for the products of the Baltic. Among these was Edward Randolph. 
In 1696 he sent the Board of Trade a memorandum on how the colonies 
could be made more useful. He points out the unfavourable balance of trade 
with Northern Europe, and says that England can be supplied with "Masts, 
Ship Timber, Oaken Planck, Pitch, Tarr, Rozin, Hemp, Flax and Salt Petre 
from her own Colonies and Provinces in America and Islands Adjacent". 
Flax and hemp "grow very kindly, very large, and very plentifully in all 
Plantations & some Colonies have Lawes Obligeing them to sow yearly a 
Quantity of Hemp and Flax seed. .."3 In the Spring of 1696 a Bill was 
presented to encourage the importation of naval stores from the colonies, 
but for some unknown reason it was never discussed or passed by Parliament. 
The threat which hung over supplies from the Baltic during this crisis, togeth-
er with the zeal of the various enterprises and the enthusiastic prospectuses 
which the colonial officials presented to the authorities in Whitehall, did, 
however, eventually have their effect. The well-known Act of 1705, which 
placed import bounties on tar-pitch, hemp, and timber for masts and spars, 
Charles Godolphin on the trade with Sweden and Denmark 31/7/1696, (copy) 
(C. 0. 389/15, p. 25). 
2 Lord, 15 ff. Nettels, 240 ff. Cf. L. F. Stock, Proceedings and Debates etc. II 
1689-1702. Corn. Inst. Publ. 338: 11, Baltimore 1927, 175. 
8 
 Edward Randolph's 'Discourse how to render the Plantations more beneficiall 
etc.' C. 0 323/2, A 2. 
2 
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represented official sanction for the efforts to find in the North American 
colonies an equivalent to the import of Baltic products, which was so ques-
tionable from many points of view.' At various times later on, iron and flax 
were also on the point of being drawn into the bounty system.2 
Apart from the American colonies, Ireland was the great hope from the 
1690's onwards. To the economic policy-makers of that time, Ireland seemed 
able to offer alternative means of supplying England with strategic staples 
of the Baltic type. As part of this policy it was intended that those refugees from 
the Palatinate who were sent across to Ireland and the colonies in 1709 should 
be employed in the production of naval stores, particularly hemp and flax.3  
This happened after the abandonment of attempts to revive the declining 
production of flax and hemp in England. In the 1660's an Act of Parliament 
was passed concerning the compulsory cultivation of flax and hemp. This 
legislation, however, had no effect, as in 1678 Parliament was again debating 
a Bill concerned with encouraging the cultivation of flax and hemp in Eng-
land. At the time, the Swedish resident in London, Johan Leijonbergh, pointed 
out how inadequate were England's provisions of hemp and flax. The bill 
aroused a great response in Parliament.4 The science of economics was 
not sufficiently advanced for people to realise that England had reached a 
1 Lord, 56-86 and J. Williams, "English Mercantilism and Carolina Naval 
Stores, 1705-1776", Journ. South. Hist. I (1935), 169-185. — See also p. 109. 
2 Board of Trade, Representations 28/3/1717 (C. O. 390/12). Cf. a pamphlet of 
1721 on the bounty system with a plea for premiums on imports of pig-iron and 
flax (Goldsmith's Library, Broadsides, vol. IV, 312). Nevertheless, iron was at 
the same time a home product, and consequently all attempts to encourage the 
colonial iron industry during the first half of the 18th century met with violent 
opposition from interested parties such as the English foundry-owners. On the 
other hand, flax was a product in which the Baltic did not have so undisputed 
a monopoly. From the strategic point of view, flax played a less important role. 
Moreover, it could be obtained elsewhere in a refined form, from Holland and 
Germany. Cf. T. S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution, Manchester 
1951 (2nd ed.), 106-108, 113-114, 116 ff., 139. A. C. Bining, The Regulation 
of the Colonial Iron Industry, Philadelphia 1933, passim. The discussion is reflected 
in pamphlets such as Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Naval Store-
Bill etc. (1720), Goldsmith's Library, (E. L.) XVIII. 20, The interest of Great Britain 
in Supplying herself with Iron Impartially considered (1756?), Goldsmith's Library, 
(E. L.) XVIII. 56. and Reasons for making copper and iron in H. M. Plantations 
in N. America, BM, Tracts on Commerce 816 m. 13. 
8 
 W. A. Knittle, The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration, Phila-
delphia 1936, 89, 135 ff. 
4 Adler, 10 ff. A. F. W. Papillon, Memoirs of Thomas Papillon, Reading 1887, 
169. 'Bör efterfrågas' (To be looked into), Wachtmeister's dispatches to the King 
of Sweden and others, 1679, Dipl. Angl. 
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stage at which both land and manpower were too expensive for crops like 
flax and hemp, which required laborious and extensive cultivation. After 
1689, when wartime requirements had made the provision of these com-
modities a matter of immediate importance, attention was directed to-
wards Ireland. Just as in the case of the North American colonies, English 
cloth interests were afraid of a competitor in the growing Irish weaving in-
dustry. The Act of Parliament of 1699, which stopped all export of cloth 
from the American colonies, simultaneously forbade the export of Irish 
clothing fabrics except to the mother country. 
The Act of 1699 had been preceded by decrees concerning the duty-free 
import into England of flax and hemp and also of linen yarns and fabrics 
from Ireland. Now it was followed by a great expansion in the importation of 
Irish linen, which in no way directly interfered with imports of flax from the 
Baltic area. Hemp, on the other hand, did not gain a foothold in Ireland 
any more than it did in the American colonies. Hand in hand with these 
measures to encourage the cultivation of flax and hemp in Ireland went the 
attempt to stimulate the Irish iron industry.' Exports were promoted by 
lowering the import duties on Irish pig-iron, but this was of low quality, and 
the deposits of ore on which the Irish iron industry was originally based 
soon ran out.2 
It was thus only the cultivation of flax which took root in Ireland and 
made linen spinning one of her national industries.3 Consequently, English 
policy was successful in this sector, but it is doubtful whether this should 
be credited to the inherently favourable economic or climatic conditions or 
to the effectiveness of the policy that was pursued. 
1 
 G. A. T. O'Brien, The Economic History of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century, 
Dublin & London 1919, 77-79, 149, 188, 224, 231. C. Gill, The Rise of the Irish 
Linen Industry, Oxford 1925, 8-15. Ashton, Iron and Steel, 105. H. L. Osgood, 
The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century I, New York 1924, 128, 147-
148. H. F. Kearney, "The Political Background to English Mercantilism, 1695-
1700", Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd Ser. XI (1958-59), 484-496. Cf. C. O. 391/9, p. 16, 
20, 37, 52 and C. O. 391/11, p. 41, 65, 152, 154, 158, 162, 164, 243-246. 
2 E. McCracken, "Charcoal-Burning Ironworks in Seventeenth and Eightenthe 
Century Ireland", Ulster fourn. Arch. 3rd Ser., 20 (1957), 123-126. J. H. Andrews, 
"Notes on the Historical Geography of the Irish Iron Industry". Irish Geography 
III (1955), 144 ff. 
S 
 Cf. J. Homer, The Linen Trade of Europe during the Spinning Wheel Period, 
Belfast 1920. 
20 	 From Stockholm to St. Petersburg 
IV 
The attention which 17th century Englishmen paid to the trade with 
Northern Europe had de facto very little to do with its economic significance 
from the point of view of pure monetary value. The fact that it occupied the 
minds of statesmen and was drawn into parliamentary debates and public 
discussion was really connected with other factors. 
Strategic raw materials and semi-manufactured goods were of great 
importance in the import trade. Consequently, under the general term 'naval 
stores', timber, iron, tar, hemp and flax from Northern Europe were drawn 
into the discussion of naval policy.' The fact that a major part of the pro-
duction and transiting of naval stores lay in the hands of a single Baltic 
power, Sweden, neutral or possibly pro-French, was a constant cause of 
uneasiness. Moreover, the goods in question were heavy and bulky commod-
ities which demanded much tonnage in proportion to their monetary value. 
It was here that aspects of shipping policy entered into strategic considerations. 
The question whether the naval stores should be imported by means of 
English or foreign ships brought the debate at the same time into the sphere 
of commercial policy. Where the exchange of goods in the one direction was 
represented by bulk products which were relatively cheap but required a lot 
of tonnage, the freight charges played an important part in the balance of 
payments. The payments situation was aggravated by the fact that Northern 
Europe could not offer an adequate market for English export goods, especial-
ly cloth, which, in spite of the appearance of new commodities for re-export, 
continued to occupy an important place in English exports.2 In discussions 
of these problems, the marketing difficulties of the cloth trade during the 
critical situation at the end of the 17th century were thus readily associ-
ated with the adverse balance of trade. The export of precious metals to 
bridge the gap between imports and exports became the constant lament 
of the champions of a balanced trade. 
There was a further reason for the attempt to shake off dependence on 
Northern Europe either by home production or by means of supplies from the 
1  See above, p. 14. 
2 
 R. W. K. Hinton, The Eastland Trade and the Common Weal in the Seven-
teenth Century, Cambridge 1959, 95 ff. L. A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws, 
New York 1939, passim. C. Wilson, Profit and Power. A Study of England and 
the Dutch Wars, London 1957, 2 ff., 17, 42, 51-52. D. C. Coleman, "Naval Dock-
yards under the later Stuarts", Econ. Hist. Rev. 2nd Ser., VI (1953-54), 145-146. 
J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William /II, 1689-1697, Cambridge 1953, 
38-58. 
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colonies. By restraining the economic development of both Ireland and 
the colonies and concentrating their commerce and industry on the pro-
duction of raw materials and semi-manufactures, an additional aim would be 
achieved. The colonies and Ireland could also continue to provide a market 
for the mother country's manufactures, and thereby guarantee the level of 
employment in the classic English export industry, cloth-weaving. But the 
whole complex of political actions and economic discussions on the theme of 
Ireland and the colonies had always to be co-ordinated with the difficulties 
which England experienced, especially in war-time, over the strategic staple 
commodities from the Baltic. 
Intensified Commercial and Shipping Contacts 
between England and Sweden 
Up to 1660, political frontiers in the Baltic area had been just as flexible 
as they were to become stable during the remainder of the century. Sweden's 
territorial expansion at the expense of the other Baltic countries reached 
its climax at this date. From the point of view of both political geography 
and power politics, the status quo remained unshaken from the peace treaties 
of the 1670's till the Great Northern War. The great power of the Baltic 
was Sweden. By holding Ingria, Estonia and Livonia, Sweden had cut off 
the ports of Riga, Reval (Tallinn) and Narva from their hinterland, those parts 
of Poland and Russia which they served. Russia had no coastline or harbours 
on the Baltic after 1617. The Brandenburg possessions on the south coast of 
the Baltic were split in two by the Polish Corridor, which extended along the 
Vistula down to the Baltic. Brandenburgian Pomerania lacked commer-
cial centres of more than local importance. East Prussia's only important 
seaport, Königsberg, opened on to Polish Lithuania, as did Sweden's Riga. 
Brandenburg was an expanding power just as much as Sweden, and in 1657 
she had extended her sovereignty so as to include East Prussia. But after 
that her progress on the Baltic coast came temporarily to a halt. The Hanseatic 
town of Danzig was the principal grain port on the Baltic, thanks to her 
position at the mouth of the Vistula. Swedish Pomerania, the Duchy of 
Mecklenburg, and that close ally of Sweden, Holstein-Gottorp, had no products 
of importance to the Western European market. By the 1660's, Lubeck had 
degenerated into a regional market town, though it is true that this market 
extended into North Germany, Scandinavia and Russia. But this was no 
substitute for the role as intermediary between North-Eastern and Western 
Europe which the city had once held. The direct contacts between this for-
merly powerful Hanseatic city and the countries on the other side of the 
Sound had been considerably weakened. The neighbouring city of Hamburg 
increasingly overshadowed Liibeck as the new financial centre of Northern 
Europe. Both the ruler of the tiny Duchy of Courland and the Elector of 
Brandenburg had ambitious plans for active trade westwards. Courland's 
commercial policy, however, was controlled by Sweden, though officially 
the country owed allegiance to the King of Poland. 
Sweden was the most powerful of the Baltic countries, owing to her political 
prestige and economic resources. England had to take Sweden into account 
when considering any political combination or trade offensive. Denmark 
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-Norway was a North Sea power as much as a Baltic one, although she had 
to be reckoned with as an important economic and political factor in the 
Baltic. Denmark both levied a customs toll at the Sound and possessed a 
not inconsiderable Navy, which at strategic moments could be directed at the 
Baltic.' But Norway was undoubtedly of the greater importance for English 
mercantile interests in the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway. The lion's share in 
the exchange of goods between England and Denmark-Norway went to 
Norwegian timber. 
The seizure of Narva and Riga (in 1581 and 1621 respectively) improved 
Sweden's position at that end of the Baltic. It was via these ports that Russian 
and Polish products were to some extent compelled to go in order to reach 
consumers in Western Europe. The normal prices given for heavy and bulky 
goods such as bales of flax or hemp from the areas surrounding these ports 
could not stand the cost of long-distance transport to the Arctic coast.2 
The conquest of Norway's south-eastern provinces and of the old Danish 
province of Scania (1658, 1660) also influenced Sweden's trading possibilities 
with the West, as it gave her a long coastline facing the Sound, the Skagerak 
and the Kattegat. At the same time it strengthened her strategic position in 
the Sound. Through these changes of frontier, the new seaport of Gothenburg, 
which in the optimistic Swedish dreams of large-scale trading had been 
thought of as the main Baltic emporium, acquired a large and well-tim-
bered area of supply and better-protected connections with the booming 
iron industry of Värmland. The fourth Swedish seaport of importance to the 
English was Stockholm, the capital city of the Kingdom. Around 1670, con-
nections between England and Stockholm were of very recent origin, but 
they were nevertheless of great importance. 
English commercial expansion in the Baltic during the 17th century can be 
traced through the merchants and factors who handled this trade. The 
Prussian harbours of Danzig, the nearby Elbing, and Königsberg were the 
focus of English commercial interest up to the 1650's, when the English 
suddenly appeared in Riga. As the years went by, the English merchant 
1  A good survey of Denmark's relations with Sweden and England will be found 
in G. Landberg, "Johan Gyllenstiernas nordiska förbundspolitik i belysning av 
den skandinaviska diplomatiens traditioner" [Johan Gyllenstierna's policy of Nordic 
alliances in the light of the Scandinavian diplomatic traditions], Uppsala Univ. 
Årsskr. 1935:10, Uppsala 1935, 34 ff. 53 ff., 64 ff., 159 ff., 166 ff. 
2 See above, p. 13. 
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colonies in the Swedish ports of Stockholm and Narva became as strong 
numerically as that in Riga. 
Westbound English ships from Danzig, Königsberg, Riga and Narva passing through 
the Sound, 1650-1699.1  
(average for each decade) 
Danzig 
Port of departure 
Königsberg 	 Riga Narva 
1650-59 8 12 3 1 
1660-69 11 15 7 2 
1670-79 25 41 37 15 
1680-89 40 28 64 37 
1690-99 11 12 47 25 
Note: The table does not show the foreign tonnage, mostly Swedish, which was 
chartered by the English, especially during periods when England was at war. 
It is true that the shipping with Riga was quantitatively greater than that 
with Narva.2 But at the end of the 17th century the English were the leading 
foreign colony in Narva. This development had roots in the past. Trade 
with Narva had already been an object of English interest in the 16th cen-
tury. After the town fell into Swedish hands in 1581, however, Reval (Tallinn) 
was, to begin with, favoured by the Swedish government at the expense 
of Narva. This policy was not altered until the Treaty of Stolbova, 1617, 
when Russia lost all direct access to the Baltic. Narva, along with the newly-
founded town of Nyen at the mouth of River Neva, now got the support 
of the Swedish state in its efforts to control trade-routes to and from Russia.3  
N. Bang & K. Korst, Tabeller over Skibsf art og Varetransport gennem Oresund, 
etc. [Tables of shipping and transport of goods through the Sound, etc.], 1661-
1783, 1, Tabeller over Skibsfart [Shipping tables], Copenhagen 1930. (As a control 
I have compared the shipping information given by the books of the authorities 
at the Sound with the Customs accounts of English ports, Port books, Series E. 
190, PRO. The correspondence is good. I hope to be able to publish in another 
connection the results of this critical scrutiny of the value of the English Customs 
Books as source material). 
2 Hinton, 106-107, 113 (Shipping statistics based on the books of the Toll 
authorities in the Sound). 
3 Öhberg, 123-162. A. Attman. Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska 
politik 1558-1595 [The Russian market in 16th century Baltic politics, 1558-
1595]. Lund 1944, 315 ff., 360 ff. A. Attman, "Freden i Stolbova 1617" [The 
Treaty of Stolbova, 1617], Scandia XIX (1948-49), 41, 47. A. Soom, Die Politik 
Schwedens beziiglich des russischen Transithandels fiber die estnischen Städte in den 
Jaliren 1636-1656. Opetatud Eesti Seltsi Toimetused XXXII, Tartu 1940, 28— 
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Because of the increased Dutch competition in Archangel and the hard-handed 
treatment the English received from the Russians, England was all the more 
attracted by the idea of shipping through the Swedish port of Narva.' The 
Narva traffic became a matter of international politics. The English am-
bassador to Sweden in 1654, Bulstrode Whitlocke, agreed with the Swedish 
negotiators that in the future Narva should be the focal point of England's 
trade with Russia. The Swedish-English trade treaty of 1665, Art. XX IV, 
includes the right for Englishmen to hold a 'commercial court' (handelshov)  
in Narva. After the Swedish-English alliance was renewed in 1672, the 
Swedish minister in London, Johan Leijonbergh, had an audience with King 
Charles I I in which he put forward the possibilities of out-distancing the Dutch 
in Archangel by means of the Narva trade. The English had been promised, 
and, as we shall see, were enjoying a greater freedom of trade in Narva than 
in any other part of the Swedish realm.2 English and Swedish economic and 
political interests were more closely allied in Narva than in Riga. Geograph-
ically Narva was the nearest Baltic equivalent to Archangel, that thorn in 
Sweden's side. 
An entirely new trade route based on Gothenburg and Stockholm was 
opened up by the iron from central Sweden and the tar and pitch from Fin-
land. Hemp and flax were obtained from the Swedish-owned ports of Riga 
and Narva. In the 1650's this traffic between England and Swedish ports 
in the mother country and the Baltic provinces had increased, and it was 
the 1670's that saw the great break-through in English trading activities 
in the Baltic.3 But after this the trend continued to point in the same 
direction, the tendency to concentrate on Stockholm, Gothenburg, Riga 
and Narva as the sources of English imports from this area. 
42. T. S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company 1553-1603, Manchester 
1956, 157 ff. R. Liljedahl, Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617-1634 [Swedish admin-
istration in Livonia, 1617-1634], Uppsala 1933, 473 ff. 
1  J. Lubimenko, Les relations commerciales et politiques de l'Angleterre avec la 
Russie avant Pierre le Grand. Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Sc.Hist. 
Philol. 261, Paris 1933, 210 ff. 
2 Leijonbergh to the K. of Sw. 29/7/1672, Dipl.Angl. — See further p. 74 ff. 
3 Cf. Hinton, 106 ff. 
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Ships leaving Gothenburg and various Baltic ports, with cargoes for England, 1670-79 
and 1690-99.1  
From 1670 —79 1690 —99 
Swedish-owned Baltic ports 	
 53.1 64.9 
Gothenburg 	  15.2 15.9 
Swedish ports in general 	  68.3 80.8 
Non-Swedish Baltic ports 	  31.7 19.2 
Totals 100.0 100.0 
In the 1630's there was only insignificant commercial and shipping con-
tact between these seaports and England. In the 1670's Swedish-owned 
ports were responsible for over two-thirds of the shipping traffic between 
the Baltic and England. By the 1690's their share had risen to four-fifths. 
This is the basic feature in the new pattern of England's Baltic trade which 
took shape at end of the 17th century. 
II 
This was the political and commercial set-up which faced the English 
diplomats and commercial agents in the Baltic area at the end of the 17th 
century. Through them, Whitehall and the City of London obtained their 
information about the situation and events in this part of the world. English 
Baltic policy was shaped in these two centres of the rapidly growing capital, 
the metropolis of England's expanding commercial and colonial empire. 
The main lines of this policy were drawn up in Whitehall, but merchants 
in the City were able to make their voice heard in various ways. One means 
of co-ordinating the requirements of politics and trade was through the various 
Councils of Trade and Plantations which were set up during this period. 
These bodies listened to the opinions of the mercantile world by allowing the 
various City groups who had interests in the Baltic trade to have their say. 
When decisions affecting commercial policy were about to be taken, a hearing 
was always given to representatives of the Eastland and Muscovy Companies 
and of the new group which had crystallised out under the name of 'the 
Swedish Merchants'. The policy towards Northern Europe officially came 
1  See note to previous table, also I. Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart 1637-1920 
[Gothenburg's trade and shipping, 1637-1920], Skrifter utg. till Göteborgs stads 
trehundraårsjubileum genom jubileumsutställningens publikationskommitté [Essays 
in honour of Gothenburg's tercentenary, published by the Publications Committee 
of the Jubilee Exhibition] Vol. X, Gothenburg 1923, Tab 70. 
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under one of the two Secretaries of State, the Secretary of State for the North. 
But often his brother-in-office also took part in deciding matters connected 
with the Baltic. Under the early Stuarts, the formulation of foreign policy 
was less clearly defined than it was either before or after. The importance 
of the Privy Council had declined, and the idea of a Cabinet had not yet 
taken full shape. Moreover, questions of privilege and customs duty were 
the concern of Parliament. Conflicts of opinion and interests both between 
and within the two Houses complicated the picture. In addition to all the 
political machinery at home which laid down the line of official policy, there 
were also the ambassadors, residents and consuls in the capitals and commer-
cial centres of the Baltic area. These were by no means passive spectators.' 
To politicians and diplomats, trade was one element in politics as a whole; 
to the mercantile interests it was an end in itself. The merchants and their 
agents in 'Eastland' were governed by their solicitude for their affairs out 
there. Their points of view can be seen in the list of 'grievances' about the 
trade with 'Eastland' which were at various times submitted to the author-
ities, either spontaneously or on request. To the men of Whitehall and 
their correspondents in the cities of Northern Europe, trade was, of course, of 
vital interest to the nation, but it was only one counter in the game. It was 
merely one of the factors that had to be taken into consideration in England's 
relations with the sovereign states of Northern Europe. In this way, the 
aims of English foreign policy in the Baltic area took shape in the tug-of-
war between various groups and interests, and, in the last resort, between 
various motives. 
1  See G. Clark, The Later Stuarts 1660-1714, 2nd ed., Oxford 1955, 13, 43-
44. D. Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II, 2nd ed., Oxford 1955, I, 192-197, 
(and the literature cited therein). 
The Diplomatic Framework: Treaty of Alliance 
versus Trade Agreement 
'Och såsom H:r Cantz:ii Råd:t icke obekandt wara kan, huru 
wåra Alljancer medh Engeland, lenge redan ähro förflutna, och 
man på Engelske sijdhan har wehladt ingå Commercii Tractaten, 
men separera dhen dheel af dhe förre tractaterne, som kunde 
touchera mutuelle deufensive Alljance, och afgöra dhen wijdh een 
thijdh som kunde falla Engeland lägligare, men att Wij dherimoot 
gärna kunde tillstå en separation af bägges sujetterne, dock så 
att dhe bägges uno eodemque tempore afgiordes, så hafwa dhe 
nu bägges alth sedhan hwijladt sigh...'. 
Johan Leijonbergh to Principal Assistant Secretary Bergenhielm,  
15th August, 1684.1  
Anglo-Swedish political relations bore an outwardly peaceful aspect through-
out the 17th century. No direct causes of friction arose in the form of territo-
rial aspirations or demands. After the small Swedish colonies in Africa and 
America fell into Dutch and finally into English hands, Sweden resigned 
herself to her position as a purely European power. After 1670, the feverish 
interest in transoceanic affairs which developed in Denmark, not to mention 
Brandenburg and the little state of Courland, was not shared by Sweden. 
England and Sweden regarded one another as pieces in the great political 
game of alliances which could be formed and then broken again. It was a 
completely unsentimental link between two nations which had no great 
direct contact with one another except in matters of trade. Consequently, 
motives and aims of a commercial nature were an important feature of the 
diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. Trade brought them togeth-
er, and then estranged them, when the commercial interests of the one 
country threatened to tread too closely upon those of the other. 
It is characteristic that around 1670 there were French and Dutch factions 
in the Swedish Court, but no English one." ... nor amongst the whole number 
of Senatores is there any one who may be extraordinarily inclined to oblige our 
1  "And as the Principal Assistant Secretary cannot fail to be aware that our 
Treaties with England have long expired, and that on the English side there has 
always been a desire to enter into a Commercial Agreement, but to separate that 
part of the previous treaties which might concern a mutual defensive alliance, 
and to settle this at a time which would be more convenient to England, but that 
we on the other hand could willingly admit a separation of the two subjects, pro-
vided they both be settled uno eodem tempore, and for this reason nothing has 
been done for a long time ...." 
The Diplomatic Framework: Treaty of Alliance 	 29 
traders ...", wrote an English observer of the 1670's from Stockholm.' 
It was not until the Danish and Dutch war of 1675-79 that people in Sweden 
began to take a serious interest in collaborating with England. The President 
of the Swedish Board of Trade (kommerskollegiet), the Finnish Baron Knut 
Kurck, was one of those who in the course of their official duties had already 
moved in English diplomatic circles in Stockholm during the critical war 
years. Later on it was Chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna — the leading figure in 
Swedish foreign policy from the 1680's onwards — who cultivated friendship 
with England as part of his policy of a balance of power with respect to 
France, a policy which has become known as 'Bengt Oxenstierna's political 
system'.2 
Sweden's commercial policy was preoccupied with safeguarding her ship-
ping in western waters in wartime, and with forcing the trade of Russia 
down to the Baltic. Sweden wanted to ensure her maritime lifeline with 
the salt harbours of the south, and to put into effect one of the dominant 
ideas in her commercial policy, the control of the Russian-Polish market. 
For all its daring, this aim was defensive and restricted to the Baltic area. 
The English aspirations were more far-reaching. Their object was to prohibit 
other nations from trading with the Baltic area. 
Holland and Sweden were England's most dangerous commercial com-
petitors in Baltic waters. Holland had her superior trade and shipping organ-
isation and her great capital resources to fall back on. Sweden's competitive 
strength was based on the exportable nature of her products, her sovereignty 
over important export harbours, and her potentialities as a maritime nation. 
Denmark also had a powerful navy, a large population, a strategic position 
at the entrance to the Baltic, and the great timber resources of Norway. 
But all this did not fully make up for the mercantile weakness of Denmark 
proper, which lay in her lack of export goods for the western market. 
At the same time England's political interests required a balance of power 
in the Baltic. For example, in 1678 the English envoy Sir Edward Wood re-
ported that he had had a confidential interview with Nils Brahe, a member of 
the Council, in which he declared that it was incompatible with His Britannic 
Majesty's interests that any ruler or state should be 'Master of the Baltick'. 
W. Allestree, secretary to the English envoy Sir Edward Wood, in a memoran-
dum on behalf of Sir Joseph Williamson, S.P., For 95/10, f. 97-118. 
2 The best modern survey of political combinations between powers interested 
in the Baltic, and of the general course of events in Baltic politics, most particu-
larly from the Swedish angle of approach, is given by G. Landberg, Den svenska 
utrikespolitikens historia [History of Swedish foreign policy] l:3, 1648-1697, 
Stockholm 1952. 
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In practice, this policy of balance of power meant not only trying to impede 
the rise to power of one particular Baltic country but also trying to prevent 
or break up dangerous coalitions.' Sir Philip Meadowe, an expert on Baltic 
affairs, thought that England and Sweden had a common interest in seeing 
to it that Holland and Denmark did not join forces.2 Keeping the Sound 
open for the naval stores traffic was the inflexible line taken by English 
Baltic policy from the 1650's onwards. In England's relationship with Hol-
land it was Dutch maritime and commercial superiority which was a con-
stant source of irritation. Here especially, English and Swedish diplomats 
were fighting the same battle. Each side kept inciting the other against the 
detested Dutchmen.3  
The Anglo-Swedish treaties during Cromwell's Protectorate and the first 
few years of the Restoration were treaties of alliance combined with trade 
agreements. This applies particularly to the Treaty of Friendship and Trade 
of 1661 which formed the cornerstone of Anglo-Swedish relations throughout 
the century, even when the validity of later treaties expired. The Anglo- 
1  Wood to Coventry 9/1/1678, Coventry Papers LXVI. 
2 (P. Meadowe), A narrative of the principal actions occuring in the wars betwixt 
Sueden and Denmark etc., 1677, 114-115, 170, 171. Cf. also Meadowe's An Essay 
to some considerations in reference to the Northern Kings in case of Warr happin 
betwitxt England and Holland, Coventry Papers LXVIII; Cf. J. Robinson, An 
Account of Sueden, London 1692. 
S S. I. Olofsson, Efter Westfaliska freden. Sveriges yttre politik 1650-1654 
[After the Peace of Westphalia. Sweden's external policy 1650-1654]. K. Vitt. 
Hist.Ant.Akad.handl. Hist. ser. 4, Stockholm 1958, 17-18, 28=29, 253 ff., 317 
ff., 484 ff. B. Grabbe, "Den nordiska allianstanken under holländsk-engelska kriget 
1652-1654" [The idea of a Nordic alliance during the war between Holland and 
England 1652-1654], Hist. Tidskr. 1938, 269 ff. B. Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik 
1660-1664 [Sweden's external policy 1660-1664], Stockholm 1932, 44-58, 
480 ff., 518 ff. B. Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik 1664-1668 [Sweden's external 
policy 1664-1668] I. K. Vitt.Hist.Ant.Akad.handl. 68, Stockholm 1949, 2 ff., 
61 ff., 83 ff. S. U. Palme, "Sverige och Holland vid Lundakrigets utbrott" [Sweden 
and Holland at the outbreak of the Lund War], Karol.Förb.Årsb. 1938, 86 ff. R. 
Hoffstedt, Sveriges utrikespolitik under krigsåren 1675-1679 [Sweden's foreign 
policy during the war years 1675-1679], Uppsala 1943, 184. Ambassador Sparre 
to K. of Sw. 20/7,27/7/1675. Leijonbergh to Ehrensteen 29/1/1675 (copy among L's 
letters to K. of Sw.). K. of Sw. to Leijonbergh 24/8/1677, Dipl.Angl. Wood to Coventry 
31/8/1672, 20/10/1677, Coventry Papers LXVI (cypher decoded p. 605). Cf. also 
Allestree to Williamson 20/7, 29/9, Oct. (undated), 1677. S. P. For., 95/10. Council 
of Trade and Plantations, minutes 9/12/1675 (C. 0. 391/1) and 2/7/1679 (C. 0. 
391/3). 
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Swedish treaty of 1665, which in 1674 was renewed in London for a further two 
years by Baron Pehr Sparre, was of of the same nature.' 
In contrast to its predecessors, however, the Renewal Agreement of 1674 
took a form which was a departure from precedent.2 After prolonged nego-
tiations in London, agreement was reached on the articles of alliance, but, 
at Sparre's suggestion, the commercial negotiations were finally referred to 
trade commissioners.3 Conflicts of interest between the two powers then post-
poned the solution of the questions of trade until the following century. 
The commercial matters which were excluded from the treaty of 1674 
were to be discussed by commissioners within six months of ratification 
of the treaty. In 1675 the necessary steps were taken on both sides to get 
these negotiations under way in London, where the Swedish resident, Johan 
Leijonbergh, had been instructed to act as the Swedish commissioner.4 But 
1 Cf. the literature quoted above and Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken 
[Swedish Foreign Policy], 77, 79, 133, 140-141, 163-165, 173, 187, 196. E. Eke-
gàrd, Studier i svensk handelspolitik under den tidigaste frihetstiden [Studies in 
Swedish commercial policy during the beginning of the period of freedom], Upp-
sala 1924, 57 ff., 66. A. W. af Sillén, Svenska handelns och naringarnes historia un-
der de tre Carlarnas tidehvarf [History of Swedish trade and industry during the 
Caroline era], Upsala 1871, 23. 
2 Through the Anglo-Swedish Agreement of 4/14 April, 1672, Sweden was 
afterwards drawn into the Anglo-French encirclement of Holland. One of the 
factors that tempted Swedish statesmen was the promise that this alliance would 
release them from commercial dependence on Holland. The treaty of alliance 
indirectly secured for English shipping free access to Swedish harbours, a valuable 
privilege in naval warfare. (Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken [Swedish Foreign 
Policy], 164 ff. A. A. von Stiernman, Samling utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och För-
ordningar etc.  angående Sveriges rikes Commerce, Politie och Oeconomie etc. III 
[Collection of Royal letters, statutes, edicts, etc. referring to the Kingdom of Swe-
den's commerce, policy, economy, etc.], Stockholm 1753, 947. Henry Coventry's 
letters of appointment. 11/7/1671. The Treaty of Alliance between England and 
Sweden 4/14 April, 1672. Originals of treaties, England N:o 9, RA. Draft of treaty 
in Coventry papers LXVIII). On the 30th September / 10th October, 1674, there 
was a renewal of the Anglo-Swedish alliance, which had formed an integral part 
of the system of alliances of both countries since the beginning of the 1650's. As 
an ally of France, Sweden was at that time well on the way to being drawn into 
the conflict between France and her enemies, Holland and the Habsburg. The alli-
ance gave the Swedes a line of retreat towards one of the two great Maritime Pow-
ers, Holland's old enemy England. (Treaty between England and Sweden, West-
minster, 30/9 (10/10) 1674, § 4, Originals of treaties, England N:o 10, RA). 
3 Sparre to K. of Sw. 8/9, 2/10/1674, Dipl.Angl. 
4 Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 6/12, 9/12/1675, 7/8, 21/11/1676 
(C. O. 391/1), Cal. S. P., Dom., 1675-76, 292. K. of Sw. to Sw. B. of T., 13/3, 
4/6/1675, RA. 
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there matters rested. In the same year, Sweden, as an ally of France, was 
drawn into war with Brandenburg. Her position further deteriorated when 
both Denmark and Holland joined the anti-French side. The only maritime 
power to remain outside the conflict was England. As the only neutral nation 
actively trading in the Baltic, the English could profit from the agreeable 
situation that had arisen without the aid of a new trade agreement.' This 
is presumably the reason why London did not seize its opportunity and did 
not act upon the urgent exhortations of the English colony in Stockholm to 
exploit the situation in order to obtain an advantageous trade treaty.2 
During his mission to London, Sparre received the impression that in 
leading English circles it was considered to be in the country's interest to 
allow the war in Europe to continue. In this way the contesting parties (France 
and Holland) would be weakened, and in the meantime England would 
enjoy a profit from trading.3 Now that Sweden had been drawn into the 
conflict, attempts were being made by her to have the Anglo-Swedish alliance 
put into operation. But these stranded on the English belief that Swe-
den was the aggressor in the war with Brandenburg.4 Instead, England tried 
to extract every commercial advantage from Sweden's isolated position. 
During the next few years Sweden's trade with Western Europe went over 
from Swedish and Dutch keels to neutral English ones.5 The Swedish govern-
ment gave in to some of the English demands for increased trading privileges. 
In 1675 English importers secured exemption for bonded goods in Lands-
krona and Helsingborg. Because of the fact that the regulations giving 
exemption or half exemption from some customs dues were temporarily 
extended to foreign merchants and ships, the latter were put on the same 
1 
 Anglo-Swedish relations between 1675 and 1679 and their international back-
ground are surveyed by Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken [Swedish Foreign 
Policy] 190-203 and Hoffstedt, 41 ff., 53 ff., 140 ff., 156 ff., 184, 188-189, 206 
—207, 214, 223 ff., 258. 
2 Sir Edward Wood to Coventry, 14/7/1675, Coventry Papers, LXVI. 
S 
"Engelland i medlertijd niuta profijt af Commercierna", Pehr Sparre's "Me-
morial för H. Secreteraren Swanhielm angående min commission här i Engeland" 
[Memorandum to Secretary Swanhielm concerning my commission here in England] 
(Windsor 9/6/1674, § 6), in Royal Secretary Swanhielm's reports 1674, Dipl. Angl. 
Same idea in Sparre's "Hwadh som widh den Engelske Commission ähr passerat 
A:o 1674" [What happened during the mission to England in 1674], Pehr Sparre's 
memoranda on his ambassadorial missions, 1672-76, Dipl.Angl. 
d 
 Pehr Sparre's instructions 3/4/1675, K. of Sw.'s letters to Sparre 1675-76, 
Dipl.Angl. "Memorial uhr Engellandh, A:o 1675 och 1676" [Memorandum on Eng-
land, 1675 and 1676]. Pehr Sparre's memoranda on his ambassadorial missions, 
1672-76, Dipl.Angl. 
5 See Francis Sanderson (Danzig) to Whitehall 10/8/1675, S.P., For., 88/14. 
The Diplomatic Framework: Treaty of Alliance 
	 33 
footing as domestic shipping as regards customs liabilities in Swedish har-
bours. The reduction in customs charges for English shipping was explicitly 
intended to give it an opportunity to out-distance the Dutch, who had lower 
operating costs, and consequently cheaper freights.' 
The Swedish authorities did not dare go further for fear of provoking Eng-
land's commercial rival, Holland, in spite of the fact that they were at open 
war with the Dutch. In fact, in the autumn of 1675 an agreement was signed 
between Sweden and Holland in Stockholm. All merchant ships which were 
provided with a certificate and were not carrying contraband were assured 
of a free passage by both warring parties. It is natural that under such cir-
cumstances Sweden hung back in her negotiations with England. At the same 
time the Swedes put off the exchange of treaties with Holland until the 
following summer, which shows their hesitation in the face of the exigencies 
of the moment and their policy of balancing between the two great maritime 
powers. It was also essential to keep an eye on Sweden's shipping inter-
ests with a view to the peaceful times which were bound to come. Swedish 
ships would then once more be asserting themselves in competition with 
Englishmen and Dutchmen.2 
It was not until 1677 that both Swedish and English circles began once 
more to be interested in putting new life into the trade negotiations. The 
Anglo-Swedish Alliance of 1674 had now expired. Sweden was in pressing 
need of allies who could be played off against the country's enemies. Under 
the protection of the treaty between Sweden and Holland, the Dutch ship-
owners had recovered from their set-backs in the Baltic during the first two 
summers of the war. The Danish-Dutch fleet controlled the entry into these 
waters. Against this background, Swedish diplomacy was trying to exploit 
the old antagonism between the two competing commercial powers, England 
and Holland. England's newly-acquired trading position in Baltic waters 
was beginning to be threatened. These were the strings that Sweden was 
pulling. 
In December 1677, the Swedish expert on trade with England, Abraham 
Cronström, Assessor to the Swedish Board of Trade, was sent to England.3  
1  von Stiernman, Kongl.Bref. etc. IV, Stockholm 1760, 138, 161, 163. Sir Ed-
ward Wood to Coventry 1/8/1676, Coventry Papers LXVI. William Allestree to 
Williamson 29/6/1677, S. P.,For., 95/10. K. of Sw. to Sw. B. of T. 23/1/1677, RA. 
2 
 Palme, 150 ff. K. of Sw. to Pehr Sparre, 10/11/1675, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of 
T. to K. of Sw. 7/4/1676, RA. 
3 William Allestree to Williamson 29/6 and 8/11/1677, S.P., For. 95/10. Johan 
Leijonbergh to Ambassadors Bengt Oxenstierna and Johan Paulin Olivekrans 
5/ l /1677, Dipl., Peace Congress Nijmegen. Johan Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 18/11/ 
1677, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to Council 27/9/1677. Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 6/6/1678, 
Olivekrans' Collection (draft), all in RA. 
3 
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Sweden's desperate situation in the early months of 1678 made her govern-
ment willing to make great concessions. The Swedish Council (riksrådet) 
 
went so far as to discuss the possibility of mortgaging to England some 
of the towns on the Kattegat and the Sound (Marstrand, Hälsingborg, 
Landskrona) or in Ingria (Narva, Nyen).1  These were towns with good 
situations as trading posts, either at the mouth of the Baltic or for contact 
with the Russian market. Even though proposals such as these never reached 
the other negotiating party, they show how serious the situation was judged 
to be. At the same time this proposition shows the efficacy which Swedish 
circles attributed to enticements of a mercantile nature in their relationship 
with England. Purely commercial experts were no longer sufficient as rep-
resentatives in London. Principal Assistant Secretary (kanslirådet) Johan 
Paulin Olivekrans arrived in London in March, 1678. In his report on the 
state of the negotiations, Olivekrans said that he thought that the complaints 
of the English colony in Stockholm over the stringent Swedish laws for 
aliens, and also over the tar and tobacco monopolies, should be met in or-
der to create goodwill. The trade agreement now became a trump card in 
the political game.2 It never had to be used, however. As is well known, the 
crisis was solved by cunning French diplomacy.3 The peace treaties between 
the warring European powers began to be drawn up in the summer of 1678, 
and during the following year Sweden began to participate in the blessings 
of this peace. 
The price paid for peace with Holland was a trade treaty (1679) between 
the two countries which was extremely unfavourable to Sweden, and indirectly 
equally unfavourable to England as well. For example, it meant the abolition 
of the differential customs rates for Swedish and Dutch ships in Swedish har-
bours in Germany and the Baltic provinces. For important Swedish export 
goods such as tar and timber the low customs tariffs of 1659 were to be 
granted to the Dutch. These regulations increased Holland's competitive 
ability.4 On the other hand, the treaty increased the possibility of an Anglo-
Swedish rapprochement in the commercial field. Sweden could continue with 
her game of balancing between the two rival western commercial powers. 
One important reason for this was the trading advantages that Sweden could 
offer. 
In the autumn of 1678, Johan Leijonberg, the Swedish resident in Lon- 
1  Council to K. of Sw. 2/1/1678, Council's letter to K. of Sw. 1678, RA. 
a Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 9/6/1678 (extract). Negotiations 1661-1679, Dipl. 
Angl. 
8 See, e.g., CaI.S.P., Dom. 1678, 561 (notes by Williamson). 
4 Ho//sledt, 336 ff. 
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don, informed the English government of the negotiations which were 
taking place in Nijmegen and of the Dutch plans to seize control of the 
Baltic trade once more. Leijonbergh began his memorandum by showing 
how trade between England and Sweden had not gathered momentum, in 
spite of the efforts which both governments had been making since the 
1650's. According to him, the English merchants were adopting a sceptical 
attitude towards the Swedish market. They felt that freights were high in 
comparison with the value of the goods, that the period during which sailing 
was possible was short, and that there was a limited sale for Swedish goods in 
England. Nor did the Swedish area offer a market for English export products. 
Leijonbergh dismissed these arguments as Dutch propaganda, however, and 
pointed out that rumours were also being spread in Sweden to the effect that 
England was inundated with Baltic products and that the English merchants 
did not abide by their contracts. He tried to show by means of shipping 
statistics how an English merchant fleet had maintained the traffic with 
the Baltic and with Sweden during the war. This showed the potentialities 
that lay in commercial connections between the two countries.1  
In reality, in 1678 as previously, Swedish policy was guided by a feeling that 
it would not do for Sweden to throw herself unreservedly into the arms of 
England. At the same time ambassador Johan Paulin Olivekrans wrote to his 
government from London that it would not be advisable to give special trading 
privileges to any one nation — Dutch, English or French. In his opinion this 
practice led only to a 'dominium' in trade; it was harmful to one's own 
subjects and it aroused indignation and enmity on the part of the nations 
discriminated against.2 But it was not easy to keep the balance, as events 
were to show. 
I  
Holland's mercantile superiority and her well-established position in 
the Baltic trade forced Swedish policy-makers to grant concessions such as 
those of the treaties of 1675 and 1679. Both these agreements caused great 
uneasiness in England because of the commercial advantages that Sweden 
Leijonbergh's memorandum to Charles I I, 17/11/1678, Leijonbergh's register of 
letters to the English authorities 1672, 91, Dipl.Angl. (also translated into German, 
enclosed with Leijonbergh's letter to K. of Sw. Nov. 1678.) 
2 Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 20/12/ 1675, Dipl.Angl. Wood to Coventry 2/6, 10/ll, 
28/ 1 1/1675, 17/5/1676, 17/7, 20/9/1677, 16/3/1678, Coventry Papers LXVI. 
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was thereby compelled to grant Holland.' In the summer of 1679, when 
an armistice in the North seemed likely, the problems of England's trade 
with the Baltic received careful consideration in England. The matter was 
discussed by the Privy Council; it was investigated by the Council of Trade 
and Plantations; the Eastland merchants and the Commissioners of the Cus-
toms were asked to give their opinion. A plan was drawn up for a trade agree-
ment, in which it is interesting to note that the projected agreement between 
Sweden and Holland served as a model. At the same time it was intended to 
incorporate everything that had been of value to England in her previous 
agreements with Sweden. One of the aims of the new project was the con-
firmation of England's position as 'most favoured nation', so as to be on equal 
terms with Holland. Consequently it was hoped that parity in customs 
matters between English and Swedish ships in Swedish harbours could be 
achieved.2 The fear that the competition of Swedish shipping might once 
more become dangerous is clearly present. The preliminaries for the opening 
of negotiations made slow progress, however. The plans were part of an 
English diplomatic offensive aimed at consolidating England's position in 
Northern Europe in the new situation which had arisen through the peace 
treaties. Emissaries were sent to Denmark and Brandenburg with offers 
of alliances and trade agreements? Sweden's turn would come later. 
In April, 1680, Philip Warwick was at last commissioned to go as as envoy 
to Sweden in order to convey the English wishes that negotiations for a 
treaty of trade and alliance should begin in London, to which place Sweden 
was expected to send an ambassador. Warwick did not reach Sweden until 
the autumn of that year. His first reports were optimistic. The feeling to-
wards England struck him as favourable. On the 13th of November, Warwick 
wrote from Stockholm, "And really most people do seeme here mightily to 
value ye English Nation. For they all confess we were extremely usefull to 
them in ye last warrs ...".4 He submitted to the Swedish government a 
note expressing the wish for trade and friendship between the two Kingdoms.5  
1  Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 9/6/ 1678 (extract). Negotiations 1661-79, Dipl. 
Angl. Cf. Landberg, Johan Gyllenstierna, 84 and A. Stille, Studier över Bengt Oxen-
stiernas politiska system och Sveriges förbindelser med Holstein-Gottorp 1689-1692 
[Studies in the political system of Bengt Oxenstierna and Sweden's relations with 
Denmark and Holstein-Gottorp 1689-1692], Uppsala 1947, 87. 
2 Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 2/7, 9/7/1679, C. 0. 391/3 (also in 
C. 0. 388/l). 
8 C. Brinckmann, "The Relations between England and Germany, 1660-1688",  
Eng. Hist.Rev. XXIV (1909), 449 ff. 
4 Warwick to Jenkins 13/11/1680, S.P.,For. 95/11. 
6 Warwick's note 1680. 'Engelska beskickningars memorial och noter' [Memoranda 
and notes of English embassies] 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. 
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In Stockholm, much was hoped from England. The new Swedish foreign 
policy, which in the eyes of posterity was to bear the signature of Bengt 
Oxenstierna, aimed at securing for the exhausted and enfeebled Sweden a 
long period of peace in the security of undisputed frontiers. Oxenstierna 
believed that through an association with the great maritime powers, especially 
Holland, he would be able to neutralise France, which was the explosive 
element in European politics. In Holland, important discussions were going 
on with the Swedes which were to result in the so-called Guarantee Treaty. 
Sweden was prepared for economic concessions in order to obtain her political 
objective, security.' This also gave rise to a well-disposed attitude towards 
the English emissary. In one of his talks with Warwick, Count Bengt Oxen-
stierna emphasised the value and importance of trade relations between 
England and Sweden. The two countries were exchanging substantial commod-
ities to their mutual advantage.2 
Warwick devoted his first few months to orientating himself in Swedish 
affairs and to contacting Swedish officials and English businessmen in Stock-
holm, Narva, Riga, Gothenburg, Norrköping and Västervik. The businessmen 
were given the opportunity to express their points of view either in person 
or by letter.3 During this period Warwick received constant instructions 
from London, where there was some anxiety whether the Swedes would 
accept the treaty of 1665 as a basis for negotiation. In the letters which the 
Secretary of State, Sir Leoline Jenkins, wrote to Warwick it is at the same 
time made clear that internal politics were absorbing the government's inter-
est at the expense of concern for England's relations with other countries.4 
Not until 21st January 1681 did Whitehall send Warwick formal authority 
to open negotiations for a treaty of trade and alliance in Stockholm.5 It 
had been hoped by the English that the negotiations would take place in 
London, and not on foreign soil. 
Warwick's instructions required that a trade agreement should be concluded 
before negotiations about an alliance could be entered into.6 Because of the 
1  Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken [Swedish foreign policy], 213 ff. K.-E. 
Rudelius, Sveriges utrikespolitik 1681-1684 [Sweden's foreign policy 1681-1684], 
Uppsala 1942, 12-48. G. F. Fåhraeus, Om förändringen av Sveriges allianssystem 
åren 1680-82 
 i dess sammanhang med de europeiska förvecklingarna [On the change 
in Sweden's system of alliances in 1680-82 as related to the complications in 
Europe], Uppsala 1891, 116 ff. 
2 Warwick to Jenkins 1/12/1680, S.P., For. 95/11. 
3 Warwick to Jenkins 10/11, 13/11, 27/11, 15/12/1680, S.P., For. 95/11. 
4 Cal. S.P., Dom. 1680-81, 4, 33, 47, 52, 86, 95, 126, 140. 
6 
 Warwick's letters of appointment 21st Jan. 1680/81, Originals of treaties, 
England N:o 11, RA. 
6 Warwick's instructions in S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153 
f. 16 ff. and in Rawlinson MS. A. 256, f. 199 ff., Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
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opposition between Crown and Parliament, those in charge of foreign affairs 
in England presented a divided front in the field of power politics. But the 
warring factions could be united in actions to the advantage of English corn-
mercial interests. The central point in Warwick's instructions may therefore 
be interpreted as a reflection of the current state of affairs in England. At 
the same time, the procedure in the case of the Swedish-Dutch negotiations 
was also at hand as an example well worth emulating — first commercial 
advantages, then political ties. These instructions also implied that the 
questions of trade and alliance should at least formally be kept apart. 
The plans for such a trade agreement began to take shape in London, and it 
was possible to send them over to Warwick for his inspection and comments.' 
Warwick also received 'directions' in the form of notes to the text of the 
agreement.2 Through his contacts with the English trade representatives 
in Sweden, Warwick added fresh points to the project. He called for 
the inclusion in the text of paragraphs demanding the breaking up of the 
Swedish companies which were monopolising the trade in salt, tobacco and 
tar. He also thought the treaty should contain guarantees of freedom of 
worship and give English subjects prompt help from the Swedish courts in 
legal matters.3 Also, the exclusive staple rights of the English in Gothenburg 
were thought to be threatened because of the fact that in 1681 staple privi-
leges had been extended both to Swedes and to other foreigners.4 
Nevertheless, the vital point was the parity in customs matters which the 
English were demanding in Sweden. In August, 1681, Warwick pointed out 
in a letter that the Swedish customs system of whole or half indemnity, along 
with Swedish customs indemnity in the Sound, gave the Swedes a superiority 
on the freight market under peace-time conditions. "If no more be granted... 
We must be content to that the Sweds Shipps have the employ on one side 
of y Baltick & keep wt we can on the other".' Warwick's dispatches were 
now more pessimistic than those of his first few months in Sweden. Further-
more, in the autumn of 1681, Anglo-Swedish relations entered upon a new 
phase. The Guarantee Treaty between Sweden and Holland had been signed, 
1 
 Correspondence over treaty plans at the beginning of 1681, (C.O. 388/1). The 
plans for the trade treaty with Sweden (49 clauses) exist in an English version 
in Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 112. 
2 Warwick's directions in S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State, 104/153, 
f. 17 ff. Cf. also Rawlinson MS. A. 256 and A. 292, f. 171 ff. 
3 Extracts from Warwick's dispatches, along with other correspondence over 
the treaty, are included in C.O. 389/11, p. 217-218, 220, 221-223, 226-228, 
279 —287. 
4 Cf. below, p. 44. 
5 Warwick to Whitehall 3/8/1681, S.P., For., 95/11. 
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but England could not be induced to accept this.' The right moment had 
passed for concluding a trade treaty advantageous to England, as Swedish 
interest in a commercial agreement had decreased when they saw that the 
English were unwilling to commit themselves to a political alliance. 
Originally, however, the Swedish government had serious intentions in re-
spect of a trade agreement. This was undoubtedly regarded in the first place 
as one link in a chain of agreements aimed at supporting the somewhat pre-
carious structure of the Swedish state. The preliminaries for the trade talks 
were begun on the Swedish side at the turn of the year, 1679-80. The 
Swedish Board of Trade ( kommerskollegiet ) issued no fewer than three 
pronouncements on the eve of the treaty negotiations. In all of them they 
reverted to the need for a clearer wording of those sections of the old trea-
ties which referred to shipping in wartime (contraband and freedom of 
passage). Swedish ships had suffered much at the hands of English priva-
teers during the last two wars between England and Holland. In matters 
relating to customs and excise, the Board wanted a greater degree of equality 
between Swedish and English ships in English harbours. In another respect, 
the Navigation Acts also came under fire. The demand that goods from the 
Levant, India and Spain should be re-exported only by means of English 
ships was held to be an injustice. After all, the English were allowed to export 
the products of the Russian-Polish market from Swedish ports in the Baltic 
provinces by means of English ships, provided they paid higher customs charges. 
The complaints of the English merchants over the treatment they were 
receiving in Sweden and the Swedish empire were dismissed with a refe-
rence to current laws and regulations. The Board thought that Plymouth 
was badly situated as a staple for the Swedes. Hull, Bristol or Portsmouth 
would be preferable.2 
While the Swedish Board of Trade was prepared for reciprocal treaty 
terms in relation to England, merchant circles in Stockholm were more 
hesitant. Ever since the negotiations with Warwick had got under way, the 
Swedes had been able to study and comment upon his draft treaty. The big 
merchants in Stockholm urged restraint. They were afraid that if the govern-
ment demanded increased rights for Swedish trade and shipping in England, 
the English would only reply by asking for greater advantages in Sweden. 
Active Swedish trade in England was neglible compared with the volume of 
Rudelius, 48-50. Cal. S.P., Dom. 1681-82, 513, 607 (Jenkins to Warwick). 
2 Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 1/1, 2/4, 17/12/1680. Cf. also abstract in 'Liggare, 
avskrifter och: anteckningar rörande handelstraktater 1641-1815' [Registers, copies 
and notes concerning Trade Treaties 1641-1815], Archives of Sw. B. of T., all 
in RA. 
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English business operations in the most important Swedish ports of ship-
ment.' This reveals the basic difference between the Swedish and English 
views on what should be the central point in a trade and navigation treaty. 
The shipping clauses were of vital interest to Sweden, whereas to England, 
with her great trading activities in Sweden, it was the sections dealing with 
customs and other purely commercial matters that were equally vital, if not 
more so. 
As has already been indicated, the attitude of those in charge of foreign 
affairs in Sweden towards the Anglo-Swedish treaty negotiations under-
went a gradual change during the year 1681 — to some extent because of 
reasons connected with Sweden's policy in general. Then came the rude 
awakening which the Swedish court received from Warwick's instructions 
to divorce commercial matters completely from the business of the alliance. 
Eventually it began to be clear that a trade treaty with England based on 
reciprocal terms was impossible so long as the rigorous regulations of the 
Navigation Acts remained in force. The material supplied by the Swedish 
resident in London clearly showed how bound England was to her 'navi-
gation system'. Swedish experts rightly doubted whether Whitehall was either 
able or willing to induce Parliament to make a breach in this armour.a 
1  Burgomaster and Council of Stockholm to Sw. B. of T. Letters received, Arch. 
of Sw. B. of T. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 9/7/1681, all in RA. 
8 Neither 'Kanslitjänstemäns koncept och mottagna skrivelser, Karl XI:s tid'  
[Drafts made by and communications received by Chancery officials in the 
reign of Charles XI] nor 'Memorialer, betänkanden o. relationer i utrikesärenden 
1680-83' [Memoranda, reports and relations concerned with foreign affairs 1680 
—83] (both in RA.) give any information on the course of the negotiations. Ad-
mittedly, the last-named series contains 'Ett oförgrijperligt [memorial] upsatt 
aff de avantager och desavantager som den 64/65 åhrs slutna Tractat medh Enge-
landh had medfördt' [An objective appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages 
which have been incurred by the treaty with England concluded in the year 64/65] 
(probably written by the Court Chancellor Edvard Ehrensteen, see below.) — but 
that is all. On the other hand, one volume in Engeström's collection, KB. (Engestr. 
B:IV, 2, 9) contains extracts made by the well-known collector Gustaf Benzel-
stierna (1687-1746) from 'public documents'. The volume consists partly of tran-
scripts of memoranda, mostly by Samuel Månsson Akerhielm (pp. 305-322, 
383-583). The first transcript of interest for our purpose is of the above-mentioned 
'Ett oförgrijpeligit etc.'. This enables us to suppose that the transcripts were made 
from documents in the Chancery archives which have now been lost. As a Chan-
cery official, Benzclstierna had access to the material in its archives, from which 
he diligently made excerpts. For the Swedish point of view see also, 'Extrait des 
 
ordres du Roy au Comte Bengt Oxenstierna contenant les points qui serviront 
de reponse à Monsieur Warwick, Envoy é Extraordfe du Roy de la Grande Bretagne', 
S.P., For. 95/11, f. 164-165. The only published account (though unfortunately 
defective) of the negotiations is to be found in a/ Sillén, 24-26. 
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From the memoranda which Secretary Samuel Månsson Akerhielm penned 
in 1681 for Swedish policy making, we see that the Swedes intended to 
give England the same commercial advantages as she had given the Dutch. 
These memoranda bear witness to a diligent study of the previous Anglo-
Swedish treaties, and at the same time they make it clear that there was 
considerable inclination in Swedish quarters to use the Swedish-Dutch 
trade treaty of 1679 as the basis for negotiations. A technical division of the 
subject-matter into two treaties, one of trade and one of alliance, is also 
recommended in Samuel Akerhielm's report, but this does not imply a retreat 
from the principal Swedish standpoint, that the two treaties should in reality 
be coupled together. 
Consequently, in the winter of 1681-82, the great question arose whether 
England could in any way be induced to sign an alliance be/ore she signed a trade 
treaty. The Swedish commissioners, Bengt Oxenstierna and the Court 
Chancellor Joel Örnstedt, were putting pressure on both Warwick and the 
Swedish Board of Trade, which was considering the problems involved. 
Warwick excused himself by referring to his instructions, and explained 
that the merchants in England were dead set on the 'commercial business': 
Warwick himself had recommended an alliance on Swedish terms. In Sep-
tember, 1681, he wrote home: "Our Trade here especially after Naval! 
Provisions as Iron, Pitch, Tarr, Hemp etc is very Considerable & ye vent of 
Cloth, Pewter, Lead, Silke & yarne Stockins & manufactures is not dispicable, 
So yt to give them a satisfaction in the Allyance may be worth ye while to 
secure & make free ye trade. Els the Hollanders will sonely clapp in and re-
establish them selfes in ye trade Mich our Engsh have worked them out of 
with great Industry".'' It was his fear of the ability of the Dutch to regain 
the position they had lost which Warwick gave as his reason for agreeing to 
Swedish wishes. In the letters to Warwick written by Secretary of State 
Sir Leoline Jenkins in December, 1681, we see quite unmistakably England's 
fear of committing herself to a political alliance and her inability to do so. 
England's exposed position, coupled with the deplorable financial state of 
the country, prevented her from embarking upon adventurous alliance 
projects or binding commitments.2 Moreover, reports were coming in from 
Leijonbergh in London that a section of the English court still wanted the 
alliance negotiations to be held in London. At the same time as Leijonbergh, 
Lord Conway, Sir Leoline's successor as Secretary of State, emphasised the 
fact that England was thinking of following the Dutch example by reaching 
an agreement on the commercial questions first of all. 
Warwick to Jenkins 21/9/1681, S.P., For. 95/11. 
2 Cal.S.P., Dom. 1681-82, 634, 648 (Jenkins to Warwick). 
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Sweden did not fail to react to this. Bengt Oxenstierna said that he sus-
pected that the English were just trying to gain time in the alliance nego-
tiations. Warwick had asked that the right to enjoy equal privileges with the 
Swedes in customs matters should also be granted to the English merchants  
sluring the summer of 1682.1  Doubts about the advantages of the 'commercial 
business' for Sweden had grown much stronger. Caution was now being 
advocated by the Swedish Board of Trade, also. In a letter to the Swedish 
commissioners (15th June, 1682) it pointed out that Sweden had no need 
of a treaty, as the trade she conducted was a passive one. It would profit 
only the English, who, moreover, would not be satisfied with less advantages 
than the Dutch. It is true that the Board points out that times can change, 
and that Sweden's trade could become an active one, but the tone is quite 
different from that of the previous autumn? 
The negotiations in Stockholm were accompanied by an exchange of notes in 
London. In a letter to the King of England (headed Kongsör, 30th Jan., 
1682) the Swedish monarch expressed his displeasure over Warwick's state-
ment that the Swedish court would prefer friendship with Holland to friend-
ship with England. Supplementary to the King's letter, Johan Leijonbergh 
submitted a memorandum on the 14th of April of the same year, in which the 
Swedish views are set forth. The Swedes felt it was now impossible to move the 
negotiations to London. The Swedish insistence that the plans for treaties 
of trade and alliance were cognate to one another was again emphasized," .. . 
the Treaty of Alliance should go before the Treaty of Commerce, as being 
the ground and basis whereupon the other ought to be builded". Accord-
ing to Leijonbergh, this is how it was with the negotiations between Swe-
den and Holland in 1679; the armistice re-establishing the previous trea-
ties was signed at the same time as the trade agreement. Warwick's pow-
ers covered both. The English now drew in their horns a little. In Lord 
Conway's reply (6th of May) the assurance was given that Stockholm would 
be allowed to remain the centre for the negotiations. But the English still 
clung stubbornly to the principle that the treaties of trade and alliance 
should be separate. England was waiting for the Swedes to submit a draft 
treaty of alliance. At the same time they wanted an answer to their own 
1  Cf. above, p. 36. K. of Sw. to Bengt Oxenstierna 8/11, 30/11/1681, 4/2/1682,  
Letters to the President of Chancery. Bengt Oxenstierna to K. of Sw. 12/11, 
16/11, 14/12, 30/12/1681, 2/2, 18/3/1682, Letters to Karl XI. Johan Leijonbergh 
to K. of Sw. 10/l/1682, Dipl.Angl., all in RA.  
2 
 Sw. B. of T. to Bengt Oxenstierna and Joel Örnstedt 15/6/1682, Letters to 
Bengt Oxenstierna, vol. 12, Oxenstierna collection, E 1169, RA. 
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suggestion for a trade and navigation treaty.1 
 The English views were also 
being presented in Stockholm by Warwick.2 
During the following winter a final attempt was made in Stockholm to 
get out of the deadlock. About the turn of the year, Warwick had frequent 
conferences with Oxenstierna and Örnstedt.3 There was still disagreement 
over the terms of the trade treaty. There were some stipulations in the treaty 
of 1661 which were of great value to the English, and they tried to hang on 
to these for as long as possible.4 Warwick regarded this treaty as if it were 
still in force. Swedish import duties, which Warwick thought too high, also 
proved to be a bone of contention right up to the very end. Finally, on the 
7th January, 1683, Warwick announced his intention of going to England 
for a while on personal business, but assured the Swedes of his eventual 
return. The trip was begun, but Warwick never reached London. He died 
in England on the 13th of March while on his way to the capital.5  
It is difficult to decide whether the final phase of Warwick's task in Sweden 
should be interpreted as pure shadow-boxing. But it is possible that neither 
side wanted to take the risk of breaking off the negotiations and therefore 
kept them alive by artificial means. John Robinson, who represented Eng-
lish interests in Stockholm after Warwick's departure and death, tried once 
more in the summer of 1684 to assure the Swedes of the seriousness of Eng-
land's intentions. According to him, the hitch had been caused only by War-
wick's death.a From the point of view of the treaty negotiations, however, 
1  S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153, p. 26 ff. (copies), War-
wick to Conway 22/3/1682, S.P., For. 95/12. 
2 Warwick's memorandum to Bengt Oxenstierna and Joel Örnstedt 16/6/1682, 
(Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591-1692), Dipl.Angl. 
3 Samuel Åkerhielm's protocol memoranda Dec. 1682 — Jan. 1683, (transcript) 
Engeström Coll. B:IV, 2, 9, (cf. above, p. 40). 
4 Cf. above, p. 39. 
6 Cal.S.P., Dom., 1683 January to June, 105. The Swedish proposal for a com-
mercial treaty (40 clauses), which Warwick took home with him, can be found 
(in Latin) in Rawlinson MS. A 292, f. 126 ff. As the Swedish draft omits the clauses 
referring to the staple in Gothenburg (see above, p. 38) and various other English 
postulates, the text and the number of clauses had shrunk in the Swedish version. 
The state of the negotiations at the time of Warwick's departure is very clearly 
illustrated by the surveys preserved in what remains of the archives of Warwick's 
embassy. (Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 18 ff.). In the present connection it is neither 
necessary nor possible to go into all the controversial interpretations of the minor 
issues between the English and the Swedes. 
6 John Robinson to Lord Godolphin 2/7/1684, S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secre-
tary of State 104/153. 
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the English diplomatic offensive which had been associated with Warwick's 
embassy failed to achieve the wanted results.' 
As we have seen, the consequences of the agreement between Holland and 
Sweden of 1679 gave the English no peace. The privileged position of the 
Dutch in the Kingdom of Sweden was the focal point of Warwick's negotia-
tions in Stockholm during the following years. Of all its commercial clauses, 
it was chiefly the fact that customs dues for Dutch ships in harbours in the 
Baltic provinces had been reduced to the same level as that for Swedish 
ships which threatened the promising English shipping activities at the east-
ern end of the Baltic. Exports of English salt to Sweden, considerable 
during the war, were also thought to be endangered. in 1684 the English 
began a new drive to obtain parity with the Dutch in the Baltic provinces. 
According to the Treaty of 1661, England should enjoy the same privileges 
as the 'most favoured nation'. The first representations led to no result.2 
This object was not to he achieved until later on, when the political scene 
had changed. 
Robinson to Lord Sutherland 19/3/1684 (copies in C.O. 389/11 and S.P., For. 
104/153). P.C. 2/70, p. 180. Godolphin to Robinson 5/6/1685, S.P., For. 104/153. 
Robinson's memorandum 27/6/1684. Memoranda and notes of English embassies 
1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. 
2 The outcome of the bonded-goods negotiations, which were coupled with the 
trade ones, was also a defeat for English interests. On the 17th January, 1681, 
the bond facilities in Gothenburg which had arisen from the treaty of 1665 were 
withdrawn. (von Stiernman iV, 303, Ekegård, 58, 69-70, 83-84, H. Almquist,  
Göteborgs historia I [The history of Gothenburg I], Göteborg 1929, 632 ff. II, Göte-
borg 1935, 246 ff.) Behind this step lay the dissatisfaction which had long been 
shown by the burghers of Gothenburg, the customs authorities, and the Swedish 
Board of Trade. (See above, p. 38. Burgrave, President and Councillor of Goth-
enburg to Sw. B. of T., 1/7/1670, Communications received, archives of Sw. B. 
of T. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 17/12/1680, 11/4/1681, RA.). The English were very 
anxious to be allowed to retain their privileges in Gothenburg. Some months after 
he arrived in Sweden, Warwick submitted a note (dated lst Dec., 1680) which 
included the request that the English merchants should continue to enjoy the 
right to keep goods in store without paying customs dues. He received the cold 
reply that the bonded warehouse led to misuse and fraud. Nationals of other coun-
tries had put in goods in the name of Englishmen. (Memoranda and notes of Eng-
lish embassies 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. Warwick to Whitehall 26/10/1681, extract 
from letter, S.P., For. 95/11. Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 182, answer of Sweden and 
Eastland merchants to Council of Trade and Plantations). Back in England, all 
parties concerned, officials as well as merchants, were single-minded about the 
use of the Gothenburg staple. During the course of the subsequent negotiations, 
therefore, Warwick attempted to get a restitution of bond privileges, but restricted 
to manufactured goods of the coarser sort. But nevertheless, he did not get any-
where with this matter either. For the discussion in England in 1681, see the corres-
pondence in C.O. 389/11, 279 ff., and P.C. 2/69 (9/12/1681), p. 424. 
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III 
When strong hands once more seized control of the half-disabled English 
state, and England was involved at the side of Holland in the great war 
with France, there was a perceptible need for a more solid and binding form 
of relationship between England and Sweden. The Dutch Stadtholder and 
King of England William III, was looking for allies. On Dutch initiative, the 
treaty of alliance and trade between Sweden and Holland had already been 
renewed in 1686. Sweden was in the process of getting involved in a league 
of states orientated against France. Two years later, Sweden by virtue of 
this alliance hired out troops to William of Orange, who was just then pre-
paring to land in England. 
At this juncture, the rivalry between England and Holland ceased to 
have a fundamental influence on power politics and commercial policy in 
the Baltic world. The conflict of interests between the two great maritime 
powers continued to find expression in commercial competition, of course, 
but the actions of the English and Dutch states were geared together after 
William of Orange took over in 1689.1  The two powers pursued a common 
Baltic policy during the war of the 1690's. For example, Dutch and English 
diplomats in Stockholm worked together to neutralise the effect of the 
measures taken against foreign merchants and factors.2 Swedish policy had 
very little opportunity to play off the two maritime powers against one anoth-
er, as it had done in the 1670's. It is very likely that here we have one of the 
reasons for the reserve and stinginess shown by Sweden during the trade 
negotiations with England at the time when Robinson and Duncombe were 
representing England in Stockholm. 
It was opposition to France which formed the political bond between the 
two maritime powers. Naturally, commercial rivalry still continued below the 
surface, but it was kept down by the threat from France. The French naval 
rearmament under the aegis of Colbert took place in the 1660's. The commer-
cial counterpart of this was a trade offensive to ensure the import of 'naval 
stores' from the Baltic area. It is true that this French maritime activity soon 
died out.3 But in any case, the English and the Dutch had a common interest 
1  Cf. 0. Burrish, Batavia Illustrata etc., London 1728, III, 569-570. 
2 Cf. below, p. 65. 
2 P. Boissonade & P. Charliot, Colbert et la Compagnie de Commerce du Nord 
(1661-1689), Paris 1930, passim. G. W. Cole, Colbert and the Century of French 
Mercantilism II, New York 1939, 83-103. P. W. Bamford, Forests and French Sea 
Power, 1660-1789, Toronto 1956, 4 ff., 14 ff., 136 ff. P. W. Bamford, "French 
Shipping in Northern European Trade, 1660-1789", Journ. Mod. Hist. 26 (1954), 
207 —209. 
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in blockading the enemy's supplies of naval stores and military contraband.1  
It is also true that from the English point of view there was a potential danger 
that the Swedish politicians and the Dutch merchants might in their several 
ways collaborate with the French, since France's trade with Northern 
Europe was effected through the Dutch. But these tendencies did not alter 
the fact that the political and commercial rivalry between the two great 
maritime powers was considerably dampened down after 1689.2 
In the summer of that year, when full-scale war had already broken out, 
an English envoy was sent to Stockholm. The person appointed was William 
Duncombe, a man with powerful connections in the City.3 His mission was 
chiefly concerned with policy in general, to draw Sweden into a coalition 
against France and to ease the tension between Sweden and other Baltic 
powers. This was threatening communications via the Sound and English 
trade with the Baltic. Robert Molesworth was working for the same end in 
Copenhagen.4 The idea was also to work on renewing the 1661 treaty of 
friendship and trade between England and Brandenburg which had long 
ago expired.5 But once more the aims of commercial policy were interwoven 
with those of power politics. In defiance of the doctrines of international 
1  Cf. below, p. 54. 
2 Cf. G. N. Clark, "Anglo-Dutch relations of commercial policy and the Nine 
Years War of 1688-1697", Verslag van de Algemeene Vergadering der Leden van 
het Historisch Genootschap etc. 1932, Utrecht 1932, 5-18. 
3 For Duncombe's embassy to Sweden see C. F. Firth (ed.), Notes on the Diplo-
matic Relations of England with the North of Europe. List of English Diplomatic 
Representations and Agents in Denmark, Sweden and Russia, and of those Countries 
in England, 1689-1762 (contr. by J. F. Chance), Oxford 1913, 20. British Diplo-
matic Instructions 1689-1789, vol. I, Sweden, 1689-1727 (ed. by J. F. Chance), 
R. Hist. Soc., Camden Ser. vol. XXXII, London 1922, 1-13. J. F. Chance, "William 
Duncombe's 'Summary Report' of his Mission to Sweden, 1689-92", Eng.Hist.Rev. 
XXIX (1924), 571 ff. G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War against French 
Trade 1688-1697. Publ.Univ.Manch. Hist.Ser. N:o XLII, Manchester 1923, 93, 100 
ff. R. Hatton, "John Robinson and 'The Account of Sweden'," Bull.Inst.Hist.Res. 
XXVIII (1955), 137-138. Stille, 156 ff., 202 ff. J. Thyrén, "Den första väpnade 
neutraliteten" [The first armed neutrality], Lunds Univ.Arsskr. XXI, XXII (1884--
85, 1885-86), Lund 1885-87, 84 ff., 103-137, Landberg, Den svenska utrikes-
politiken [Swedish foreign policy], 240 ff. 
4 Cf. C. F. Allen, Bidrag till Danmarks Historic under Christian V, samlede 
fra udenlandske Arkiver. [Contributions to the history of Denmark during the 
reign of Christian V, collected from foreign archives] VI. Engelske Relationer 
1689-99 [Relations with England 1689-99]. Danske Samlinger, Andre Raekke, 
IV (Copenhagen 1874-76), 211. H. Rachel, Die Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik 
Brandenburg —Preussens bis 1713. Acta Borussica. Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik 
I, Berlin 1911, 795. 
6 Cf. below, p. 88. 
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law, all trade with France was forbidden by the allies in August, 1689. Dun-
combe was given the more than delicate task of informing the Swedish 
government of the Anglo-Dutch decision to impose this blockade. At the 
same time, through both Leijonbergh in London and Duncombe in Stock-
holm, England offered Sweden a trade agreement as a complement to the 
proposed alliance.' The idea was that England and Holland should take 
over the trade that Sweden would lose by being cut off from France. It 
was really French access to 'naval stores' that the allies principally wanted 
to block. Swedish merchantmen were offered an Anglo-Dutch convoy system 
to protect them from French privateers. Duncombe immediately began 
preliminary investigations. He got in touch with the English agents in 
Riga and other ports in order to get their views on the final shape which 
the treaty should take.2 In October, Duncombe was given the authority 
to conclude the treaty of alliance and trade with Sweden; in December, 
he received a Swedish counter-proposal. But the negotiations on both the 
political and commercial aspects petered out inconclusively. In spite of the 
fact that the palms of Bengt Oxenstierna and other influential advisers of 
the King had been 'greased', the Swedish government was not disposed 
to give up either its position of neutrality or its trade with France.3 As 
is well known, the ruthless Anglo-Dutch violations of neutral shipping led 
instead to a collaboration between Sweden and Denmark for the protection 
of Nordic shipping. Duncombe left Sweden in the autumn of 1692 with his 
mission unaccomplished. His work had failed, in spite of the support of 
Dutch diplomacy, now co-ordinated with English.4 
In the year this happened, there was speculation in Sweden on the advan-
tages which the neutral role could offer. In spite of English, Dutch, French 
and Spanish privateering, the Swedish merchant navy was keeping to the 
seas.5 But gradually the disadvantages of the position became apparent. The 
Swedes, who had previously refused to acknowledge that the treaty of 1661 
was still in force, now changed their attitude. A bad agreement was better 
than none at all. In 1690, Leijonbergh exerted pressure in London to get the 
shipping and commercial clauses of the 1661 agreement declared valid.5 From 
1  Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 13/8/1689, Dipl.Angl. 
2 Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 25/9/1689, S.P., For. 95/13. 
3 Samuel Akerhielm's memorandum, etc., 1689 (transcript), Engeström Coll., 
B:IV, 2,9 (cf. p. 40) Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 5/3, 12/3, 19/3, 22/3, 26/3, 
5/4, 19/4/1689, S.P., For. 95/13. 
4 Cf. Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 30/3/1695, S.P., For., 95/14. 
B Cf. below, p. 118. 
3 Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 29/8/1690, Dipl.Angl. 
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the Swedish point of view, therefore, it was a great gain when this treaty was 
recognised by England in March 1693 as still valid. In his final report, Dun-
combe was able to ascribe the changed attitude towards the question of the 
validity of this treaty to such people as Baron Fabian Wrede, Lord High 
Chamberlain and President of the Swedish Board of Trade,' incidentally 
a Finn, one of the most zealous advocates of a resolute and active Swedish 
trade and shipping policy. 
IV 
During the next few years, not the slightest interest in trade negotiations 
was shown at the highest levels of the foreign departments of either Sweden 
or England.2 In 1695, John Robinson, England's permanent charge d'affaires  
in Stockholm, could therefore sum up the situation and the course of events 
as follows:3  
"The Commerce between the two Nations is founded upon the Treaty 
made at London anno 1661, which for a time was superseeded by that of 
1664%b, but upon its expiration took place again & has been declared by 
both sides to be a subsisting Treaty. In the year 1680 a Project of a new 
Treaty of Commerce was sent from England to Mr Warwick with a Com-
mission & Instructions to treat here. Little progress was then made. It was 
also intended Mr Duncombe should make a Treaty of Commerce, but that of 
Allyance not succeeding, that designe was deferr'd. So that the Treaty 
of 1661 is still the rule of Trade between the two Nations". 
Some months later, however, Robinson was approached by the Swedes 
about the possibilities for a trade agreement. He was able to report that 
what had been Sweden's standpoint in 1681 was now England's. A treaty 
of alliance must first be concluded, and then a trade agreement could be 
built up on that basis.4 
It is possible that Sweden's readiness to begin fresh negotiations was 
connected with disquieting items of news which were coming in from Lon-
don. Johan Leijonberg's successor, Christoffer Leijoncrona, gave warn-
ing in his dispatches of an Act for the encouragement of privateering 
which was being prepared. In conjunction with the English Eastland mer-
chants, Leijoncrona worked against this new Bill. He made propaganda 
1  President in Kammar- och kommerskollegiet.  
2 Chance, William Duncombe, 582-583. 
8 
 Robinson to Trumbull 29/5/1695, S.P., For. 95/14. 
4 Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 11/3/1695, S.P., For. 95/14. 
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against it both by disseminating leaflets and by trying to influence members 
of both Houses by word of mouth. One argument in the propaganda against 
it was that it conflicted with England's treaties. It was passed by the Com-
mons in 1695, but rejected by the Lords. In 1696 the Bill was reintroduced, 
and this time it was also passed by the Lords, though in a moderated form.' 
The same year saw the reorganisation of the Council of Trade and Plan-
tations, now called the Board of Trade. This became a permanent depart-
ment of the Civil Service, a body with salaried members and employees. 
One of its first assignments was the preparation of a trade agreement with 
Sweden. The war in Europe was drawing to a close and it was time to pre-
pare for peace. The English and Dutch factors in Sweden were at this time 
being hard pressed by the authorities as a reprisal for the attacks on Swe-
dish shipping.2 At the same time, some Swedish circles had again become 
anxious to renew the trade treaty with England. The Swedish point of view 
was epitomised in an account of the work of the Chancery drawn up in 
April 1697, shortly after the death of Charles X I and with the end of the 
war in Europe in view. The war had shown the need for a treaty of trade 
and navigation. The treaty of 1661 had been declared valid, but it was 
imperative that a better one be brought into being. A defensive alliance 
with England would also be advantageous. Privateering on the one hand, 
and the English complaints about the treatment of her commercial agents 
and about the increases in Customs charges on cloth on the other, were 
straining relations between England and Sweden. It was disquieting to 
learn that England was making arrangements to obtain her import require-
ments of goods normally bought in Sweden from elsewhere, particularly 
Denmark.3 In August of the same year Bengt Oxenstierna was able to make 
a statement in the Swedish Council to the effect that Robinson had con-
veyed the information that his sovereign was not only willing to enter into 
an alliance on behalf of England and Holland but was also interested in 
trade talks. The news were favourably received by the Council. It was stated 
that friendship with England was important for the sake of trade. England's 
1 G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 57-59. Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/2 (en-
closing the pamphlet 'Reasons humbly offered ... in relating the Privateers Bill') 
26/2, 2/4, 23/5, 3/5/1695, 28/1, 4/2, 24/4/1696, Dipl.Angl. 
2 Cf. below, p. 65 ff. 
8 'Relation om Sweriges Rikes tillstånd, i anseende til det utrikes werket, upsatt 
den 30 April 1697' [An account of the state of the Kingdom of Sweden in regard 
to foreign affairs, drawn up on the 30th April, 1697] printed in S. Loenbom, Hand-
lingar till Konung Carl X I:s Historia [Documents for a history of Charles XI],  
vol. 7, Stockholm 1766, 103-110. 
4 
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major role in Sweden's export trade must have been clear to the councillors, 
in spite of all the Francophile tendencies that were again becoming evident. 
In the autumn of the same year, when the peace treaties had been con-
cluded, Leijoncrona discussed the treaty question with the Secretary of State 
Sir William Trumbull, who pointed out that the time to conclude this had 
now come.1  Trumbull said that he had in his keeping Warwick's plan fora trade 
treaty. But it was not Warwick's plan in its original form that the- Board 
of Trade eventually received in December of that year from Trumbull's 
successor, James Vernon, to be submitted as the basis for preliminary dis-
cussions.2 John Robinson in Stockholm had revised it. For example, the 
clauses referring to the staples in Gothenburg and Plymouth have been 
struck out in the copy which is now in the Board of Trade's archives.3  
But the plan was not to be presented even in the form that Robinson had 
now given it. The Board of Trade also subjected it to a thorough scrutiny. 
At the beginning of its career this new branch of the Civil Service was zeal-
ous and effective.4 The Baltic and North Sea merchants were consulted, 
likewise the Customs authorities. The Eastland Company was particularly 
worried about the high import duties on English cloth which Swedish pro-
tectionism in respect of textiles had forced into being. Eventually, on the 
1st of June 1698, the Board of Trade was able to send to the Secretary of 
State, James Vernon, the first draft of a trade agreement, containing 44 
clauses.5  
1  Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/11/1697, Dipl.Angl. Rådsprotokoll [Proceedings of 
the Swedish Council] 19/8/1697 (Bergenhielm), RA. 
2 James Vernon to B. of T. 15/12/1697. Cal.S.P., Dom. 1697, 514. B. of T, 
Journals 16/12/1697, C. O. 391/10. 
3 C.O. 390/1 (Drafts of Commercial Treaties 1654-1713) contains two drafts 
for a trade agreement with Sweden of very similar content. The first (undated) 
contains 45 articles, and begins with a preface giving some information about previous 
treaties. This may be connected with Warwick's (or Duncombe's) embassy. The 
second (with contemporary dating 1698) contains 44 articles (after paragraphs 
24-27 giving the regulations about the staples in Gothenburg and Plymouth had 
been struck out by Robinson) and is the one mentioned in the text. The draft in 
question is, in its revised form, of similar wording to a draft entered in the Board 
of Trade's Entry Book, 1698-1700 (C.O. 389/16, f. 60 ff.). 
' On the Board of Trade's sphere of activity, cf. O. M. Dickerson, American 
Colonial Government 1606-1765. A Study of the British Board of Trade, its Rela-
tion to the American Colonies etc., Cleveland, Ohio, 1912, 20 ff., 61 ff. A. H. Basye, 
The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1748-1782. Yale Hist.Publ. 
Misc. XIV, New Haven, 1925, 24 ff. G.A. Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, Yale 
Hist.Publ.Misc. XXI, New Haven, 1932, 296 ff., 330 ff. 
5 For the Board of Trade's handling of this question, see C.O. 389/16, p. 29 
ff., 37 ff., 52 ff., 58-59, 60 ff., C.O. 391/10, p. 373 and C.O. 391/11, p. 67, 70, 
74, 78, 85, 91-94, 101-102, 107, 115, 132. 
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This digging up of the old proposals was no good omen for success. Warwick's 
negotiations had not come to grief merely because the other side insisted 
on coupling the trade agreement with a treaty of alliance: certain points 
in his draft treaty had aroused hostility in Sweden. 
Preparations for negotiations were also going on in Sweden. The ship-
owners of Stockholm submitted far-reaching requests. In the name of 
reciprocity they demanded that English ships should be forbidden to im-
port into Sweden the products of countries other than their own — in oth-
er words, the application of the English Navigation Acts to Swedish cir-
cumstances. In Gothenburg, they appealed to the same principle over the 
question of bonded goods. If the English wanted to renew their bond priv-
ileges in Gothenburg, this was good reason to ask for similar privileges 
in London in return. Also, the principle that 'free ships make free goods' 
should be recognised, privateering should be suppressed, and the war-time 
increase in customs charges on Swedish ships and goods in England should 
be abolished.' The attitude of the Swedish Board of Trade was of even 
greater consequence. The Board's report is one long complaint about the 
treatment of Swedish merchants and seamen in England. Its requirements 
as to the draft of the treaty are summarised under these four main points.2 
The rule that 'free ships make free goods' should be recognised. The English 
colonies should be opened to Swedish shipping. The wartime customs increas-
es (introduced in 1690) should be abolished. Ships owned in Sweden but 
built abroad should be given the right to carry Swedish goods to England. 
This was what the Swedes wanted to understand by 'reciprocity'. Taken 
together, these expressions of Swedish opinion are clear evidence of the 
feeling that English protectionism in trade and shipping was oppressive 
to active Swedish shipping, which had enjoyed a period of great success 
during the war. Nor did they bode well for the success of the negotiations 
which were about to start. 
V 
The centre of diplomatic activity in 1698 was at The Hague, where the 
Swedish ambassadors Nils Lillieroot and Carl Bonde had been authorised 
to conclude an alliance and a trade treaty with England and Holland. In 
'Memorial av Stockholms redare' [Memorandum by the shipowners of Stockholm] 
(undated), Handel och sjöfart 1 [Trade and Shipping 1], Kammararkivet. Supple-
ment to the memorandum of the Commissioner Uthfall, concerning the advantages 
to Gothenburg of a trade treaty with England, 1700. [Trade and Shipping 9], RA. 
2 Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 15/9/1698, RA. 
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March 1699, the English ambassador, Sir Joseph Williamson, was able to 
announce his sovereign's assent to a Swedish proposal (§ 6 in Lillieroot's 
instructions) to move the trade talks to Stockholm.' The negotiations for 
the alliance at first made slow progress at The Hague. The old antipathy 
towards joining a league directed against France once more began to reappear 
in Swedish policy. Bengt Oxenstierna, who had aimed at forming connections 
with the anti-French camp, had been pushed aside under the new regime. 
However, the Holstein question and the threatened encirclement of Sweden 
by Denmark, Poland and Russia forced the Swedish negotiators to come to 
a decision. In January 1700, a defensive alliance was concluded between 
Sweden and the Maritime Powers.2 
But what became of the trade negotiations? The responsibility for these 
now rested with John Robinson in Stockholm.3 Through his long diplomatic 
service in Sweden he had acquired an unrivalled knowledge of Swedish 
affairs, and in 1696 had been promoted to Resident Minister.4 It is evident, 
however, that Robinson had his doubts when faced with this difficult task. 
He wished he had detailed instructions from Whitehall, of the kind that 
Warwick had been given for his guidance. It was difficult to decide where 
English diplomacy in Stockholm should stand firm, and where it should 
give way. The modern principle that 'free ships make free goods', which 
was part of the Swedish treaty plans, gave Robinson much food for thought. 
In a letter to Secretary of State Vernon (27th May, 1699) he pointed out 
the advantages this would give to a neutral Sweden in the event of a new 
large-scale war. The Board of Trade, who were consulted on this matter, 
took a more liberal-minded attitude. The old system of inspections and 
1  Nils Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 25th Febr./7th March, 1699. Letters from the 
Ambassadors Lillieroot and Bonde to K. of Sw., Dipl.Holl. James Vernon to Ambas-
sador Sir Joseph Williamson in The Hague, 13/1, 7/3/1699. Cal.S.P.,Dom. 1699 
—1700, 18, 85. 
2 J. Rosén, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia [History of Swedish foreign 
policy] I1:1, 1697-1721, Stockholm 1952, 38-70. J. Milne, "The Diplomacy of 
Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697-1709", Trans. 
R.Hist. Soc. 4th Ser. vol. XXX (1948), 76-78, Nils Lillieroot's authorisation 
to negotiate the renewal of previous trade treaties between Sweden and England 
15/8/1698. Originals of Treaties, England N:o 13. Instructions to Extraordinary 
Ambassador Count Nils Lillieroot 15/8/1698, K. of Sw. to Lillieroot. Letters from 
K. of Sw. to Lillieroot, 1698-1699, Dipl.Holl. Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 25th Febr.  
/7th March, 1699. Letters of Ambassadors Bonde and Lillieroot to K. of Sw., Dipl. 
Holl. Christoffer Leijoncrona to Lillieroot 13/1, 21/4, 1699, Leijoncrona's letters 
to Lillieroot, Dipl.Holl., all in RA. 
8 Robinson to Ambassador Williamson, 1/2/1 699, S.P., For., 95/15. 
4 On Robinson's career and activities, see Hatton (and literature cited therein). 
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sea-passes of the 1661 treaty had led to gross fraud on the part of the Swedes 
during the late war. In principle, the Board of Trade preferred the more 
modern rule, but admitted that Robinson should fall back on the regulations 
of 1661 if the need arose." In July 1699, Robinson handed over to the Swedish 
government the English proposals for the trade treaty.2 
When the Great Northern War broke out in March 1700, the Maritime 
Powers proved loyal allies to begin with. Their warships policed the Sound. 
Sweden was provided with cloth and gunpowder for her army requirements. 
Naturally, the Maritime Powers hoped at the same time to look after their 
own interests. The outbreak of hostilities led the English to believe that this 
was the golden opportunity to conclude the coveted treaty which they had been 
haggling over for more than twenty years.s In March 1700, the Board of Trade 
had informed the Commons that the proposals for a trade agreement were 
ready and were intended "Not only to preserve the trade and vent of our 
Northern Draperies in that Country, but also to remove the many difficulties 
that His Majesties Subjects trading into those parts have of late years lain 
under".4 But there was to be yet another hitch. Robinson's appraisal of the 
situation in the autumn of 1697 turned out to be right. At that time he had 
written in a letter to the English delegates to the Hague Conference:5  
"In point of commerce both Nations are very uneasy, the Suedes on acct 
of the great hardships they think to have suffer'd by the bringing up & 
confiscation of so many of their Ships & Goods, & our Merchts on acct 
of the Laws that have been made to restrain their stay & trade in this 
country to 4 months in a year, full satisfaction of all damages sustain'd 
in the former case, being the condition of relief in the latter. These difficulties 
stand in the way of a new Treaty of Commerce, of which there is other-
wise great occasion, & I think inclination enough on both sides." 
Robinson's dispatches during the following period show the obstinate atti-
tude of the Swedes. The Swedish demand for reciprocity could not be brought 
into line with the system established by the Navigation Acts.6 On the whole, 
it was difficult to compare the English system with the Swedish system of 
1  Cf. above, p. 30. Correspondence on this subject is found in C.O. 389/16, p. 
302 ff., 372 ff. See also Vernon to Ambassador Williamson 21/4, 25/4/1699, the 
same to B. of T. 25/5/1699 and Cal.S.P.,Dom. 1699-1700, 118, 141, 144, 193. 
2 Robinson to William Blathwayth 26/6/1700, BM, Add. MSS 35106. 
3 Rosén, 82. Cf. Cal. Treasury Papers 1696-1701/02, 499. 
4 B. of T. to the Commons, 22/3/1700, C.O. 389/17, p. 29. 
5 Robinson to Ambassador Williamson 4/12/1697, S.P., For. 95/15. 
6 E.g. Robinson to Sir Charles Hedges, together with letter from Hedges to 
B. of T. 18/7/1701, B. of T. to Hedges 24/7/1701, C.O. 389/17, p. 209-213. 
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whole and half customs indemnity, which had been re-introduced after 1684. 
In spite of the fact that Leijoncrona in London believed that he could de-
monstrate to his government that there was a greater difference between 
customs charges for domestic and foreign shipping under the Swedish system 
than under the English one, the Swedes stood firm in their demands.1  Robin-
son had been instructed by Whitehall to ask for recompense for England's 
services in the form of a favourable trade agreement, but this claim fell on 
deaf ears.2 To the Swedes, the English proposals still contained two tough 
nuts to be cracked: one was the English demand that in the matter of cus-
toms' dues they should receive most favoured nation treatment in the Baltic 
provinces, thus obtaining full parity with the Dutch; the other was the com-
plicated problem of the English merchants' residence in Sweden.3 It is true 
that limitations on their period of stay were suspended after the outbreak 
of war, but this was only for the time being. In 1702, a new attempt was 
made by the English for an agreement concerning trade during the war.4 
Negotiations were, however, complicated by two factors: after the outbreak of 
the War of the Spanish Succession the English and the Dutch were exerting 
pressure in order to blockade French supplies of Swedish products; and the 
Swedes were demanding compensation for the privateering which had taken 
place during the previous war.5 When Robinson left Sweden early in 1703 
to join the Swedish headquarters in Poland the negotiations were de facto 
broken off for many years. 
VI 
It was not until after the closing of the Sound by Denmark's re-entry into 
the war that the Swedish attitude towards the English proposals gradually 
underwent a change.° Sweden's military reverses at the hands of Russia, and 
her distress at home, had softened her attitude by 1719, when Ambassador 
1  Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 23/8, 13/12/1700, with enclosed memoranda, Dipl. 
Angl. 
2 Cf. orders to Robinson in Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions I, Sweden, 
20 ff., 24 ff. 
a See further p. 71. 
4 See S.P., For., 95/15, f. 129 ff. and memorandum from Eastland Company 
and Russia Company C.O. 389/17, p. 398-404, C.O. 388/8, D 42, E 10, E 11 and 
C.O. 391/14, p. 116, 118, 321, 363-364, 383, 410-411. 
6 Milne, 79, 83-84. Ekegård, 172-176. 
6 Ekegård, 177. The English agent Robert Jackson to Henry St. John 10/2/1711, 
reported in Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1708/9— 1714/1 5, 362. Also 
in C.O. 388/15, M 15. 
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Lord Carteret arrived in Sweden in the capacity of peace mediator. The 
price paid by Sweden for England's helping hand was the Anglo-Swedish 
Alliance of 1720. Article X I I in this gave England the position of 'most 
favoured nation' and at the same time gave the English factors an unlimited 
period of residence. The country's desperate situation — a Russian inva-
sion of the main provinces of the Kingdom was imminent — had forced 
concessions from this major Northern power, now clearly disintegrating. The 
new alliance resuscitated the confederations of 1700. But it had significant 
additions, commercial advantages which the English had not succeeded in 
stipulating on previous occasions. On the other hand, the question of renewing 
the trade treaty was once more postponed, in spite of the fact that during the 
negotiations it had been laid down that Article XI I should be expanded into 
a separate commercial treaty.' 
Rosén, 161 ff. J. F. Chance, George I and the Northern War, London 1909, 
333-359, 377 ff. Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions I, Sweden, 105 ff. Eke-
gdrd, 181 ff., 421 ff. E. F. Heckscher, "Produktplakatet och dess förutsättningar"  
[The Edict on Production and its postulates], Hist. stud. tillägn. Harald Hjärne[His-
torical studies presented to Harald Hjärne], Uppsala 1908, 723, 731, 739, 764. 
The Baltic Staple Products in 
Anglo-Swedish Relations 
1. The Position of the English Purchasers of Iron in Sweden 
'Altså til at här effter hindra och förekomma sådant, Hafwa 
Wij godt funnit, såsom Wij och här med stadge, thet ingen frem-
mande, begynnandes til at räkna ifrån näst fölliande åhr 1674,  
skal hafwa mackt at sig uthi wåra Städer til den ändan uppehålla, 
öfwer theras rätta liggedagar, theras Gods och Waror ther igenom 
at uthbringa. Hwilka liggedagar Wij, effter Handels-Ordonantien, 
hafwa welat determinera til twå Månader om åhret, och intet 
ther öfwer, med mindre the sedan willia afläggia Borgare Edh 
och draga Stadrens tunga.' 
Handels Ordonantien (1673).' 
During the period examined English commercial politics in Sweden were 
partly devoted to treaty negotiations. They also comprised a series of attempts 
to make the Swedish administration facilitate the work of the English trad-
ing agents. The representatives of English commercial houses operated 
in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Riga and Narva. These factors and residents func-
tioned as buyers of Swedish export products, and sold English cloth and other 
commodities to the citizens of the towns. English merchants were a social 
and economic force in the Swedish community, in that they subsidised 
Swedish heavy industry by providing the working capital. In 1695, the 
English diplomat John Robinson gave the following account of the English 
merchant colonies in Stockholm and other towns, "There are at Stockholm 
at present about 10 or 12 English Factors. They yearly import into Sweden 
English Manufactures to the value of about 20 or 25000 £. They export 
Iron to the summe of near 70000 £, Pitch and Tarr about 25000 £, Copper, 
Wire, Dealboards etc about 10000 £. In all they deal to the summe of about 
120000 £ p annum ... There are also in Gottenburg two or three English 
1 
 "And so, in order to hinder and prevent this hereafter, We have deemed good, 
as is hereby stated, that with effect from the next following year, 1674, no foreigner 
will be empowered to reside in our towns, with the object of exporting his goods 
and products, over and above his legitimate period of residence. This period of 
residence We have decided in accordance with the Trade Ordinance to determine 
as two months per year and no more, unless he is then prepared to swear the Oath 
of Citizenship and take up his share of the Town's burdens." Trade Ordinance 
(1673). 
The Baltic Products in Anglo-Swedish Relations 
	 57 
Merchants and no more in the Dominium of Sweden besides those at Riga 
and Narva."1  
The English were unfavourably regarded by the local bourgeoisie in the 
main staple ports, who would themselves have been. glad to act as agents 
for the firms in London, Hull and Newcastle. As they were not Swedish 
subjects, these foreigners were exempt from local and national taxation —
a circumstance which increased their ability to compete, but not their popu-
larity. But the foreigners were also handicapped by orders and regulations 
concerning their trade. 
Following the continental pattern, Sweden's internal commercial policy 
drew a sharp distinction between staple towns and non-staple towns (upp-
stdder).2 As is well known, the right to trade and shipping with foreign 
countries was to be restricted to the former. The foremost place in the pro-
gramme was given to Stockholm, the capital of the Kingdom. The citizens 
of non-staple towns, as well as country producers and consumers, were 
barred from direct contact with the foreign merchants who visited Sweden, 
though exception was made for specially privileged groups such as the no-
bility. The position of the foreign merchants was made the subject of detailed 
regulations, the object of which was to give the citizens of staple towns the 
advantage over the foreign residents. At the beginning of the 17th century 
their period of residence was fixed at eight weeks per year. Their goods had 
to be kept in warehouses rented from the town. Goods sold by weight had 
to be weighed on the town's scales. Retail sales were forbidden. They were 
not allowed to own house property, but had to lodge with local citizens 
under the supervision of their landlords. If they died, one third of their 
property went to the state and the town; if they left, one sixth. The laws 
concerning staples and aliens were complementary to one another. Their 
object was to protect domestic commerce and industry by ensuring that 
all the profits of the intermediary trade with the foreign agents went to 
the citizens of the staple towns. The Aliens' Laws were of ancient origin 
in the Swedish towns, but they began to be intensified when in the 17th 
century official commercial policy was aimed at increasing Sweden's active 
trade .3  
Robinson to Whitehall 28/12/1695 (extract), C.O. 389/15, p. 12. 
2 For the nearest continental prototypes, see H.Rachel, "Die Handelsverfassung 
der norddeutschen Städte im 15. bis 18. Jahrhundert", jahrb. fiir Gesetzgebung, 
Verwaltung und Volkwirtscha/t XXXIV, 105 ff. 
8 E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. II, 2nd ed., London 1955, 73 ff. E. F. 
Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden, Cambridge, Mass. 1954, 109 ff. In 
greater detail in Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia l:1 [Economic history of 
Sweden], Stockholm 1935, 246 ff.; 1:2, 674-675 and Heckscher, Produktplakatet 
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The system had also existed for a long time in Sweden's possessions on 
the South coast of the Baltic. But whereas it was uniformly applied in Sweden 
proper and in Finland, there were local variants of Alien's laws in the Baltic 
provinces. The restrictions went furthest in Riga, where the citizens kept 
the intermediary trade in their own hands. The least rigorous Aliens' laws 
were in Narva, where — as has been noted — the western residents had the 
right to direct trade with the Russians in all important products. 
As one might expect, the law was one thing and the carrying out of its 
provisions was something else. Time after time it was found necessary to 
insist on the application of the regulations concerning aliens in the trade 
ordinances of 1617 and 1636, but this had no practical results worth mention-
ing.1  There were powerful forces behind the foreigners. The citizens of the 
Finnish non-staple towns, who supplied tar and timber to the staple towns and 
bought their salt there, had nothing against direct contacts with the foreign-
ers. An even more powerful group was to be found in the iron-masters of 
Central Sweden, who were closely connected and to some extent identical 
with the nobility and the bureaucracy. 
In the Swedish Diet of 1672, the burgesses had banded together to at-
tack the flourishing anomaly that foreign residents were allowed to re-
main in Swedish towns for years without taking the oath of citizenship 
or assuming its responsibilities. The result of this complaint appeared in 
[The Production Edict], 708-709. An earlier account in E. G. Palmén, Historisk 
framställning af  den svensk-finska handelslagstiftningens utveckling från Gustaf  Wasas 
regering till 1766 [A historical presentation of the development of Swedish-Finnish 
commercial legislation from the reign of Gustavus Vasa to 1766], Helsingfors 1876, 
65 ff. 
1  For example, in Stockholm the Burgomaster and Town Council published the 
regulations again and again (10/5/1661, 6/10/1671, 1/10/1685 and 9/11/1720). The 
decree that the foreigners should report on arrival to the Palace Chancellery and 
the Depantment of Commerce was posted on 8/3/1671, and renewed on 27/5/1674, 
3/5/1680 and 30/1/1695. Cf. M. Lagerström, Junior, (Ed.) Stockholms Stadsordinantier 
etc. I [Ordinances, etc. of the City of Stockholm], Stockholm 1731, 67, 142, 205, 
254; II, Stockholm 1734, 1, 60, 98, 103, 114, 137. 
2 
 Borgarståndets riksdagsprotokoll före frihetstiden [Parliamentary Proceedings 
of the Burgesses before the Age of Liberty], published by the Institute for Urban 
History, Uppsala 1933, 105. 'Utskåttets af Borgerskapet betänkande och Swar 
till K.M:ts författning af een handelsordinantie till åhr 1672', Sekreta Utskottet 
['Report of the Committee of Burgesses, and answer to His Majesty's formulation 
of a Trade Ordinance for the year 1672', Secret Committee], Parliamentary Docu-
ments of 1672, RA. 
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the following year in the form of a Trade Ordinance (2lst March, 1673), 
which was partly directed at the trading activities of the foreigners. In 
this ordinance all the old regulations in the Aliens' Laws were enforced. Fur-
thermore, native residents were forbidden to act as figureheads for foreign re-
sidents. It was very typical of the strong economic position of the foreigners 
that this ordinance was preceded, one week earlier, by a royal decree which 
gave both the citizens of non-staple towns and country-dwellers the right to 
purchase grain from foreigners during the emergency caused by the failure of 
the harvest? 
The publication of this trade ordinance naturally received considerable 
attention from the foreign factors. Sir Edward Wood, who had been sent 
to Stockholm in 1672 as English envoy extraordinary, had been given the 
task of protecting those English subjects who were trading in Sweden.2 
In September 1673 he was able to give his principals in London the calm 
assurance that the edict was aimed chiefly at the Dutch in Sweden. They 
came there, amassed a fortune, and left, taking their capital with them. 
Sir Edward thought that the edict would never be put into effect. That 
would be contrary to Swedish interests. He also reported that the English 
factors were taking it calmly. Nevertheless, during the course of that au-
tumn he called on Councillor Johan Gyllenstierna, who promised to take 
the matter up in the Council.3 But the time was approaching for the edict 
to come into effect. On November 10th, 1673, Wood submitted a memo-
randum to the Swedish government. In this he asked for a postponement 
of the enforcement of the edict, which had been fixed for the beginning of 
1674. At the same time Wood asked for a more precise ruling on the clauses 
relating to the period of residence, and for assistance to enable the factors 
to get their assets out of the country within the prescribed time.4 The matter 
was referred to the Swedish Board of Trade for its opinion. 
The Board thought that the Trade Ordinance did not forbid the foreigners 
to stay in Sweden, but was merely a directive to the effect that they could not 
export their goods for more than the residence period of two months. This 
should be reckoned from the time they arrived and began to do their 
trading for the season. The Board was against postponing the application 
of the edict until the Englishmen had managed to collect the money that 
1 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bret etc. IV, 3, 6 ff., 45, 80. 
2 Sir Edward Wood's instructions 8/7/1672, Cal.S.P.,Dom. 1672, 321. 
8 
 Wood to Coventry 17/9, 24/9, 1/10, 11/10, 8/11/1673, Coventry Papers LXVI. 
4 Wood's memorandum 19/11/1673, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 
1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. (Copy in Trade and Shipping 31, RA, also in Coventry 
Papers LXVI). 
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was owing to them. On the 30th December, 1673, Wood was given an answer 
on these lines. He refused to accept it. The subject came up for new discussion 
in the Council in the spring of the following year. The Swedish Board of Trade 
had its spokesman in the person of its president, Baron Knut Kurck, who 
was a member of the Council. The latter pointed out that the ordinance had 
been decreed during the last Diet as a result of pressure from the burgesses. 
It did not affect only the English. He personally thought that the new 
Trade Ordinance was undesiderable. The Swedish merchants could more 
easily be kept in check without it, and be forced to keep their prices down. 
In maintaining an attitude so favourable to the consumer, Kurck had in 
mind the maxims of the great Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna. On the other 
hand, he felt it would be impossible to repeal the edict on the grounds of 
pressure exerted by a foreign power.' 
Kurck's negative attitude was shared by the Swedish resident in London, 
Johan Leijonbergh, who learned from his local contacts that feeling in Lon-
don had gradually become uneasy. Wood had alarmed Whitehall, which 
at this time was carrying on negotiations with the newly-arrived Swedish 
ambassador, Pehr Sparre, over extending the alliance of 1672. The Secretary 
of State, Sir Henry Coventry, was at the same time being worked upon by 
two leading 'Sweden merchants', Urban Hall (Senior) in London, and Sir 
William Blackett in Newcastle. It was hoped that it would be possible to 
delay the implementation of the edict, which would obviously seriously 
restrict the radius of action of the English factors in the big towns of cen-
tral Sweden. During the course of the negotiations, Conventry also declared 
emphatically that this new Trade Ordinance was a stumbling-block in the 
way of the alliance between the two Kingdoms. Sparre showed complete 
ignorance of its contents, and, as appears from Leijonbergh's dispatches, 
this ignorance was genuine and not feigned. His mission in London was 
purely political.2 The English démarche therefore came as a surprise. Sparre 
asked for instructions from home, and these were sent in April, 1674. He 
was instructed to point out that the new trade ordinance was just a re- 
suscitation of old decrees, and was based on Swedish law. He was to meet 
the English threat that they would confiscate Swedish ships and goods by 
referring to Sweden's services in the concluding of the most recent armistice 
between England and Holland. When Sparre at last got hold of a copy 
of the Trade Ordinance, the pressure exerted by Coventry inclined him to 
1  Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 22/1 2/1673. Proceedings of the Swedish Council 21/5/ 
1674 (Lillieflycht), RA. 
2 Cf. above, p. 31 ff. 
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recommend a retreat. Under the influence of the Board of Trade, the Swe-
dish government declared its willingness to be liberal-minded in the app-
lication of the ordinance, provided that during the current negotiations 
in London the English government guaranteed advantages to Swedish 
commerce. Implementation of the edict had already been postponed until May 
1674 by the resolution of December 1673, and it was now put off indefinitely.' 
In Stockholm, nevertheless, during the spring of 1674, the authorities had 
already begun to put the new ordinance into effect. On the 20th of March the 
foreign residents were summoned to the city's Department of Commerce and 
informed of the new regulations concerning their period of residence. John 
Cooper answered on behalf of the English factors that on the 20th of December 
of the previous year H. M. the King of Sweden had extended the period 
of residence, and that they were now awaiting a new resolution. Those 
summoned amounted to 28 Germans, 22 Englishmen and Scots, 9 Dutch-
men and 1 Frenchman. In the autumn, the Stockholm magistrates decreed 
that the foreigners' warehouses were to be cut down, and at the same time the 
supervision of newly-arrived foreign merchants was intensified.2 
In any case, these actions against the English residents in Stockholm had no 
great immediate effect. During the war of 1675-79, in which Sweden was in-
volved, the shipping of the neutral English helped Sweden considerably. Dur-
ing these difficult years the English managed to appropriate to themselves 
several commercial advantages, e. g. reduced customs dues on cheap cloth and 
salt.3 But when the war ended, the attacks against English and other foreign 
factors became more violent. In 1680 Stockholm's representatives pro-
tested in the Diet about the foreigners, and pointed out that the clauses in the 
Wood to Coventry 20/12/1673, 18/4, 23/5, 27/5, 3/6/1674, Coventry Papers 
LXVI. Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 1/5/1674, Leijonbergh's letterbook, Dipl.Angl. 
(Also in Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). K. of Sw. to Sparre 8/4/1 674 (enclosing 
Wood's note and the King's resolution of 20/12/1673) and 10/6/1674. Sparre to 
K. of Sw. 8/5, 7/7/1674, Dipl.Angl. 'Hwad som widh den Engelske Commissio 
ähr passerat A:° 1674' [What happened during my mission to England in 16741, 
 
Pehr Sparre's memoranda on his embassies 1672-76, Dipl.Angl. (Cf. also extract 
from letter from Sparre to K. of Sw. 28/4/1674, Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). 
Sw. B. of T. to Leijonbergh 9/5/1674, RA. 
2 Proceedings of City of Stockholm magistrates, Dep. of Commerce (Handels-
kollegiet) 20/3, 7/11, 10/11/1674, 3/6/1 675, 19/6/1679, Stockholm City Arch. 
3 It is true that in 1678 the question of the foreigners had been taken up in 
the Diet which met at Halmstad on behalf of the towns. Nevertheless, it was only in 
the most general terms that the King, in his reply, pointed out the importance 
of observing the regulations (A. A. von Stiernman, Alla riksdagars och mötens 
besluth etc. 11 [Decisions etc. of all the Diets and Assemblies Il1, Stockholm 1729, 
1791-1792. 
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ordinances of 1617 and 1673 restricting their period of residence had not been 
put into effect. Then, as previously, the petitioners found no backing in the 
Swedish Board of Trade, which defended the foreigners. The motives behind 
this are interesting. Any form of coercion in trade was held to be harmful. This 
was the typical official standpoint of that period. The foreigners were said 
to swell revenues and give employment to the poor. In times of war they 
were very advantageous to the country, and restrictions on their trade 
would cause enmity abroad. It was stated that the Swedish merchants 
had not recovered from the war and were not in a position to carry out foreign 
trade on a large scale. A little before this, the Board had been equally un-
sympathetic towards the citizens of the little town of Nyen, who wanted 
to force the foreigners there to apply for citizenship.1  In the King's reply 
to Stockholm's appeal, the settlement of the question was postponed inde-
finitely, and at the same time it was emphatically pointed out that the 
trade ordinances of 1617 and 1673 could not be enforced "out of regard for 
the flourishing of commerce and other public benefits ...".2 
The continual complaints from the citizens of Swedish staple towns 
did, however, have some results. The ordinance which, in the interests of 
shipping protectionism, re-introduced in 1684 the system of whole and half 
exemption from customs dues, at the same time gave new directives for the 
treatment of foreign residents. It is true that the Swedish government felt 
that the time had not yet come for carrying out to the letter the trade ordi-
nances. But those foreign merchants who had overstayed their period of 
residence and had set up house in Sweden instead of lodging with local citizens 
were now made to pay a contribution to the town. Journeys to the mining 
districts and trading there were now forbidden, and were liable to a fine of 
100 silver dollars. When they left Sweden, foreign residents were requested 
to pay the sums of money perscribed by the trade ordinance of 1673. Natu-
rally enough, both the re-introduction of the differences in customs dues 
between Swedish and foreign shipping and the decision to impose taxation 
on foreign factors caused displeasure in English circles.3 The intention behind 
1  Ruling of Sw. B. of T. Dec. 1680 (dated 7/1 in Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). 
Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 9/7/1679, RA. 
2 'i anseende till commerciens flor och andre publique nyttigheter ...' von 
Stiernman, Kongl. Bref. etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 320. 
2 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bref etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 592 (A similarly 
worded letter addressed to the Governor-General of Stockholm in K. Hildebrand 
& A. Bratt (Eds.), Stockholms stads privilegiebref. Urkunder rörande Stockholms his-
toria [Letters-patent of the City of Stockholm. Documents concerning the history 
of Stockholm] I, Stockholm 1900-1913, 476-477). John Robinson's memorandum 
(copy) S.P., For., 104/153, f. 47 ff. 
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these measures was, of course, to protect the competitive ability of Swedish 
shipping and trading during the period of recovery. 
But the Swedish attitude was to become much harsher before this long 
period of peace came to an end. Edmund Poley, the newly-arrived English 
envoy, in 1687 came in for the next attack. His mission was really that of an 
observer, and he was there to follow the crisis between Denmark and Holstein 
as seen from Stockholm. But from the beginning he became principally invol-
ved in the question of the position of the English commercial agents, both in 
Stockholm and, as we shall see, also in Narva.' The indirect cause of the 
Swedish measures was given by the foreign residents themselves, who 
referred to their freedom front taxes and complained that the Stockholm 
city administration had demanded a contribution in connection with the 
revenue duty imposed by the Diet. By a Royal Mandate of the 28th April 
1687, the foreign residents were exempted from this tax. But at the same 
time, all the interim resolutions which had delayed the inplementation of the 
trade ordinances of 1617 and 1673 were cancelled.2 The foreign merchants and 
factors were out of the frying-pan and into the fire. The Stockholm city 
administration hastened to publish the new decree at the beginning of the 
navigation season. The warehouses of the English residents were closed down. 
This was followed by prosecutions and fines for the refractory. Both Poley 
and his Dutch colleague protested.3 As usual, the foreign interests were also 
backed up by the Swedish Board of Trade. As givers of credit, the foreigners 
had an important function in Sweden's export industry, especially the iron 
trade, which, in default of capital, was dependent on the advance-payment 
system. This was why the Board recommended an extension of the period 
of residence to a total of four months. At the same time, they pointed out 
that there was no basis at all for the assertions of the foreign diplomats that 
the prescriptions on the period of residence were contrary to the treaties. 
The Board's recommendation was accepted by the King in a decree issued 
on October 4th of the same year. The warehouses were re-opened.4 
' Hatton, 135. Edmund Poley's instructions 19/5/1687, S.P.,For., Letterbooks 
of Secretary of State 104/1 53. Poley to Lord Middleton 3/8, 10/8, 24/8/1687, "Letters 
from Stockholm to ye Secretary of State from August 1687 to December 1688", KB. 
Ruben Eriksson gives an account of Poley's reports home as shown in this letter-
book in Hist.Tidskr. 1946, 55-56. 
2 von Stiernman, Kongl. bref etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 855. 
3 Edmund Poley's memorandum 23/8/1687, Memoranda and notes of English 
embassies 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. Poley to Lord Middleton 31/8/1687, KB. 
4 Lagerström II, 60 ff. Almqvist II, 313-314. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 5/9/ 
1687, RA. Samuel Akerhielm's memorandum Sept. 1687, with draft of reply to 
the foreign ambassadors' letters, Memoranda and Reports on Foreign Affairs 
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These measures taken in Stockholm were in the first place meant as a 
warning shot. According to Poley, the war of nerves was intended by the 
leading burghers of the town to force the English to become citizens and 
so help bear the burden which the state was imposing through its demands 
for loans and taxes. This, he argued, was a misconception, as the Englishmen 
in Stockholm were only agents, operating with the capital of their principals. 
Debate on these issues continued up to 1688. Its only result was an increase in 
the duty on cloth, intended to counterbalance the effects of the freedom of 
movement of the foreign residents, which had again been made legal. The 
rivalry between the foreign middlemen and the citizens of the staple towns 
continued to exist. The problem could not be solved by administrative 
methods.1  In the highest quarters there was neither the will nor the means 
for a high-handed treatment of the representatives of foreign capital. 
II 
So long as peace prevailed between the great Maritime Powers, neither 
Sweden's shipping nor her trading could assert itself in the international 
field. But the outbreak of the new war in 1689 gave fresh impetus to Swedish 
trading and shipping interests. In May 1690, when the Swedish Chancel-
lery (kanslikollegiet) was discussing an appeal submitted by two English-
men concerning their grievances, even Bengt Oxenstierna, the cautious 
and pro-English President of Chancellery, spoke about the advantageousness 
and necessity of letting the laws take their course. In the following year, 
the foreign residents in Stockholm were summoned before the city's magistra-
tes. They were informed that from then on no-one would be allowed to 
maintain premises in the Customs warehouses for longer than three years. 
The embargo on business-trips was enforced. Those who had been long 
resident in the city were urged to apply for citizenship.2 The situation was 
aggravated by the growing bitterness over the privateering of the Eng- 
1684-87, RA. (Cf. also Transcript in the Engeström Coll. B IV, 2, 9). Poley to 
Lord Middleton 7/9, 21/9, 28/9, 19/10, 26/10, 2/11 /1687, KB. Proc. of Stockholm 
Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 25/10/1687, Stockholm City Arch. 
1 
 Poley to Lord Middleton 21/9, 23/11/1687, 21/3, 28/3, 11/4/1688, KB. Cf. 
Robinson, 66-67. E. G. Palmén, Politiska skrifter af  Anders Chydenius etc.[Political 
writings of Anders Chydenius, etc.], Helsingfors 1880, 148-149. 
2 Proc. of Sw. B. of Chancellery 8/5/1690 (extract in Trade and Shipping 31, 
RA.). Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 17/11/1691, Stockholm 
City Arch. 
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fish and the Dutch and their attempts to obstruct the trade and shipping 
of the neutral Swedes. The prevailing war-time conditions seemed to have 
presented a suitable opportunity for getting rid of the foreigners. 
The witch-hunt against the foreigners ill the large staple towns was begun 
in the autumn of 1694.1 The Swedish Board of Trade said that it could 
now recommend the implementation of the edict of 1687, which had never 
been applied for reasons unknown to them (sic!). Both the Swedish mer-
chants and the iron producers were now in a position to free themselves 
from foreign middlemen. In general, the Board expected no great immediate 
effects from this implementation other than an application for citizenship 
from many of the foreign residents. On the 26th October, 1694, the Governor-
General and City administration of Stockholm were ordered to put the 
seven years old edict into effect. This meant, among other things, that the 
legal period of residence of the factors was again reduced to two months 
per year, in accordance with the trade ordinance. There is no doubt that this 
action was connected with Swedish demands for restitution of, or compen-
sation for, confiscated ships and cargoes. This time, those in charge of 
Swedish foreign policy had as their opponent John Robinson, the English 
resident in Stockholm, whose outstanding diplomatic abilities and contacts 
with the leading Court officials were now brought into play. In conjunction 
with the Dutch minister in Stockholm, Robinson submitted a memorandum 
in protest. The answer was a promise to look into the mattera 
A Royal Commission led by Bengt Oxenstierna was now appointed to 
sort out this tangle. On their recommendation, the King granted a prolon-
gation of the residence period to four months. Things were back to where 
they had been. The report of the commissioners is an interesting document. 
The legality of the Swedish measures was pointed out and their time-honoured 
precedents invoked. From the economic point of view, the regulations 
were intended to enable their own merchants to compete, as these did not 
enjoy the tax immunity of the foreigners. There was no desire in the minds 
of the commissioners to exclude the latter from Swedish staple towns. 
But the intermediary trade should be secured for the native merchants, 
who could work as commission agents for the foreigners during their annual 
1 
 For further material on this, see p. 67, note I. 
2 von Stiernman, Kongl. Brej etc. [Royal letters, etc.] V, Stockholm 1766, 
494 ff. Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 14/11/1694, 2/3, 14/12/1695, Robinson to 
James Vernon 6/2, 20/2/1695, S.P.,For., 95/14. Robinson's memorandum 24/2/ 
1695, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1693-1730, Dipl.Angl. 
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absence.1  The commissioners were undoubtedly influenced by the leading citi-
zens of Stockholm on this point. In a memorandum from the Burgomaster 
and City Council of Stockholm, which was read out to the commissioners, 
it was pointed out that the time was now ripe for emancipation. It was 
thought that the reduction in the rate of interest would make it less difficult 
to help the mining area by giving credit. But the Board of Mines (bergs-
kollegiet) was less optimistic. Because of the way in which they financed 
the Swedish mining industry, the foreign residents found staunch supporters 
there. The foreigners were defended both in that Board's discussions and 
in the report which it submitted to the King on the 30th of May.2 
The extension of the residence period which had been granted by the 
King on the 4th December 1695 by no means placated the representatives 
of the Maritime Powers in Sweden. Preliminary measures were also taken 
in Stockholm to let the law take its course. The landlords of the foreign-
ers were ordered to hand in the names of those residents who were lodging 
with them.3  
Robinson tried to frighten the Swedish authorities by maintaining that 
the factors' principals had seats in Parliament, and would be able to harm 
Sweden by means of countermeasures. In England there were forges 'in 
great abundance', flax and hemp could be grown in Ireland, 'naval pro-
visions' could be obtained front America.4 If the Navigation Acts were to 
be strictly applied to ships which were Swedish-owned but not Swedish-
built, half the Swedish tonnage which was engaged on the traffic with Eng-
land would be confiscated. From Whitehall came the order to take a firm 
stand.5 Nevertheless, on the 24th March 1696, Robinson received a negative 
answer to his recent note. On the same day a similar refusal was handed 
to the Dutch envoy, van Heeckeren, and the resident, Rumpf. The English 
factors now turned to the King himself with a petition for an extra res-
pite to enable them to put their affairs in order. But on the 17th April came 
1  Commission on the trading of foreign merchants and their residence in the King-
dom 1695, RA. (Formerly in Trade and Shipping 31, ibid.). Commissioners' report 
2/12/1695 printed in von Stiernman, Kongl. Bret etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 544 
ff. K. of Sw.'s letter 4/12/1695 printed in Hildebrand & Bratt, 519 ff. 
2 Proc. of Sw. B. of Mines 23/5, 24/5, 5/6/1695. Arch. of Sw. B. of Mines, RA. 
Sw. B. of Mines to K. of Sw. 30/5/1695, RA. 
3 Lagerström 11, 98, 114. Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 
20/2, 19/12/1 695, 28/l/1696, Stockholm City Arch. 
Cf. above, p. 17.  
'framboll to Robinson 11/2, 21/4/1696, S.P., For. 104/153. 
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the unambiguous answer: "The petitioners must abide by the rules read 
out to them in December last ..."1  
However, during that same month Robinson managed to arrange for 
three commissioners to be appointed by the Swedes in order to enter into 
negotiations with him. The three negotiators were the Councillor of Commerce 
Johan Stiernhöök, the Chancellery Secretary, Samuel Akerhielm, and the Di-
rector-in-Chief of Customs, Johan Filip Sölfvercrona. Of these, Stiernhöök and 
Sölfvercrona were commissioners for commercial matters in the amalgamated 
Treasury and Board of Trade (kammar- och kommerskollegiet). Sölfver-
crona had also been dealing with questions arising out of the privateering 
of the Allies. Robinson principally wanted to know which categories of 
British subjects would be affected by the edicts. In order to emphasize 
Anglo-Dutch unity, Robinson wanted to read out at the first conference 
a letter from van Heeckeren, the Dutch minister. This was, however, refused 
him by the Swedish commissioners. At the next conference, on the 4th 
of May of that year, Robinson was informed that the edicts applied to all 
foreigners who had not become citizens but were residing in Sweden in order 
to carry on business. Robinson now appealed to the President of the Chan-
cellery, Bengt Oxenstierna. On the 26th of May, he, together with van 
Heeckeren and Rumpf, had a new discussion with Oxenstierna and Count 
Gyldenstolpe, Councillor to the King. 
At this conference between the Swedish representatives and the allied 
1 'Suplicanterne hafwa att rätta sig effter dhet för dhem in Decembri förledne 
upläste reglemente ...' Royal mandate 17/4/1696 (Transcript in 'Handlingar hö-
rande till historien om Englands handel med Sverige' [Documents relating to 
England's trade with Sweden], Engeström Coll. C:X, 1, 9, KB). This volume contains 
copies of memoranda, resolutions, conference-minutes, etc. concerning the English 
factors 1695-96. The handling of this question can further be followed in the K. 
of Sw.'s letters to Leijoncrona, Dipl.Angl. (especially those of 18/12/1695, 25/3, 
20/5, 30/5/1696 with their numerous enclosures). On the other hand, the two col-
lections 'Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591-1692' and 'Negotiations 
1680-1700' (Dipl.Angl.) are very reticent on this subject. Robinson's dispatches 
in S.P., For. 95/14 (especially to Trumbull 1/1, 22/4, 6/5, 30/5/1696) give a good 
picture of the main outlines of the course of events, but should be used in conjunction 
with the Swedish material. Extracts from some of the Robinson dispatches appear 
in C.O. 389/15. Cf. also BM Add. MSS 35105, which, however, contains nothing 
of importance over and above the material already mentioned. In the literature 
of the period, the actions against the English factors during the 1690's are touched 
on by Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 101, Ekegdrd, 173 ff., Almqvist 11,314 ff. Heckscher,  
Produktplakatet [The Production Edict], 709-711, F. F. Carlson, Sveriges historia 
under konungarne af  Pfalziska huset [History of Sweden under the Kings of the 
Palatine House] V, Stockholm 1879, 391-393. 
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diplomats, Robinson was able to tell the former that the English residents had 
obtained their travel permits but had not yet left Sweden. Robinson now made 
a last attempt to get their departure postponed, but to no avail. The King 
of Sweden did not deviate from the course he had set. The only concession 
he granted was the right for the English Admiralty to maintain a purchaser 
of 'naval stores' in Stockholm. Leijoncrona was instructed to inform the 
English court of this royal favour. The English factors were also given per-
mission to settle their affairs, but after that, the moment of departure was to 
come inexorably. Robinson obtained the right to retain two of the Stockholm 
English in his personal service. One of them was Robert Jackson, who in 
1694 was commissioned to act as representative of the English Admiralty, 
with the title of Commissary.1 William Joye, of a London merchant family, was 
also saved from a compulsory departure by this strategem of Robinson's. 
Philip Forster and Henry Moxton (Moxon) were also allowed to remain in 
Sweden, the former on grounds of ill-health.2 Robinson finally managed to ar-
range an extended residence permit for one of the most important of the fac-
tors, Thomas Cutler, who had acted as English consul in Stockholm since 1686.3  
A total of nine English subjects had set out by the end of May and beginning 
of June. According to Robinson, only one Scot and a few financially embarras-
sed Englishmen were willing to swear the oath of citizenship and stay on 
as Swedish subjects. There is evidence that this was done by Jeffrey Little 
of Essex and Robert Forrest of Scotland. In September it was discovered 
that two Englishmen were still staying with their host, Thomas Black. 
One of these was the tar factor William Sykes ('Wilhelm Seyx'), who had 
already applied for a travel permit in May.4 The other Englishmen took 
refuge in Helsingör (Elsinore) after their expulsion. 
The Swedish action failed because of the reluctance of the factors to become 
Swedish citizens. John Robinson in Stockholm and the 'Swedish merchants' 
in London each gave their own explanation of the reason for this.6 Robinson 
Robinson to Vernon 12/12/1694, S.P., For. 95/14. 
2 Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 6/2, 21/4, 5/5, 8/5, 29/5/1696, 
Stockholm City Arch. 
8 
 Cutler's letter of appointment 12/5/1686, renewed 24/5/1689, S.P., For. 104/ 
153. Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 24/12/1686, Dipl.Angl.  
Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 8/5, 29/5, 3/9/1696, 
Stockholm City Arch. 
5 For the reaction in Narva, see below, p. 78. 
6 Robinson's memorandum to the Swedish Government 28/12/1695, Engestrom 
Coll. C:X, 1, 9, KB. Men-orandum from the 'Swedish merchants' in London to B. 
of T. 9/10/1696, C.O. 389/15. 
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pointed in the first place to one's natural unwillingness to change King 
and Country. The compulsion to adopt the Lutheran religion, or at least 
to bring up one's children in that faith, was thought to be one of the most 
important reasons. There were many other things which all added up —
things such as the heavy burden of taxation and inadequate property rights 
in Sweden, the compulsory surrender of part of one's property if one left 
Sweden either temporarily or permanently, or if one died and one's heirs 
did not happen to be Swedish subjects. Finally, both Robinson and the 
London merchants who were dealing with Sweden pointed to a factor which 
is most important from the economic point of view. As Swedish subjects 
by naturalisation, they would encounter great difficulties in their business 
with England. Robinson stresses weakened credit abroad as a natural con-
sequence of a change of nationality. 
The nature of the credit system makes it possible for us to ask whether 
this action had ever had any chances of success, even if it could have been 
carried out. As both Poley and Robinson maintained, the factors in Stock-
holm were only commission agents, acting on behalf of their principals in 
England and operating with foreign capital.' lf the action had succeeded, 
Sweden might possibly have acquired their expert mercantile knowledge for 
the export industry of the country, but it would not have been freed from 
dependence on foreign credit. 
Nor did any break in the trade between England and Sweden follow. 
l.t is true that Robinson had prophesied to Trumbull that the carrying 
out of the edicts would be fatal to England's trade with Sweden.2 But by 
May 1697 two Englishmen had already returned, the recently-mentioned 
Sykes and John Middlecott ('Middelcott'). They were given strict injuctions 
not to exceed the permitted period of residence. in the following summer no 
Englishmen, only Scots, appear in the records of the permit department, 
and in the summer of 1699 there was only one. Trade was evidently flourishing, 
but it was being carried on by figureheads, or by those English who were 
staying on.3  
From the Swedish point of view, however, the situation began to be dis-
agreeable. It was not only the English and the Dutch who were grumbling. 
In December 1696, Robinson referred to the great disquietude in the mi-
ning districts, and to the fact that petitions were streaming in to the Board 
1  Cf. p. 56. Poley to Lord Middleton 23/11/1687, KB. 
2 Robinson to Trumbull 30/5/1696, S.P., For. 95/14. 
3 Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 27/5/1697, 7/9/1699, Stock-
holm City Arch. 
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of Mines.1  Of greater significance, probably, was the undiminished pressure 
from outside. In October 1697 — the autumn after the King's death --
protracted  discussion arose in the Government. The attitude was now cautious, 
and the fear of running foul of the Maritime Powers was evident. But out-
wardly the Swedes were still just as inflexible as they had been during the 
closing years of the reign of Charles X I.2 During 1699, the Treasury and 
the Boards of Trade and Mines together worked out, on the King's orders, 
a joint draft for a proclamation forbidding industrialists (both noblemen 
and commoners) from having direct dealings with the foreigners. The pro-
clamation, which had come into being as a result of pressure from the mer-
chant classes during the most recent Diet, was published on the 25th No-
vember, 1699. This shows how difficult it must have been to sever connec-
tions between the foreign providers of working capital and the producers 
of Sweden's foremost export commodity, iron.3  
By 1696 the question had already acquired a much more political tone. 
About this time, peace-feelers were being put out in Holland, with Sweden 
as the mediator. The Swedish diplomatic representatives, Lillieroot in The 
Hague and Leijoncrona in London, were able to report that there was a feeling 
of distrust both in Holland and in England towards the Swedish peace 
mediators.4 This had been aggravated by the action against the foreign 
commercial agents in Sweden. Whether by accident or design, this action 
had happened to coincide with measures aimed at restricting the practice 
of the Reformed Religion within the Kingdom of Sweden. Consequently, 
instructions went out to London and The Hague that the Swedish diplomats 
were to try to efface the bad impression which had been created by the arro- 
Robinson to Trumbull 2/12/1696. It has not been possible to investigate the 
truth of this statement by going through the large volumes of 'Incoming Documents' 
in the Archives of the Sw. B. of Mines, RA. 
2 
 Proc. of the Swedish Council 5/10, 25/10/1697, RA. Robinson to Ambassador 
Williamson 28/9, 19/10/1698, S.P., For. 95/15. Robinson's memorandum 7/10/1698, 
Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. 
3 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bref etc. [Royal letters, etc.] V, 769, 782. A. A. von 
Stiernman, Bilrang utaf åtskillige alrnenna handlingar ifrån 1529 intil år 1698...  
hörande til... 
 Riksdagars och Mötens beslut etc. [Appendix containing various 
public documents of the years 1529 to 1698 ... relating to ... decisions of Diets 
and Meetings, etc.). Stockholm 1743, 470 (the burgesses' appeal to the Diet 1698, 
§ 17). Ekegård, 174. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 15/11/1699, RA. 
4 Leijoncrona, who had a moderate and reasoned view of Anglo-Swedish trade 
and shipping relations, thought that the English businessmen in Sweden did more 
good than harm to the country. (Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 23/8/1700, with enclosed 
memorandum, Dipl.Angl.). 
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gant Swedish attitude towards both the religious question and the position 
of the foreign factors. 
The matter was again raised to the level of international politics during 
the alliance negotiations with the Maritime Powers at The Hague in 1698 
—99, and the unhappy position of the factors was used as an argument 
by the English. Count Lillieroot, the Swedish ambassador and negotiator, 
reported the fuss that was still being made about this in England. He 
was instructed to inform the negotiators on the other side that the edicts 
were old and well-established, and that they had been applied without 
stringency or animosity. At the same time, Lillieroot was instructed to re-
mind the English of the way in which they had obstructed Sweden's merchant 
shipping during the war and had given no compensation for their acts of 
privateering.1  This brings to light the power politics which lay behind the 
Swedish action; its essential nature was that of reprisals against the warring 
parties and a protest against their methods of dealing with neutral shipping. 
The action also had international repercussions to the extent that it 
undoubtedly stimulated the English trade talks with Denmark, Brandenburg 
and Russia. These took place after 1695, and were clearly intended to replace 
the strategically important Swedish commodities with the products of other 
Baltic countries. For example, in the summer of 1696, the Danes promised 
the exiled commercial agents who had taken refuge in Helsingör the same 
privileges in Denmark and Norway as they had lost in Sweden.2 
in the end, the problem was temporarily disposed of by international 
politics — by the outbreak of the Great Northern War. On the 30th of March, 
1700, the edicts limiting the period of residence were declared suspended until 
further notice. On the other hand, during the treaty negotiations which 
were going on at the same time, the English failed to induce the Swedes 
to include the right to unrestricted residence in the trade agreement which 
was being planned.3 The English did not achieve their object until Sweden 
had been brought to her knees at the end of the war. The position of the 
English factors was guaranted by Article X 1 I in the 1720 Treaty of Alliance 
between England and Sweden, inasmuch as they, in contrast to other foreign-
ers, were now granted an unrestricted period of residence. 
1 Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 19/29 Nov. 1698, 14/24 Jan. 1699, Ambassadors Bonde's 
and Lillieroot's letters to K. of Sw. K. of Sw. to Lillieroot 7/12/1698, Letters from 
K. of Sw. to Lillieroot 1698-1699, Dipl.l-loll. 
2 Cf. below, p. 91. Pauly (Danish Minister in England) to Whitehall 14/7/1698, 
copy of letter with extract from memorandum by Dutch Resident in Copenhagen. 
Documents read to the [English] B. of T. 3/8/1698 (C.O. 388/6, A 2). 
3 Conference Minutes 29/7/1700, Negotiations 1700-1728, Dipl.Angl. 
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It is furthermore the regional aspects of Swedish policy towards foreign-
ers which are interesting. Whereas the English factors in Stockholm were 
at least at times hard pressed by the authorities, their position in the Baltic 
provinces, especially in Narva, was never threatened. In the next chapter 
we shall look for the key to this remarkable difference in attitude towards 
the English and other trade agents in the different parts of the Kingdom of 
Sweden. Sweden's policy towards foreigners also forms part of her staple 
policy, but economic conditions and political objectives were not the same 
in the Baltic provinces and in the mother-country. 
2. England and Swedish Transit Policy in the Baltic Flax and Hemp Ports 
'Så är och Sveriges Crono i sig själv välsignat och ymnig giord 
af Gud och naturen med månge begärlige varur, som här födas 
och växa, erkannerligen af allehanda Metall: och de Provincier, som 
nu inkräktade äre, således belägne, att Livland, Estland och In-
germanland, sompt av naturen, sompt genom gode och försiktige 
råd, och invånarnes medverkan, drage, och mera kunde draga alle, 
eller ju de tyngste och mäste varurne till sig uthur Muskou och 
Littowen ...' 
Kommerskollegii Instruktioner (1651).1  
Swedish staple policy in the latter part of the 17th century was guided 
by two interesting basic principles. The first was the traditional one: to 
concentrate the Gulf of Bothnia's foreign trade in the staple towns, and 
chiefly in Stockholm.2 The second was to attract both the Russian trade 
with Western Europe away from Archangel and the Polish and Lithuanian 
trade away from the Prussian and Courland coastal cities and divert them 
to Stockholm or one of the other Swedish ports on the Baltic.3  
1 
 "Thus the Swedish realm is in itself abundantly blessed by God and by Nature 
with desirable commodities which grow or are found here, especially metals of 
all kinds: and the provinces she now occupies are so situated that Livonia, Estonia 
and Ingria, partly by Nature and partly because of good and prudent counsel 
and the co-operation of their inhabitants, are attracting, and, what is more, could 
attract all or at least the major part of the heavier products from Moscow and Lith-
uania ..." Instructions of the Sw. B. of T. (1651). 
' Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia 1:2 [Sweden's economic history l:2], 
535, 665, 674-675. 
3 P. Nyström, "Mercatura Ruthenica", Scandia X (1937), 257-288. S. Gerentz,  
Kommerskollegium och näringslivet, Stockholm 1951, [The Board of Trade and the 
economic life], 21, 34, 48-49. Ekegård, 78-87, C. von Bonsdorff, Nyen och Nyen-
skans [Nyen and Nyenskans]. Acta Soc. Scient. Fenn. XVIII, Helsingfors 1891, 
421 ff. 
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Those in power completely approved of Stockholm as the staple for both the 
northern and eastern parts of the mother country and for the provinces. 
The Bothnian trade monopoly prevented foreigners from trading in the 
Gulf of Bothnia north of a line drawn between Stockholm and Åbo. The 
policy was furthered by the right to store certain essential imports (such 
as salt) from Western Europe on the one hand and from the Baltic region, 
with its access to the Russo-Polish area of supply, on the other. Stockholm 
was granted this in the 17th century. It is true that the right of free storage 
for Western and Eastern imports in Stockholm was abolished in the 1680's, 
but it was again revived in the 1690's when the old aggressive spirit of com-
mercial policy was reawakened during the Nine Year's War. Steps were 
taken at the same time to eliminate the double payment of local duties (ex-
cise in Stockholm, portorium etc. in Riga) on the re-exports which passed 
through the two principal Swedish trading cities. Salt was put in store in 
Stockholm to be later transported to Livonia, but there was a lack of re-
exports in the opposite direction. Despite all efforts, Stockholm did not he-
co►me an important trading centre between Western and Eastern Europe. 
Flax and hemp were not attracted to Stockholm; instead, the Stockholm 
ships' sometimes took on board a ballast of iron in their home port and then 
filled the holds with flax, hemp and other Baltic goods in Riga.l Economic 
factors weighed more heavily than administrative ones. 
The favouritism shown towards Stockholm by Swedish commercial policy 
met opposition amongst the other trading nations. The English merchants  
in the Baltic, for instance, expressed their disapproval of the Bothnian trade 
monopoly to the Council of Trade and Plantations.2 The monopoly held by 
the Swedish tar company, which was run by Stockholm merchants, was  
also regarded as an attempt to make Stockholm into a staple town for tar 
coming from other regions than those Bothnian ones which were forbidden to  
foreigners. Amongst other grievances complained of by Philip Warwick dur-
ing his embassy to Sweden in 1680----83 is the accusation that Englishmen 
were not allowed to get tar from Viborg and Kalmar, these being the two 
natural export harbours for the tar-producing areas of East Finland and 
South Sweden.3  
1 Ekegård, 83-84. Sw. B. of T. lo K. of Sw. 15/3, 6/7/1694, RA. Sw. B. of T. 
and Treasury to the Sw. General Customs Administrator 5/4, 21/8/1694. Alpha-
betically arranged extracts, etc. from correspondence and resolutions 1577-
1700, Archives of the Sw. General Customs Board, Stockholm (letter 5/4/1684, 
printed by von Stiernman, Kongl. Bre/ etc. V, 459). 
2 Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 21/11/1676, C.O. 391/1. 
3 Memorandum to Warwick from English merchants in Stockholm 5/1/1681, 
S.P., For. 95/11. Cf. below, p. 81 ff. 
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The attempt to make Stockholm a staple for the whole of the Baltic basin 
and to force out foreign capital failed through its own inherent absurdity. 
There were, however, good economic and geographical reasons for concen-
trating the export of Sweden's and Finland's main exports, iron and tar, in 
Stockholm. The city was near the iron ore district of Central Sweden, and, 
even after the trade monopoly ended (1765), many tar ships from East Bothnia 
still called at the capital.l Products from the Russo-Polish market, however, 
could not be routed through Stockholm to Western Europe. A more realistic 
attempt was made instead to send them via Sweden's Baltic ports. 
Riga, Narva and Nyen were the most likely for this purpose, and in their 
interests Reval, Dorpat and the Courland ports were consistently and ruthless-
ly set aside. Riga's monopoly of the surrounding trade area was fixed by the 
Swedish government through an agreement with the Duke of Courland. 
According to this treaty, exports from Courland were concentrated in the 
poorly situated ports of Mitau and Libau. All other shipping-ports in Courland 
territory were declared illegal and the Swedish Governor General in Riga 
clamped down on the traffic in these 'blacklisted' ports.2 
These plans were furthered by treaties with Russia in Vallisaari and Kar-
dis (1658 and 1661 respectively), according to which Russian trade with the 
West was concentrated in Stockholm, Reval, Narva and Riga. The Russian 
merchants obtained the right to keep factors there and carry on their trade, 
though of course under Swedish supervision.3 Stockholm's actual inade-
quacy as a centre for the Russian market has already been mentioned. The 
Russian goods which were exported to Stockholm came chiefly from the area 
around Lake Ladoga. From there they were transported by small boats past 
Nyen, along the south coast of Finland, to the capital of Sweden. From the 
point of view of transit-trade, the volume was insignificant.4 Reval's transit- 
1  A. J. Alanen, Der Aussenhandel und die Schiffahrt Finnlands im 18. Jahrhun-
dert. Ann.Acad.Scient.Fenn. B, 103, Helsinki 1957, 132 ff., 266 ff., 413 ff. 
2 W. Eckert, Kurland unter dem Einfluss des Merkantilismus. Zum Beiträge zur 
Staats- und Wirtschaftspolitik Herzog Jakobs von Kurland (1642-1682). Riga 1927 
194 ff. E. Dunsdorf, "Merchant Shipping in the Baltic during the 17th Century", 
Contributions of the Baltic University 40, Pinneberg 1947, 25 ff. 
S Soom, 27-72, 254. G. Jens, "Rivalry between Riga and Tartu for the Trade 
with Pskov in the XVI and XVII Centuries", Baltic and Scandinavian Countries 
IV (1938), 153-154. G. Ens (Jens), "Moskovskoe torgovoe podvor'e v Rige v XVI I 
veke",  Voprocki Istorii 11 (1947), 74-79. 
4 A great deal of illuminating material on Russian shipping in Stockholm is 
kept in Stockholm's City archives (minutes of the Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce, 
customs accounts, etc.). 
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trade, too, fell to one of secondary importance. Changes in economic and geog-
raphical conditions and in commercial policy made Reval's Russian trade 
but a dim reflection of what it had been in the city's heyday, the time of the 
Hanseatic League. Narva held a trump card over Reval in that nature had 
given her good water communications with Pskov via the Narova and Lake 
Peipus, and in that she was on the whole nearer to the Russian hemp and flax 
district. In the end Narva had only one rival — the old city of Riga. At that 
time Riga's trade area stretched beyond Poland to the Russian-governed 
province of Smolensk and on to Vilna in Lithuania. 
In Narva and Riga there were Englishmen who had come to trade with the 
Swedish Baltic provinces.' But was this just because they were the easiest 
places to which the goods they sought could be transported? It seems that 
Swedish commercial policy also had a hand in linking English trade with 
these two ports, or at least with Narva. Undoubtedly the most important 
instrument of the new staple policy was the policy towards foreigners and 
tariff policy. The laws on foreigners in Narva in particular were instituted 
with regard to the English interest in the transit trade with Russia. 
There is in fact a crucial difference in the policy towards foreigners be-
tween the young town of Narva and the old Estonian and Livonian cities. 
Both in Reval and Riga the English factors had to fight against severe 
local restrictions on foreigners. In 1679, for instance, Englishmen in Riga 
and Reval complained that they were not allowed to spend the winter there.2 
The ancient regulations for trade in Riga restricted foreigners to trade 
with the burghers. The renewed regulations for 1690 reads as follows: "Alle 
Frembde, so entweder See oder Landwerts mit Ihren Wahren zu Stadt 
kommen, sollera dieselbe an Burger und keine Frembde verkaufen, auch 
Ihre retour Wahren von keinen andern als Burgern erhandeln ...". The 
great merchants of Riga — about 400 members of the 'Grosse Gilde' — jeal-
ously guarded their position as middlemen, the 'jus emporii', both against 
their own Swedish authorities and against foreign nations. It is true that 
Riga's trade with the West was inactive and that therefore both the presence 
of Western agents and their capital were necessary to the town's trade;3  
nevertheless, everything possible was done to exclude the foreigners front 
contact with the nobles and peasants of the vast trade area. 
1  See Hinton, 106-107. 
2 'Additional grievances' (Riga, Reval, Narva) 1679, C.O. 388/1. 
3 G. jensch (Jens), Der Handel Rigas im 17. 
 jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur 
livländischen Wirtschaftsgescitichte in schwedischer Zeit. Mitteilungen aus der Liv-
ländischer Geschichte 24:2, Riga 1930, 63-105, 130. von Stiernman, Kongl. Bre/, 
etc. V, 142-144. 
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The situation was different in Narva. By the middle of the 17th century, 
the laws regarding visitors had been relaxed, owing to the consistent policy 
of the authorities. The trade of all goods between the Westerners and the 
Russians could take place freely in a broker's presence in the Russian trade 
depot. The special position of Englishmen in Narva was clue to the treaty 
of 1665 between England and Sweden, which secured them the unhindered 
transit of goods and the right to hold a commercial court. The Narva burgh-
ers, however, who were mainly German in origin, were not content with 
this situation. They stubbornly continued to exert pressure on the central 
authorities with the object of preventing trade between foreigners from 
different nations. In 1673 the Burgrave of Narva, Liliendahl, handed in a 
memorandum on the possibility of attracting the Archangel trade to the 
Baltic. He was of the opinion that the Narva burghers were capable of acting 
as middlemen between the Russians and the Western merchants in the city. 
The Englishmen in Narva had at the same time inquired uneasily about the 
application of the new trade regulations. These, published on March 2lst, 
1673, did indeed aim at limiting the time during which foreign factors might 
stay in the Swedish cities to two months a year.' The Swedish Board of Trade 
in Stockholm, however, recommended that Narva should continue to occupy 
a special position, "Emedan Eders Kongl: Mij:t såsom och dess högloffl: 
Antecessorer för detta, altidh Hafwa uthi en helt annan Consideration tagit 
Narfwa och dhe andre städer i Lijf- och Ingermanlandh, för dhen Ryska 
handellen och Archangelske fahrtcns diversions skull, i thet thersammanstädes  
icke allenast een helt lindrigh tull är, uthan och tillåtet (:hwilket ell'iest här 
i Swerige intet skeer, såsom löpandes emot Lagh och ordinantier:) gäst handla 
medh gäst, opå wisse wilkor och sätt."2 But attempts to deprive the foreign-
ers of their advantageous position continued from the side of Narvas 
burghers. 
As has been pointed out, the 1673 regulation on foreigners was never 
applied in Sweden proper. On October 4th, 1687, their stay was again fixed 
at four months; at the same time they were forbidden to stay the winter in 
1 Cf. above, p. 59. 
2 "As both You• Royal Majesty and His most honourable Concillors in these 
matters have always adopted quite a different attitude towards Narva and the 
other towns in Livonia and lngria for the sake of diverting Russian trade and 
the traffic over Archangel, in that in these same towns there is not only a very 
much lower rate of Customs charges but also permission (which is not granted 
elsewhere in Sweden, as it is contrary to Law and Ordinances) for foreigners to 
trade with foreigners, on certain terms and in certain ways. "Burgrave Liliendahl's 
memorandum (1673), (Trade and Shipping 1), RA. See also Nordin Coll., vol. 415 
(Narvas desideria, 1673), UUB. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. (undated) 1674, RA. 
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the country.' But the right of West European merchants in Narva to trade 
with the Russians was confirmed on the same day. The burghers of Narva 
did indeed try to seize the opportunity and were supported by the Ingrian 
frontier commission; but the central authorities in Stockholm were agreed 
on the importance of foreigners retaining the right to trade with each other 
in Narva. The Governor General of Ingria, Count Jöran Sperling, was 
nevertheless informed by the government that neither the Westerners nor 
the Russians were to regard this as a perpetual privilege. The foreigners 
ought to be made to realise this so that they might be induced to obtain 
citizenship of the town. The Royal Chancellery had therefore considered 
it extremely important that nothing should be given in writing to the English 
envoy, who had been alarmed by his uneasy countrymen in Narva.2 
The real Swedish motives can be seen more clearly from the internal 
correspondence between the central authorities in Stockholm and the local 
administrative bodies. For instance, we get an interesting glimpse of the 
attitude towards free trade between the Russians and other foreigners in 
Narva from the Swedish Board of Trade's pronouncement quoted above. 
Sperling, the Governor General, had been present when the question came up 
before the Board: consequently, the burghers' interests in the prohibition 
had been put forward. He also pointed out that the terms of the Kardis 
peace treaty allowed the Russians free trade in Stockholm, Riga, Reval and 
Narva (article X) but that no express mention was made of the right to trade 
with other foreigners. As Count Sperling was an authority on the matter, 
the Board agreed that it was possible to forbid mutual trade between visi-
tors; but this was to happen only after the number of burghers in Narva 
had increased and the shipping position had become more stable. It was to 
be feared that the Russians would protest and this was reason enough to 
proceed cautiously. Progress was described as promising: the trade turnover 
had considerably increased since the 1670's. Later in the same year, Sperling 
emphasized that the Narva burghers still lacked the capital to run the transit 
traffic themselves. According to him, even the burghers themselves admitted 
that to finance it lay beyond their resources both of capital and credit. 
1  Cf. above, p. 63. 
2 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bret, etc. IV, 899. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 21/7/1687, 
RA. The Governor General of Ingria, Count Jöran Sperling, to K. of Sw. 16/11/1687, 
Livonica II, 187, ibid. The English envoy Edmund Poley's memorandum on the 
'grievances' of Englishmen in Narva, Memoranda and Notes of English Embassies, 
1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. "Påminnelser vid Engelska envoyéns memorial etc." 
['Remarks on the English envoy's memorandum, etc.'' in Memoranda and reports 
on foreign affairs 1684-87, RA. Poley to Lord Middleton 30/11/1687, 25/1, 21/3/ 
1688, KB. 
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By the time the action against foreign trade agents culminated in Stock-
holm and Gothenburg in 1695-96, the burghers of Narva tried to act like-
wise.' But the Board of Trade opposed all measures against the foreigners 
there; in the prevailing circumstances an attack on the important foreign 
merchants in Narva would be most inopportune. The Board was always 
anxious to point out, however, that the lenient law for foreigners in Narva 
was not a perpetual privilege. Freedom of trade was only granted at a suit-
able time. Any Russian attempts to attain the same status in Riga should 
be opposed since, according to the pacts, Russian trade rights in the Swedish 
cities were confined to trade between the merchants of those two countries 
and did not apply to a third party. Thus the Board's attitude was the same 
as before. It its obvious, however, that it was precisely this lenient law for 
foreigners which was one of the reasons for the yearly increase of Narva's 
and Nyen's transit-trade. The other reason was the tariff policy.2 
II 
The basis for the system of tariffs in the Estonian and Ingrian area during 
the latter half of the 17th century was the 1648 regulation concerning the 
transitduty and transit-trade in Reval, Narva and Nyen. The tariff on goods 
in transit, with the exception of salt and wine, was then lowered to 2 % of 
their value. The duty on Russian goods in Narva and Nyen had already been 
abolished five years earlier. At the same time, free trade for foreigners from 
east and west was established (article V I). Neither of these privileges were 
extended to Reval. From a technical aspect the regulation contained a simpli-
fication of the method of collecting duties, and from an economic aspect a 
lowering of the transit-duty. Foreigners must have gained enormously from 
this, even though it was naturally not always easy to apply the new system.3  
Complaints about annoyances during customs inspections could not be avoided. 
In 1694 Count Sperling pointed out that from the foreigners' point of view the 
duties in Narva were as large as those in Archangel. In Narva, however, the 
West European factors complained that their goods were opened, which did 
not happen in Archangel. Sperling therefore recommended that there should 
1 
 Cf. above, p. 65 ff. 
2 Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 18/3/1697, 6/12/1698, RA. 
3 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bref. etc., II, Stockholm 1750, 532 ff. Scorn, 79-164, 
255. For the tariff system in Livonia, Estonia and Ingria at the end of the Swedish 
period, see, e.g., P. J. Marperger, Schwedischer Kauffman, in sich haltende eine 
kurze geographische und  historische Beschreibung des Königreichs Schweden etc., 
Wismar-Leipzig 1706, 293 ff. 
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be no inspection at customs examinations.1  New kinds of transit goods also 
caused difficulties at the customs. In 1698 Czar Peter granted an English 
merchant syndicate the monopoly of tobacco imports into Russia.2 Tobacco 
had earlier been forbidden in Russia. Part of the first consignment was sent 
via Narva, where, according to the tariff regulations, the same duty was 
required for the consignment as for tobacco destined for Ingria. John Robin-
son, England's representative in Stockholm, appealed to the Swedish Govern-
ment, but his request for the customary tariff on tobacco in transit was 
refused. On the other hand, the government agreed both to free transit-to-
bacco from the municipal harbour dues claimed by the Narva authorities 
and also not to rank ordinary cut tobacco in the same category as fine Vir-
ginia tobacco. It was typical that at the same time Leijoncrona, the Swedish 
resident in London, was instructed to watch whether after this Englishmen 
would instead send the tobacco via Archangel -- so much anxiety was 
there to keep and enlarge Narva's English trade? 
From England's point of view, Narva was the only important city in Estonia 
and Ingria. Despite the efforts of Swedish commercial politicians, Nyen 
was not able to assert herself, probably because both the visits of West Euro-
peans to Archangel and the Russian direct traffic to Stockhoten hindered 
the town's development. It was only when Russian commercial policy in 
the next century did all in its power to make St. Petersburg the great port 
and trading city of the Russian realm that the geographical advantages of 
Nyen's position could be utilized. English ships en route to Narva only occa-
sionally unloaded part of their cargo in Nyen and Reval. English complaints 
about difficulties of trade in Nyen and Reval, therefore, chiefly concerned 
the customs examinations of these small consignments of goods; the Swedish 
authorities opposed, for instance, English petitions in 1689 to be allowed 
to pay the duty on tobacco unloaded in Reval and Nyen in those towns, 
but to wait until Narva for payment on the rest of the cargo.4 The autho-
rities considered this would only lead to fraud, and refused the petitions. 
' Sown, 153-156, The Governor General of lngria to K. of Sw. 3/4/1694, Livo-
nica 11, 186, RA. 
2 See below, p. 95. 
3 von Stiernman, Kongl. Bref, etc. V, 765. John Robinson's memorandum 14th 
Oct. 1698 and K. of Sw.'s reply, Memoranda and notes of Eng. Embassies 1591 
—1692. K. of Sw. to Leijonbergh 15/2/1699 with enclosures, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. 
of T. to K. of Sw. 13/12/1698, 25/5, 7/9/1699, RA. 
4 Narva Magistrates to K. of Sw. 29/6/1683, Livonica Il, 206, RA. Edmund 
Poley's memorandum on the 'grievances' of the English in Narva, Memoranda 
and notes of Eng. Embassies 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 
17/1/1689, RA. 
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In this way, too, English trade within the Gulf of Finland was concentrated on  
Narva.  
From the tariff point of view, Riga was slower than the Estonian and Ingrian 
staple towns in enjoying the benefits of the favourable Swedish tariff policy 
towards transit-goods. It was only after 1676, when the Russian trade became 
the monopoly of Liiders and Wesseling, native Riga merchants, that the 
transit-duty on Russian goods was put as low as 11/2 % of their value. The 
object of this low duty was to attract back to Riga the goods from the Smo-
lensk area, which had recently been ceded to Russia by the Poles. It is true 
that the transit-duty was raised in 1691, when the Russian trade was opened 
to all the Riga burghers, but only to 21/2 
The real trade area served by Riga was however that of Polish Lithuania. 
It was not transit-duty but dues on goods transported by sea which affected 
the supply to and from this area. In the middle of the 1680's, the English 
factors in Riga asked for the high tariff to be lowered by a sixth, a benefit 
already enjoyed by the Dutch and Swedes.' 
In 1688 the state export duty (the licent) on timber was finally lowered to 
4 °A, but it was raised for other goods. For instance, three times as much duty 
was paid in Riga on a shippund ('skeppund') of pure hemp as in Narva.2 At 
the end of the century there were complaints in Riga that the port charges 
for a ship with a tonnage of 150 lasts came to almost a quarter of the licent 
duty.3 It was therefore obvious that the customs policy made Riga a less 
inviting town than Narva, from which no complaints had been received 
about the customs duty either from the English or the native burghers. 
The latter paid certain customs duties in the current coinage, while the Eng-
lish were compelled to make the same payments in Albert dialers. U. Handrack, 
Der Handel der Stadt Riga im 18. jahrhundert, Jena 1932, 60. J. Kleintjes, "Relations 
between Latvia and Holland: XIII --XIX Centuries", Baltic and Scandinavian 
Countries IV (1938), 312. 
2 For licent tariffs, see especially Extract aff den Rijgischke Licent Taxan etc. 
(Excerpt of the Riga duty tariffs etc.), Customs and tariff account of the Baltic Pro-
vinces 33, Kammararkivet.  
3 Jensch, Der Handel Rigas, 119 ff. G. Wittrock, Karl X l's förmyndares finans-
politik etc. 1668-1672 [The Finance policy etc. of Charles Xl's guardians]. Skr.  
utg. K. Hum. Vet. Samf. Upps. 19:1, Uppsala 1917, 81 ff. Marperger, Swedischer 
Kauffmann etc., 313 ff. von Stiernman, Kongl. Bref etc., IV, 158, 643, 1036; V, 
288. English merchants in Riga to the Governor General of Livonia, Krister Horn 
(undated), Baltic committees 1684-86, Livonica II, 497. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 
10/2/1674, 24/5/1676, RA. Sw. B. of T. and Treasury to the Sw. General Customs 
Administrator 3/2, 16/3, 1/7/1684, Alphabetically arranged extracts, etc., from cor-
respondence and resolutions 1577-1700, Arch. of the Sw. General Customs Board. 
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Finally, Narva had yet another advantage highly valued by the English 
there; they enjoyed the right of free religious worship which the Dutch, in a 
similar position, had at first vainly sought in Riga. The English in Narva 
were granted this right on December 16th, 1684. This step was the more 
remarkable as the question of religious worship of foreigners was discussed 
in Sweden proper at the same time. Sperling had eagerly recommended 
the granting of this privilege, pointing out to the Swedish government the 
importance of the English to the city's Russian trade. According to him, 
every Swedish patriot should long to destroy the Archangel traffic. Nor 
should the Englishmen's religious worship cause annoyance, since it would 
be in English and for Englishmen only. In a long statement, the Lutheran 
superintendent in Narva, Johannes Gezelius, also supported these special 
privileges. The English colony called upon Charles Thirlby, who was appointed 
by the Bishop of London, to be their preacher. The services took place 
in a private house called 'the English Church'.1 
 One is struck by the com-
mercial policy behind this departure from the official and strictly Lutheran 
church policy within the confines of the Swedish Church. When John Robin-
son, the English minister in Stockholm, protested against the attempt to 
drive English factors out of Gothenburg and Stockholm, the Swedish govern-
ment was able to point to the fact that the English in Narva enjoyed great-
er freedom of trade and worship than any other nation. From this point 
of view the brisk English trade in Narva has a very special interest. 
3. The English Tar Supply and the Swedish Monopolistic Policy 
'The reason is that now and for several years last part there 
is a [Tar] company erected at Stockholm, who in consideration of 
a certain summe of money to the King have the sole power of 
buying & selling that Commodity as also of Pitch, whereas for-
merly before this Company, we had the freedom of an open market 
and bought it for less than half the present price.' 
Gilbert Heathcote to the Board of Trade, Sept. 30th, 1700. 
To the English, perhaps the most irritating aspect of Swedish commercial 
policy was the concentration of tar and pitch, Finland's most important 
1  Gov. Gen. of Ingria to K. of Sw. 14/11/1684, 24/9/1685, Livonica II, 186; 
9/8/1688, Livonica II, 188, Note to Leijoncrona, the resident in London, Robinson's 
memorandum 21/2/1695. Memoranda and notes of Engl. Embassies 1693-1730 
with Negotiations 1680-1700, Dipl.Angl. 
6 
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exports, in the hands of a monopoly company. This had happened in 1648, 
when a newly-formed joint-stock company had been entrusted with the 
export of these forest products, which came from the area north of a line 
between Stockholm and Nyen. The existence of the tar company was a 
permanent thorn in in the flesh to English interests: the company's price 
policy aimed at limiting the quantity, with the object of keeping the price level 
as high as possible. The fight between the company's directors in Stockholm 
and the English factors there finally amounted to a question of agent's profits. 
The company had previously had its own agent in London, and the object 
of its export policy was to transport the tar and pitch to English harbours 
in its own ships and to arrange the sale there through its own agent. The 
company's internal strength was originally based on having amongst its 
shareholders a combination of Stockholm merchants and courtiers. At the 
beginning of the 1670's, Joseph Verden, the English envoy, described the 
Tar Company as the counterpart of the English East India Company. The 
shares, he says, were divided between merchants who knew trade methods 
and nobles who had the ear of the King.' Externally, the company's position 
rested on the fact that Sweden had a greater production monopoly on tar 
and pitch than on any other goods. Attempts were matte to exploit this 
production monopoly both by the Swedish merchants with an eye to profit 
and by the Swedish politicians in the game of power politics.2 
In the 1650's Englishmen in Stockholm began to appear as tar buyers. This 
was in marked contrast to the export to Holland, which was entirely admin-
istered by the company's directors. Conflict between the English buyers 
and the Stockholm directors was therefore likely. The English Govern-
ment resolutely supported its own merchants; the supply of pitch and tar 
for the needs of the Navy was a state concern. The Swedish Government's 
attitude wavered. On several occasions the Tar Company advanced large 
sums to the exchequer; it had influential friends at court, but the discon- 
1  Undated memorandum on the tar trade received 1/4/1672, Coventry Papers 
LXVIII. Cf. Cal.S.P.,Dom., 1672, 263. The memorandum (or rather a copy of 
it) has obviously been used by J. Williams, A Discourse relating to the trade etc., 
87 ff. (in A General Treatise of Money-exchanges etc., London 1707), which gives 
the same views and information concerning the Swedish tar monopoly. 
2 For the tar monopoly, see 0. Fyhrvall, Bidrag till svenska handelslagstiftningens  
historia I. Tjärhandelskompanierna. [A contribution to the history of Swedish 
commercial legislation I: The Tar Companies]. Hist.Bibl. 7, Stockholm 1880; and 
A. Hallberg, "Tjärexport och tjärhandelskompanierna under stormaktstiden" [Tar 
export and the tar companies during Sweden's great power period]. Historiska och 
litteraturhistoriska studier 34, Helsingfors 1959, 86-190 (and other sources in the 
above). 
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tent felt amongst the producers -- the peasants of Finland and Norrland 
-- and amongst the intermediary agents — the burghers in Finnish and 
Norrland towns who were compelled to deliver the tar to Stockholm — 
could not always be appeased. In addition, the tar trade was of great im-
portance in foreign policy. It was true that there was no further risk of 
Amsterdam's replacing Stockholm as a staple town for tar — the English 
had themselves seen to this by prohibiting the import of pitch and tar from 
Holland (Act of Frauds, 1662). But it was difficult to set aside the English 
petitions that the Admiralty purveyors should be allowed to make pur-
chases in Stockholm through its own agents.: The Swedish attitude to the 
monopoly question therefore varied according to market conditions, as the 
English diplomats and merchants were to learn by bitter experience. 
In the trade negotiations of the 1660's, the English demanded the aboli-
tion of the monopoly. This certainly originated from the merchants but fell 
on good soil amongst the statesmen.2 The latter did, it is true, understand 
the Swedish monopoly policy better. The Secretary of State, Henry Coventry, 
for instance, who was very familiar with Swedish affairs, pointed out to his 
colleague, Lord Arlington, that it was necessary to control tar-distillation 
in Sweden: otherwise the forests would be destroyed, there would be over-
production of tar and prices would fall. Coventry had learnt the Swedish 
arguments for monopolizing the tar trade when he was in Sweden.3 Yet it 
was neither the work of the diplomats nor the effect of opinion at home 
which brought the Tar Company to its knees in 1672: financial troubles 
compelled its liquidization.4 But from the ashes of the old there at once rose 
a new company, which had to some extent the same interests and directors. 
While the old Tar Company was in its death-throes in the spring of 1672, 
the English envoy Joseph Verden was staying in Stockholm. One of Verden's 
tasks was to buy 1000 lasts of pitch and tar on behalf of the English Crown. 
1  See above, p. 68. 
2 See p. 31 note 1. Complaints by the Eastland Company about the Swedish 
tar monopoly: S.P.,For. 95/12, f. 91-92 and C.O. 389/l, f. 30 ff. The Swedish reply 
reported by Gerentz, 48. 
3 Coventry to Lord Arlington 14/2/1672, Coventry Papers LXV. 
4 Hallberg, 120 ff. Unsigned memorandum "Concerning the Trade of Pitch & 
Tarr in Sweden 1672", S.P.,For. 95/8, p. 147 ff. For the memorandum's origin, 
see Sir Edward Wood's secretary, William Allestree, to Joseph Williamson 19/10/ 
1672, S.P.,For. 95/8. The memorandum is not in Allestree's writing. 
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There was a good precedent in the Scottish burgher James Tempel's (Timpel) 
tar contract with the Swedish Government. In payment for a loan, Tempel 
had been given royal permission to ship out 1000 lasts a year for three years. 
In May, Jacob Magnus de la Gardie, the Chancellor, promised Verden the 
desired amount in exchange for a quick conclusion of the bargain.1 At the 
same time a daring plan was hatched in England: to try to turn the Swed-
ish tar monopoly into an English one. This was just before the conflict 
with Holland, and the intention was to cut the Dutch off from the tar supply. 
Verden, however, advised against all such measures: the Tar Company's 
annual exports amounted to 6000 lasts, of which 4/5 were tar and 1/5 pitch; 
it would cost the English about £ 40.000 to buy up this quantity. It would, 
in addition, be necessary to oust the tar from South Sweden, Norway and 
Russia: the Dutch imported 1000 lasts from Archangel and also kept 10000 
lasts in store. The Swedish monopoly policy over the last decades, with its 
constant rise in prices, had increased the production of tar in areas which 
were not controlled by the Tar Company.2 
After the outbreak of the Dutch war, Verden was succeeded in Stockholm by 
Sir Edward Wood.3 His task was to continue where Coventry and Verden had 
left off. Sir Edward's instructions contained, amongst other things, an order 
to procure the 1000 lasts which Verden had been commissioned to arrange.4 
The matter was undertaken by the merchant Samuel Sowton and by Johan 
Strother, his partner. They contracted for an annual delivery of 1200 lasts of 
tar and 200 of pitch for 1673-75.5 At the same time, they obtained from the 
Tar Company the sole right to supply the English market. Payment was 
to be made by bills of exchange on Amsterdam, to be cashed by Philip Botte, 
the company's agent there. Smooth co-operation thus seemed to be develop-
ing between the English and the Swedish monopolists. But there was no 
corresponding confidence on the Swedish side. Messrs. Sowton & Strother had 
given credit to their business friends in the Tar Company and in 1677 they 
still had important claims on it. The English Privy Council therefore ordered 
Sir Edward to intervene with the Swedish Government.° 
1 J. Verden to Lord Arlington, May, 1672, S.P.,For. 95/8, Henry Coventry to 
Lord Arlington 1/5, 8/5/1672, Coventry Papers LXV. 
2 Undated memorandum on the tar trade, received 1/4/1672, Coventry Papers 
LXVI I I. 
3 See above, p. 59. 
4 Cal.S.P.,Dom., May 18th to September 30th 1672, 321. 
6 For 1674 all 1400 lasts were of tar. 
s Hallberg, 125. Civil Acts 89/1678, Stockholms City Arch. P.C. 2/66, p. 9. 
'Some Reflexions upon England's Trade with Sweden. Anno 1677', S.P.,For. 
95/11, f. 17 ff., 20 (William Allestree's writing). Cal.S.P., Dom., 1677-1678, 108, 
462. 
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The envoy had other reasons for taking up the tar question. During the win-
ter, the Tar Company had offered to sell tar to the English factors in Stockholm, 
but these — amongst whom is mentioned Urban Hall, Junior -- lacked both 
the capital and the authority from their employers in England. They were 
therefore unable immediately to accept the consignment, with the result that 
it went instead to the Dutch for £ 5.000. When the shipping season began, 
the English ships that came to Stockholm were unable to get a cargo of tar 
in return. Instead, the Tar Company tried themselves to sell tar and pitch 
on the English market through a cover in London, the merchant Jacob Davies. 
This was arranged through Botte, the Company's agent in Amsterdam, so 
it is probable that there was Dutch capital behind the idea. Sir Edward now 
complained to the highest authority. The Swedish Board of Trade recommen-
ded his request, pointing out how important it was to have a counter-
weight to the Dutch. The Government's resolution also took the same line: 
Englishmen should be given the right to buy and ship out tar. When the 
Councillors justified their point of view to the King, who was absent on 
campaign, they found it desirable to point out what a great advantage the 
English trade was to the kingdom and its inhabitants. According to Sir Ed-
ward, the Tar Company and the Dutch put up a hard struggle, but the attitude 
taken by the President of the Swedish Board of Trade, Councillor Kurck, 
decided the outcome. If the Tar Company had not been browbeaten, he adds 
in his report to Henry Coventry, the sugar and tobacco companies would have 
followed in its footsteps. The following year Sir Edward was nevertheless again 
having the same trouble with the Tar Company. In the spring the English 
factors were able to buy up tar and pitch, but when the Dutch ships came in 
this came to a halt.' The powerful position held by the Dutch in the tar 
market was probably because of their financial superiority. In giving generous 
credit they had an excellent instrument for ensuring continued delivery. 
The Swedish monopoly policy was most successful during the complications 
caused by war, with its great demand for naval stores and its high prices.2 
With the coming of the 1680's and general peace, the monopolization of the 
exports did not help to keep up the price level. Instead of still stricter reg- 
1 Hallberg, 125-126. Wood to Joseph Williamson 22/7, 2I/8/ 1677, S.P., For. 
95/10. Wood to Henry Coventry 17/7, 10/8, 21/8, 31/8, 20/9/1677, 20/10/1678, 
Coventry Papers LXVI. Wood's memorandum 25/7, 26/7/1677, Memoranda and 
notes of Eng. Embassies 1591-1692, Dipl.Angl. (the latter one also in Trade and 
Shipping 1, Kammararkivet). Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 11/8/1677, RA. Government 
to K. of Sw. 1818/1677, RA. 
2 For prices of tar and pitch in England, see W. Beveridge, Prices and Wages 
in England from the twelfth to the nineteenth century, London (Oxford) 1939. 
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illations so as to survive the crisis caused by peace, the Swedish Govern-
ment completely altered course. In 1682 the Tar Company's charter was not 
renewed. Politics also contributed to the company's downfall. The monopoly 
companies had been one of the subjects at issue between Holland and Sweden 
in the peace-talks of 1679 at Nijmegen.1 At the ratification of the peace 
and trade treaty, Sweden had to promise, besides other commercial conces-
sions, to abolish the privileges of the companies;2 and the following year pres-
sure was also brought to bear in the same direction by Warwick, the English 
envoy .3 The actions of the foreign powers were accompanied by the grumbling 
dissatisfaction of the provinces with the hated Stockholm-directed company. 
II 
Plans for a new tar company were again stimulated by the outbreak of the 
war in 1688. The 'Tar Trade Association' was formed the following year on 
almost the same principles as its predecessors. Its organisation was even better, 
since the tar from the south, which accounted for 1/4 to l/5 of the total ex-
ports from Sweden, was now covered by the privileges. The company was 
obliged to purchase 8000 lasts of tar annually. The big Stockholm wholesalers 
saw a chance of lining their pockets at the expense of those engaged in the 
war, but this was nevertheless to prove unexpectedly difficult, owing to the 
ruthlessness with which the trade war was waged.4 
The proclamation by the Maritime Powers forbidding trade with France 
was coupled with other English measures. The old English plan to buy up 
ship-building materials, chiefly tar, reared its head again. Sweden would be 
allowed free trade with France in exchange for allowing the allies, England and 
Holland, first right to buy naval stores. In 1690, Duncombe, the new English 
envoy, concluded a contract with the tar directors for the delivery of a total 
of 5000 lasts of pitch and tar. At the same time, the Tar Trade Association 
engaged not to sell tar and pitch to other buyers before June 1st; but as they 
nevertheless made some minor sales before the end of the period, the English 
revoked the contract, accusing the tar directors of having broken it.6 
1  See above, p. 34. 
2 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken [Swedish foreign policy], 219. Hof /-
stedl, 377 ff. 
3 See p. 38, note 3. 
Hallberg, 130 ff. 
6 Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 153. Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 5/3, 12/3, 
19/3, 22/3, 26/3, 2/4, 5/4, 19/4, 19/11/1690, S.P.,For. 95/13. Nottingham to Duncombe 
15/4/1690, S. P., For. 104/153. 
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The directors in turn accused the English of not daring to take the great 
risks involved in this giant operation. There is reason to doubt whether the 
English offer was seriously meant. It was perhaps only a move in the campaign 
to hinder and delay deliveries to France. Nottingham's letter certainly indi-
cates that the royal hand was behind the suggestion. The Swedish authorities 
were irresolute for quite different reasons: if the contract were fulfilled, there 
would be a great risk of antagonizing France, on whom Sweden depended 
for supplies of salt and wine. From various points of view, the most acceptable 
solution seemed to be an active Swedish trade in tar and pitch. But the 
government discussions showed how fear of war-time privateers put a damper' 
on the plans for the Swedes to transport the tar to the buyers' ports. In 
addition, the English threatened to treat the tar as contraband.' 
The English purchase of tar, unlike the Dutch, was overwhelmingly 
confined to Sweden, especially to Stockholm.2 According to contemporary 
sources, England's annual import of tar and pitch amounted to 3000 lasts 
between 1693-95, of which 3/4 came from Sweden. In such circumstances 
the Swedish Tar Company could continue to try and exploit its position in 
the English market as long as the war lasted. In the spring of 1695, for instance, 
the tar directors employed the old tactics of refusing to sell to the English 
buyers in Stockholm.3  
This was probably due to an attempt to push up prices. Even at the begin-
ning of the war the prices of tar and pitch were high — they almost doubled 
after the outbreak of war. The increase in both Swedish and English duties 
contributed to the rise, but it was certainly chiefly clue to the increased de-
mand, increased transport risks, and fewer offers on account of the war and 
the renewed Swedish monopoly of the tar trade. After the peace of 1697 it 
immediately became a buyer's market, but the consequences of the Great 
Northern War again altered the market situation? The Russian and Amer-
ican. tar then made its entrance into the markets of Western Europe. 
1  ThyrQn, 109 ff. Proceedings of the Swedish Council 22/3, 8/4, 25/11/1690, 
Proceedings of the Swedish Council, (miscellaneous minutes) 1689-92, RA. 
2 The Dutch were already buying tar in Archangel. Hallberg, 93-94, 137 ff. 
Lindhielm, Governor of the province of Viborg, to K. of Sw. 3/4/1 699. Sw. B. of T. 
to K. of Sw. 23/1/1700, RA. 
ö John Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 6/4/1695, S.P.,For. 95/14. 
• Hallberg, 137 ff. Ehrman, 64, 485. Navy Board to Admiralty 12/7/1704, 
Adm. 1/3599. Price alterations 1697-1700 (the Navy Board's buying prices) can 
be followed in Table 5. 
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4. Brandenburg and Denmark—Norway as Commercial Alternatives to Sweden 
'These are most of them such gross & brute wares as employ 
many thousands of our people to convert them into Manufactures 
for the use of our Shipping & other occasions ... If the projects 
for getting Pitch & Tarr from New England, setting up Iron 
works in Norway & being supplyd with Hemp & Flax from Ire-
land were brought to perfection, we might then do with the 
Swedish Commoditys as we would, but till that be, I see not how 
we can that way come to rights with them.' 
John Robinson to Whitehall, Nov. 19th, 1698. 
The great Brandenburg port of Königsberg was flanked by Danzig and 
Riga. It was therefore a dangerous rival from the point of view of both cities, 
and its potential trade area covered their own traditional trading district. 
Despite the fact that the three towns chiefly based their inland communi-
cations on their individual river systems — the Niemen, the Dvina and 
the Vistula —, there was still competition for the marginal belts between 
the river areas. Since 1651, for instance, Brandenburg's tariff policy had 
stopped, by means of high duties, Danzig's supply from Lithuania of heavy 
goods which had gone by sea via the Niemen and the Pregel. The purpose 
behind the electoral policy was to make Königsberg the centre for the whole 
area lying behind it. Its shafts were therefore directed both against its own 
non-staple towns, such as Memel, and against its mighty foreign rivals, 
Riga and Danzig. In 1681, for instance, Riga sent a warning to Stockholm 
about Brandenburg plans for forming a hemp company directed against the 
hemp trade in Danzig and Riga.1  
The official trade relations between England and Brandenburg were 
settled by a ten-year treaty in 1661. This gave the English the position 
of 'the most favoured nation' from the point of view of duties.2 Otherwise, 
their freedom of movement in Königsberg was curtailed by similar restric-
tions to those in the other Baltic staple towns, i.e. they were forbidden 
to stay the winter or to trade with other foreigners.3 The electoral corn- 
1 
 Jensch, Der Handel Rigas, 118. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 25/2/1681, RA. 
2 Th. von Moerner (ed.), Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 
 bis 1700, 
Berlin 1867, 254-255. Brinckmann, 251. 
3 The English agent in Danzig, Francis Sanderson, to Williamson 25/5/1675, 
S.P., For., 88/4, ditto S.P., For., 88/15, 11/9/1677. Council of Trade and Planta-
tions, minutes 17/8/1676, C.O. 391/1. 
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mercial policy was friendly to foreigners in principle, but its application 
was as subject to whims and as dependent on the conjunctures as in the 
other Baltic ports. The Elector's plans to provide a place of refuge in his 
ports for English nonconformist merchants and interlopers from London 
and Bristol produced few concrete results. His efforts to improve the position 
of foreigners where trading privileges were concerned always met with 
opposition from his own merchant corporations. Frederick William's death 
in 1688 only led to an intensification of the burghers' attitude towards the 
application of the laws. In 1692 the old laws about length of stay and trade 
between foreigners were revived. The next year the English and Scottish 
factors complained that whereas previously they had in fact been able to 
buy goods from others besides the burghers, now they were compelled to 
buy from them and to sell to them. Thus the authorities' policy, favourable 
to foreigners in principle, was neutralised by the egoism of the burghers.1 
There were also economic factors working against the plans cherished by 
the town's ruler for out-distancing Danzig and Riga; Danzig had long been 
securely established on the import side as an entrepöt for the great Polish 
market and, on the export side, Riga could offer high-class naval stores. 
'Riga hemp' and 'Riga masts' were already well-known trademarks. From 
a transport point of view, too, Königsberg was in a worse position than 
her rivals in the east. It was only when the Friedrichsgraben canal was 
built in 1696 that the town's water communications with her main artery, 
the Niemen, were improved. Königsberg could thus provide no serious 
threat to Riga's and Danzig's domination of the export and import trade. 
But its possibilities as a market drew a disquieting amount of trade and 
foreign capital there. 
In 1690, the long-expired trade treaty between England and Brandenburg 
was renewed by a treaty of alliance,2 which ushered in a new era of political 
activity in the relations between the two. England attempted to free herself 
1  Rachel, Die Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik, 365 ff. 373 ff., 428 ff., 795.  
H. Rachel, "I-tandel und Handelsrecht von Königsberg in Preussen im 16.-18. Jahr-
hundert". Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte 22 (1909), 
99-126. Urkunden und Aktenstacke zur Geschichte des Kur tarsier' Friedrich Wil-
helm von Brandenburg, 21. Band, herausgegeben von F. Hirsch, Berlin 1915, 339 ff. 
K.-H. Ruffinan, "Engländer und Schotten in den Seestädten Ost- und West-
preussens". Zeitschr. jur Ostforschung 7 (1958), 21-22, Brinckmann, 465. Reso-
lutions of the Elector concerning the English in Königsberg 31/12/1680, 28/3/1681, 
6/l 1682, 12/22 March 1693, Etats—Ministerium, Abt. 74, Pakete 2298, Staat-
liches Archivlager, Göttingen.  
2 The treaties of 1661  and 1690, published in von Moerner. 
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from her extreme dependence on ports in Swedish territory for her increas-
ingly vital imports of naval stores. The crisis in Anglo-Swedish commercial 
relations became acute in 1696-97, when the English factors' freedom of 
movement was threatened in ports in Sweden proper.' 
11 
In 1696 the problem of naval stores was one of the first problems to be dealt 
with by the recently formed Board of Trade. The result of the Swedish 
restrictions was that the English began seriously to look round for other 
ports and production districts from which to get iron, copper, hemp, flax, 
pitch and tar. In 1696 'the Swedish Merchants' recommended "That Weyer 
and Copper may be had from Hamburgh, Pitch and Tarr from Norway 
which may with care be there made as good as that from Sweden".2 The 
merchants were uneasy and desired parliamentary intervention and re-
prisals against Sweden.3 A memorandum from this group of merchants sums 
up as follows, showing what they regarded as being the intention behind 
the Swedish policy:" ... that the English will be altogether deprived of 
their Trade into Sweden, which will be driven by the Sweeds themselves, 
who being once become the sole Importers of Naval Stores, — may impose 
upon the Nation as they shall so fitt, especially in time of Wars."4 Yet, 
according to Leijoncrona, some people wished for an amicable settlement 
with Sweden and a new trade treaty, whereas the eyes of others were turned 
towards Ireland and the Colonies as potential suppliers. William Blathwayt, 
the influential Secretary, even had hopes of the West Indies' power to produce 
naval stores, "which will make the Northern Crowns more reasonable to 
us ..."5 As we have seen, it was just at this time that there were great 
expectations from the American colonies and to a certain extent from Ireland, 
and a number of attempts were made to start production.° 
But people's eyes were at the same time turned towards the other Baltic 
powers — to Sweden's political enemies and commercial rivals. In 1692 
the Brandenburg envoy in London, von Dankelmann, had already succeeded 
in concluding a hemp contract with the English Admiralty, and the same 
1 See above, p. 66. 
2 B. of T., Journals, 1696, C.O. 391/9 (pp. 14, 35, 37, 44, 112, 163). The 'Swedish 
Merchants' memorandum 9/10/1696, C.O. 389/15, pp. 34-37. 
S 
 Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 3/12/1697, Dipl.Angl. 
4 The 'Swedish Merchants" memorandum 21/6/1698, C.O. 389/16, pp. 37-47. 
5 Jacobsen, 329-330. 
e Cf. above, p. 17 ff. 
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year three ships with samples of hemp left Königsberg. It was typical 
that the English Admiralty requested that the hemp should be of the same 
quality as that from Riga. It was on this account that the control (brack) in 
Königsberg was reorganised. Despite this, the English trade agents in the town 
considered that the contracted consignment could only be delivered on the 
condition that a trade organisation was built up in Königsberg similar to 
that in Riga. This dealt with travelling agents, advance payment and deliv-
ery agreements. The Brandenburg government made a still more far-reaching 
proposal after the English factors' position in the Swedish cities seemed 
in 1696 to have become untenable; Königsberg was offered as a place of 
residence for the English in Riga. The Brandenburg envoy promised Trum-
bull deliveries of hemp and tar from Prussian territory. This trade nego-
tiation was chiefly levelled at the Swedish city of Riga and its flourishing 
English trade. The Board of Trade, however, acted in a very reserved man-
ner towards the Brandenburg plan. Had they perhaps come up against 
certain vested interests?1  
Ili 
Denmark, too, scented a chance of profiting from the deteriorating relations 
between England and Sweden. The Danish government, through its London 
representative, offered those Englishmen who had been driven out of Sweden 
the same privileges in Denmark and Norway as those they had lost in Sweden. 
The offer included religious toleration and also the duty-free export of iron for 
a number of years. In return for this concession, the merchants were to put the 
Norwegian iron mines in working order at their own expense. After the 
expiration of the concession period, the mines would be handed over to 
Denmark, but the export duty should continue to be kept at such a low 
level as would enable Norwegian iron to be sold in the English market at 
a price lower than, or the same as, the Swedish. There were also negotiations 
between the two governments in 1696 over deliveries of hemp, flax, masts, 
oak-planks and tar. The Baltic merchants in London seemed interested, 
but they wished to know what quantities might be involved and what priv-
ileges the agents would receive: free import of woollen goods seemed desir-
able to them. There was an optimistic attitude towards the possibilities; 
"As our trade to Swedeland bath increased within the Memory of some yet 
living, in Iron from so small a Beginning as 3 to 400 Tuns p Ann. — to 10 
Rachel, Die Handels-, 'Loll- und Akzisepolitik, 439-441. B. of T., Journals 
24/12, 28/1 2/1 696, C.O. 391/9. B. of T. to Trumbull 28/12/1696, C.O. 389/15, p. 38. 
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or 12000 Tuns as now of late imported annually, and in other goods pro-
portionable to the great advantage of that Kingdom so if Encouragen t 
bee given by the King of Denmark that a Beginning bee made to this trade, 
it is possible that in a course of a year the like encraze may happen ..."1  
The English negotiations between both Brandenburg and Denmark could 
not escape notice in Sweden. Leijoncrona in London was extremely well 
informed and was able to send detailed information to his government. 
He was also able to report to Stockholm on the experiment with synthetic 
tar and on the attempt to get naval stores from the American mainland and 
the West Indies.2 There was indeed no reason for the English to make a 
secret of these matters. On the contrary, both the negotiations with the 
Baltic powers and the eager attempts to start the production of important 
naval stores at home and in the colonies could be used as weapons in the 
lengthy discussions with Sweden over the position of the factors and the 
renewal of the trade treaty .3 Concrete results did not, however, come from 
the attempt to play the small resources of Brandenburg and Denmark-
Norway against those of the Swedish realm. On the other hand, the inten-
sified trade connections between England and Russia in her 'Transition 
period' were of greater importance from a long-term point of view. 
5. Russia Comes into the Foreground 
'And for as much yor Matte during ye wars wth  the Dutch hath 
been put to great Straites, for want of Navall Stores, Welt have 
been then bought at vast Rates. That yor Matte may be pleased 
to cause Inspection to be made of what Quantity of Tarr Hemp 
& Cable-yarne, may be sufficient for ye supply of yor Mats Navy; 
And to contract wth ye sd Emperor that all such Tarr Hemp & 
Cable-yarne may be delivered to yor Mats Agents there yearly 
and every yeare at a constant and certaine Rate'. 
John Hebdon to Whitehall, 1676. 
One of the key figures in English policy in the Baltic sphere around 1670 
was Henry Coventry, who was twice envoy to Sweden and later Secretary 
of State for the North. Material is preserved amongst his papers on the 
1  M. Lane, "The relations between England and the Northern Powers, 1689-
1697. Part I. Denmark." Trans.R.Hist.Soc. 3rd ser., vol. V, London 1911, 183. B. 
of T., Journals 3/8, 27/11/1696, C.O. 391/9. The correspondence relating to this 
in C.O. 389/15, pp. 1-11, and C.O. 388/6, A 2, A 7, A 16. 
' Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/2, 3/12/1697, Dipl.Angl. 
3 See above, p. 49, 71. 
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Russian trade and the Anglo-Swedish relations.' The author of 'As for drawing 
the Archangel trade into the Baltic' lists the English terms for co-operation 
with Sweden over this: Sweden should fix lower duties for them and they 
should have preference over other nations in the Baltic ports; through Swed-
ish and Polish pressure in Russia, the English should be given the same 
special privileges for traffic through the Baltic as in Archangel. In addition, 
the English demanded guarantees of freedom of worship in the Baltic ports. 
The author of another memorandum, however, is suspicious of the Swedish 
plan to direct the Russian trade to the Baltic, chiefly to Narva. England, he 
says, should negotiate with the Russians herself; it seems dangerous for her to 
tie herself to Sweden, who can bring trade in the Baltic to a standstill. If the 
privileges possessed by the Muscovy or Eastland Companies prevent direct 
contact with the Russian market, then Parliament can change or annul them. 
Each memorandum illustrates a particular line of English commercial policy 
with regard to the Baltic market, and chiefly to the Russian sector of it. 
The increasing activity of .English commercial policy in the middle of 
the 1670's in East Europe was conditioned by the war situation. English 
policy tried to take advantage of the chance offered to English trade in 
Baltic waters during the war-time market conditions of 1675-79. Am-
bassadors were sent to both Russia and Poland. The envoy to Russia, John 
Hebdon Junior, went by the direct route to Moscow via the Swedish city 
of Riga. But nothing was gained by Hebdon's journey. He was, moreover, 
travelling as much on his own private affairs as the Government's; his 
father had been an important Russia Merchant and Hebdon was anxious 
for the Russians to give him a state import contract for tobacco and an 
export contract for naval stores.2 
Laurence Hyde, Master of the Robes and Ambassador to Poland, was 
instructed to assist in rectifying the 'grievances' of the English in Danzig. 
When he had investigated the situation, however, Hyde was able to report 
that the English trade agents were well treated and had de facto, if not de 
jure, greater privilegies in the city than any other nation. Thus, for different 
reasons, there was little that could be done to further English trade interests 
Coventry Papers LXVIII (memoranda unsigned and undated). 
2 Lubimenko, 247 ff. John Hebdon's memoranda, instructions and dispatches 
in S.P., For. 91/3 and 104/118. 
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in either Russia or Poland prior to the great upheavals in Eastern Europe 
around 1700.1  
II 
There had been some sporadic attempts after Hebdon's mission to en-
courage relations with Russia, but without result. The well-known Russian 
trade regulations of 1667 sharply curtailed the opportunities foreigners had to 
trade. By it the English were deprived of the right to settle in Moscow, Novgo-
rod, Pskov and other trade centres. Attempts were made in 1681, in connection 
with Prince Potemkin's embassy to England, to regain the territory lost 
by English trade in Russia. The English merchants wished to get back 
their privileges of free trade.2 From the war years in the 1690's onwards, 
there was a really serious interest in Russia's potentialities as a source of 
supply for England's strategically important naval stores. Those who favoured 
such trade were stimulated by the 1696 crisis in relations with Sweden. 
English policy now began to follow along lines which had already been 
exposed. Inherent in it was an opposition to Sweden and an attempt to 
break the impending Swedish monopoly of naval stores. Thomas Cletscher, 
the Swedish metallurgist, who wrote about his journey to England in 1696, 
gave an account of the propaganda in Parliament for increasing Anglo-
Russian trade. He described how Russia was well provided with forests, 
rivers and iron ore. The iron industry had good prospects. Pitch and tar 
could be produced in abundance. It would be an advantage for England 
to be supplied with these goods from a country other than Sweden. It would, 
1 Cal.S.P.,Dom. 1676-77, 219-220. P.C. 2/65, p. 284. Laurence Hyde's memo-
randa, instructions and dispatches in S.P.,For. 88/14 (especially Hyde to Whitehall 
l/11 Aug. 1676) and in S.P.,For. 114/18. Cf. also petition of merchants in Danzig, 
1676, C.O. 389/3, p. 89 ff.) and Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 10/7, 
17/8/1676, C.O. 391/1. It was not until 1706 that the English succeeded in exploiting 
the situation created by the Great Northern War and definitely legalized their 
favourable position in Danzig through a trade treaty. But the ancient English 
demand for the right to trade with other foreigners and for freedom of movement 
on the roads and rivers in Danzig's trading area was categorically refused. On 
the other hand, they now officially secured the right of religious worship (Art. IX). 
H. Fiedler, "Danzig und England". Zeitschr. des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins 
68 (1928), 122-124. J. Papritz, "Dietrich Lille und das Englische Haus", ibid. 182. 
H. Bauer, W. Millack, and others, Danzigs Handel in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, 
Danzig 1925, 157-158. 
2 Lubimenko, 251. William Blathwayt to the Governor of the Muscovy Company 
29/11/1681. Charles II to Czar Feodor 12/4/1682, S.P.,For., 104/119. 
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according to the propaganda, be dangerous if England were obliged to limit 
herself to imports from Swedish harbours.1  
At the same time, the Russia Company was attacked in Parliament for 
monopolizing trade in Russia. The Company of those days was a small 
and exclusive group of merchants who monopolized the trade to Archangel 
and who sold licences to the Eastland merchants trading in Narva. In 1694 
there was an unsuccessful opening attack by the Eastland Company to 
throw the company open at a low admission fee. The House of Commons 
rejected the bill by 120 votes to 100. The attack was renewed three years 
later.2 Nathanael Tench, the Governor of the Eastland Company, pointed 
out in Parliament, "That Russia abounds with store of Masts, Timber, 
Firrplank, Hemp, Pitch, Tarr and other Naval and useful commodities, 
which we might be from thence cheaper supplyd than from Prussia, Den-
mark, Sweden and Norway".3 Tench described Russia, who could not en-
gage in a sea war, as an ideal source of supply compared with the other 
countries mentioned. In addition, the freight would go to England, as Rus-
sia was without a merchant fleet. At the same time another useful argu-
ment was brought into the discussion; the inaction of the Russia Company 
had left the trade open to the Dutch, who had contracted for the whole 
of the Russian exports of masts and tar. During Czar Peter's visit to Lon-
don in 1698, a syndicate headed by Gilbert Heathcote had succeeded in 
obtaining a contract for the import of tobacco into Russia.4 This time the 
Eastland Company was seconded by another city group — the Virginia 
merchants — who were interested in the tobacco trade. The holders of the 
tobacco contract, who represented at the same time the chief importers of 
naval stores, pointed out, "If this trade encouraged, we shall bring the great- 
1  T. Cletscher, 'Berättelse om de Europäiske Bergwerken år 1696' [An account 
of the European mines in 1696], 274-277, Arch. of the Board of Mines, RA. Cf. S.  
Rydberg, Svenska studieresor till England under frihetstiden [Swedish study tours to 
England during the Age of Liberty], Uppsala 1951, 149-150. Several grievances 
of the English Merchants in their Trade into the Dominions of the King of Sweden 
etc., BM, Tracts on commerce 816. m. 11. 
2 W. R. Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish 
Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 II, Cambridge 1912, 68-69. 
8 Eastland Merchants to B. of T. 26/11/1697, C.O. 389/15. 
E. Donnan, "Eighteenth-century English Merchants, Micajah Perry". Journ. 
Econ. Bus.Hist. IV (1931-32), 87-88. Lipson, 332-333. Micajah Perry and others 
to Board of Trade 11/8 etc., 1697, C.O. 391/10, p. 193, 417. Reasons for Enlarging 
and Regulating the Trade to Russia and the Narve (pamphlet), presented to Board 
of Trade by Micajah Perry and other Virginia Merchants, 4/2/1698, C.O. 388/6, 
B 69. 
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est part of our Naval stores from Russia in our own shipping when as now, 
we have almost all these Stores brought us from Sweden and in Sweeds 
Ships by w: h` this Nation suffers, Several ways ..."1  This united onslaught 
succeeded and the Russian trade was thrown open by a parliamentary 
resolution in 1699. The price of admission into the Russia Company was 
lowered. The combination of state and business interests had been too power-
ful for the little clique of Russia Merchants. 
III 
The English now had the choice between the American colonies and 
Russia as alternatives to Sweden. The Board of Trade's treatment of the 
problem in 1699 is indicative; "Their Lordships being informed, that two 
ships lately arrived from Russia with some Quantities of Pitch and Tar, 
Which Commodity has not usually been brought from thither. They re-
solved to suspend a while their Report upon the Earl of Bellmont's Proposals 
for bringing Naval Stores from New York, (which were Yesterday under 
consideration) untill they may be better informed, concerning this Trade 
of Pitch and Tar from Russia".2 The outbreak of the Great Northern War 
in the early spring the following year to some extent dashed the hopes aroused 
by the new direct contacts with Russia via Archangel. In 1702, for instance, 
only 4 barrels of tar were received from Russia, but on the other hand the 
quantities of hemp and flax continually increased.3 That year Whitehall 
was much disturbed by Swedish attempts to disrupt the promising trade 
with Archangel, "which being of great importance to the naval stores wee 
bring from there".4 
There was no immediate fulfilment of the hopes entertained in particular 
of the Russian tar. England continued to depend on the Swedish deliveries 
of Stockholm tar for some years to come. Despite this, in 1703-1705 the 
1  Owners of the tobacco contract to B. of T., 1698 (C.O. 389/16, p. 138). 
2 B. of T., Journals 7/1, 10/l, 10/10/1699, 23/4, 27/5, 23/7/1700, C.O. 391/11, 
391/12, 391/13. 
2 See below, p. 123, and also B. of T., Journals (C.O. 391/16, pp. 7, 64). Entry-
books (C.O. 389/18, pp. 29, 36-37) and Correspondence (C.O. 388/9, F. 3/.) Cf. 
House of Lords' Manuscripts. New Series IV (1699-1707), London 1908, 83-85, 
430-436. 
4 Ca1.S.P.,Dom. 1702-1703, 33, 116. Hedges to Robinson 16/6/1702, S.P.,For., 
104/1 53. Cf. N. F. Holm, "Kampen om ryska ishaysvägen på Karl Xll:s tid" [The 
fight for the Russian arctic route in the time of Charles XII], Forum Navale 9, Upp-
sala 1948, 15 ff. 
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English Navy regarded their supply situation as extremely critical. The 
Swedes had a more complete monopoly of pitch and tar than they had of other 
naval stores. It was "the great tar crisis" which finallybrought forth rigorous 
measures to benefit deliveries from the colonies. For decades — and espe-
cially in wartime -- the English buyers had been tyrannised by the great 
Swedish monopolists, the tar companies. But the downfall of the Swedish 
tar monopoly was not only brought about by the colonial tar but equally 
by the appearance in the market of a new European rival — Russia.' 
1 
 The importance of the import possibilites of tar and pitch from Russia in 
breaking the Swedish monopoly is discussed in Appendix II. 
7 
England and Sweden: Some Conclusions 
1 
The main European districts producing those bulk goods which were 
important to the English — such as iron, hemp, flax, tar, pitch and potash 
— lay in the vast areas which stretched from the Arctic Ocean in the north, 
through the Scandinavian forest belt, to the Russo-Polish plateau in the south. 
The production areas of Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden's Baltic pro-
vinces were connected with the coastal towns -- the transit ports — by 
river and sea routes. The Swedish conquests along the Baltic coast during the 
period of expansion between the 16th century and the middle of the 17th 
century put Sweden commercially in an excellent strategic position on the 
eastern arteries for traffic with the trade area; the tributaries of the Dvina, 
Lake Pcipus and the Narova, the Neva and Lake Ladoga. Swedish commer-
cial policy began to exploit this situation, as we have seen, after the con-
quest of the new provinces. 
The rapid geographical expansion of England's direct trade in the Baltic 
after 1650 brought her into close contact with Sweden, at that time the 
leading Baltic power. One of the reasons for this was the combination of 
England's fast increasing economic potentialities and Sweden's coveted ex-
port articles — chiefly bar iron, but also tar and pitch from Finland. The 
second reason was Sweden's domination of the important Baltic hemp and 
flax ports of Riga and Narva. Thus the great Swedish plans for altering 
the course of Russian trade away from Archangel to the Baltic ports tallied 
with the perpetually increasing English demand for Baltic goods: hemp 
and flax from Russia and Poland, iron from Sweden and tar from Finland. 
The political importance of these kinds of goods was greater than their 
mere value: it was the strategically important naval stores, indispensable 
to the great sea powers, which were chiefly concerned. If we analyse the 
part played by bulk goods in English imports from the Baltic area, we there-
fore find a marked disproportion between the mere monetary value of Eng-
land's trade with the whole of Northern Europe and its political and strategic 
importance. 
The summary given below reminds us of how English imports of strategic 
bulk goods were distributed amongst the various areas of origin. At the 
same time it shows in concentrated form the share of each area in the total 
English imports from Northern Europe. 
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Total English imports from Northern Europe of iron, hemp, flax, potash, pitch and 
tar during 1699/1700 (average).1  
% distribution of total 
imports of iron, hemp, 
flax, potash, pitch and tar, 
amongst areas of origin: 
'Sweden' 	  48.0 
'Russia' 26.4 
'East Country' 	  24.1 
'Denmark-Norway' l.5 
Northern Europe 
	  100.0 
Thus 'Sweden', from a monetary aspect, answered for almost half of the 
imports of the five bulky staple goods, so that it was the most important 
import area from the English point of view. But only when we consider 
that part of the imports appearing in the trade statistics under 'East Country' 
went via Riga and those appearing under 'Russia' via Narva — both Swedish 
cities — do we realize Sweden's real share. Only then can one fully appre-
ciate the part played by the commercial element in the official Anglo-
Swedish relations during the 17th century. 
ll 
Anyone who attempts to penetrate further into the early history of Anglo-
Swedish trade relations is struck by obviously paradoxical facts. Official 
feelers were put out concerning trade almost a hundred years before there 
was direct trade of any importance between the two countries. It was only 
in the middle of the 17th century that middlemen were eliminated and that 
active English trade in Sweden got under way. It was at this time that the first 
really important trade treaties were concluded. But after 1674 nothing 
came of the continued attempts to conclude a treaty which would mutually 
control for decades to come the ever-increasing mercantile relations between 
the two countries. 
The problem is presented in a nutshell by the preliminaries to the Anglo-
Swedish trade relations.2 When the official Anglo-Swedish contacts were 
1  For sources and exact figures, see Table 1. 
2 The oldest Anglo-Swedish political relations are described in I. Andersson,  
Erik X iV:s engelska underhandlingar. Studier i svensk diplomati och handelspolitik. 
 
[Erik XIV's negotiations with England. Studies in Swedish diplomacy and trade 
policy], publ. by Vet.-Soc. Lund 17, Lund 1935, 93 ff., 108 ff., 118 ff. Anglo-Swedish 
trade negotiations after 1650 can be followed, e.g., in S. Grauers's "Sverige och den 
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made in the middle of the 16th century on Sweden's initiative, commercial 
policy lay behind it. Gustav Vasa's intention was to by-pass the Hanseatic 
middlemen for West European goods, particularly those of Lfibeck, by means 
of direct trade with England. Another aim was gradually added: to direct 
goods from the Russo-Polish market to the Swedish Baltic ports. Sweden, 
who lacked capital, thought that in the new sea and trade power of England 
she had found a partner who would help to control the stream of goods 
flowing to and from the Russian and Polish markets. Denmark's powerful 
position at that time in the Sound gave his successor, Erik XIV, the idea 
of developing Sweden's only western port -- Elfsborg, at the mouth of the 
Göta river. Elfsborg was to become the staple town for Russian trade. Gothen-
burg, built on the site of Elfsborg, was still allotted this task well into the 
17th century. English passiveness and Dutch progress in both the Arctic 
Ocean and the Baltic hindered these bold plans from the start. But through-
out the new century Swedish statesmen still dreamt of turning the util-
ization of the Russo-Polish market into a source of Swedish wealth. Ltibeck's 
place as a 'middleman' was taken by Holland, and it seemed vital that 
Sweden should make herself independent of Holland as a transit country 
for both her imports and exports. After 1648, the political centre of gravity 
undoubtedly slowly shifted westwards. Sweden at this time acquired a 
fast-growing direct export trade to England and thus adapted herself to 
the new conditions. 
111 
England's commercial interest in the Swedish part of the Baltic is after 
this chiefly reflected in her intensive diplomatic activity during the last 
decades of the 17th century with the object of bringing about a trade treaty 
första engelska navigationsakten" [Sweden and the first English Navigation Act]. 
Hist. stud. tillägn. Ludvig Stavenow [Historical studies dedicated to Ludvig Sta-
venow], Stockholm 1924, 202 ff.;  Olofsson, 253 ff., 315 f., 484 ff.; A. Helmer, De 
diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och England 1633-1654 [Diplomatic 
relations between Sweden and England, 1633-1654], Lund 1893, 84 ff., 91, 97  
ff., 109 f., 111 f., 121  ff., 146 ff.; J. L Carlbom, Sverige och England 1655— aug.  
1657 [Sweden and England, 1655 to Aug. 1657], Gothenburg 1900, 2 ff., 42 ff.,  
64 ff., 100 ff., 120 ff.; T. Gihl, Sverige och västmakterna under Karl X Gustafs andra 
krig med Danmark [Sweden and the Western Powers during Karl X Gustaf's  
second war with Denmark], Uppsala 1913, 74 ff; M. Prestwich, "Diplomacy and 
trade in the Protectorate". fourn.Mod.Hist. XXII (1950), 112 ff. M. B. Ashley, 
Financial and Commercial policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, Oxford 1934, 
126-127, 170-171. Hinton, 126 ff. 
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with Sweden. Sweden could offer vital necessities and was also to some ex-
tent a market for the classical English export, cloth. Nevertheless the connec-
tion between England and Sweden was in the main dictated by power politics. 
The Swedish Empire was geographically scattered and hence insecure; 
alliances with England could strengthen its position in the Baltic. Thus Eng-
land's main interest was in the sphere of commerce, Sweden's in power 
politics. The result of this was that all further diplomatic contacts disclosed 
clear opposing interests involved in the apparent community of interests 
between the two countries. As we have seen, England's price for political 
alliances with Sweden was commercial concessions. The roles were acciden-
tally reversed when England became involved in war with France in 1689 
--97 and was hard pressed, though it should be noted that Sweden's main 
concern was her shipping policy. 
England was the active partner in trade questions as a result of her vast 
trade in Sweden and the Swedish Baltic possessions. In contrast to Eng-
land, Sweden was an undeveloped country which lacked capital for a trade 
offensive in the west. The Swedish heads of state were not insensitive to 
economic arguments and aims, but their hands were tied by the limited 
opportunities the Kingdom had for carrying on an active trade policy. 
Only in wartime conditions could the Swedish government intervene to 
support the neutral Swedish shipping and foreign trade. Otherwise its attitude 
to trade matters was defensive and watchful. 
Where Sweden proper was concerned, one of the most crucial questions 
for English commercial policy in the last decades of the 17th century was 
de facto that of the legal position of the English iron factors in Sweden. 
The eternal theme of the complaints was the curtailment of the foreign 
factors' freedom of movement and trade: the prohibitions on travel in the 
country, restraints on the storage of imports, the prohibitions on owning and 
living on their own property, the loss of part of possessions on dying or leaving 
the country, prohibitions against trading with anyone but the burghers in 
the staple towns, etc. These regulations, however, were international and 
they were also closely connected with local Swedish laws on foreigners and 
staples. There was therefore little chance of altering the principle of this 
system, which had the weight and custom of centuries behind it. But, as 
we have seen, its application varied according to conjunctures. 
Chronologically, activities against the foreigners came to a head during 
periods when Sweden was neutral (1672-73, 1694-96) or when peaceful 
conditions gave prospects of a revival of Swedish trading activities (1687-
88). On the other hand, Sweden gave in to the foreigners when she was 
at war (1676-79, 1700-1720). The rhythm of the attacks against foreign 
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mercantile elements and foreign capital is clearly connected with periods 
of peace and war, that is to say, with the market conditions for Sweden's 
shipping and foreign trade. 
The vacillations of the official Swedish attitude can also be explained in 
another way, as has been pointed out by Heckscher.l The tendency towards 
strict control was connected with the fear that the Swedish iron industry 
would become economically dependent on foreign capital. On the other 
hand, the freedom of movement of the foreigners was to the advantage of 
the iron industry. People with interests in metals had everything to gain 
from a free competition for iron between foreign and domestic buyers. 
Swedish attemps at emancipation in the last decade of the 17th century 
went so far as an endeavour to free themselves not only from foreign enter-
prise but also from the foreign capital supplied by the factors from other 
nations. But here the new severe policy towards foreigners collided with 
the legitimate interests of certain groups and branches of economic life, chiefly 
that of the iron works. This was also the cause of the struggle between the in-
terests of those who worked the forges and of the staple burghers, between 
the interests of the consumers and the distributors. Despite this internal 
conflict between different sectors of the economy, the policy was increasingly 
conducted along lines which must be interpreted as a sharpening of the 
attitude towards foreigners. The driving force behind these actions, which 
were conditioned by the economic situation, is clearly the desire to be free 
from dependence on foreign enterprise and loans. 
Apart from this problem of residence, English trade and shipping met other 
difficulties which Whitehall sought in vain to resolve during the lengthy 
Anglo-Swedish trade negotiations. Throughout these, the English strove to 
reach the Dutch position of 'the most favoured nation' as far as customs 
duties were concerned. They did momentarily gain special privileges which 
de /acto gave English shipping the favoured position in the Swedish realm. 
This was in the dangerous war years of 1675-79, when England was also 
able to enjoy the advantages of neutrality in Scandinavian waters. But after 
the reorganization of the Swedish Baltic empire by Charles XI and his advis-
ers, the English mercantile view not only of the Swedish policy towards 
strangers but also of the regulations governing shipping, customs and manu-
factures is one long lamentation.2 The dissatisfaction came to a head in the 
1 
 Heckscher, Produktplakatet [The Production Edict], 708. 
2 Eastland Company, representations 13/11/1660, C.O. 388/1 (a copy also in C.O. 
389/l and in BM Add. MSS 25115). Memoranda from English merchants in Sweden 
from the 1670's (?), Coventry Papers LXVI, 603 ff. 'Concerning the English Trade 
with Sweden', 1675, S.P.,For. 95/9, f. 168. Undated memorandum in French about 
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1690's and the tension was to return in the great tar crisis of 1703-04. The 
following extract from a pamphlet of 1697 illustrates the anti-Swedish feeling 
and propaganda at the turn of the century:' 
 
"Tis evident that Sweden seeks to lngrosse to itself the Northern Navi-
gation... This appears from the Customes laid upon Merchandize in Sweden 
which are high, and exacted with rigour, but with all so laid wth favour 
to their own shipping, that it is almost impossible for foreign Ships to be 
Employed either for importation or exportation ... 
1 might also speak of the ways they have in Sweden to Monopolize Trade 
by their Tarr and other Companies, and their large Priviledges to the setters 
up of Manufacturies; but I think it will be enough for a paper of few lines 
to hint here, that the Consumption of the English wollen and other Manu-
facturies in Sweden which formerly was considerable, and good profit got 
by it, is now quite lost, except only a little fine Cloath and some Serges ..." 
In many respects the Swedish policy towards shipping, customs, manufac-
tures and the monopolizing of the distribution and sale of certain imports 
and exports proved to be of superficial value. The protection of shipping 
had no deep effect. Conditions in the Swedish shipping industry were not 
determined by royal decree but by alternations in the cycle of peace and 
war. Smuggling and the lack of opportunities to build up Swedish manu-
factures combined to make the effect of the manufacturing policy less than 
was expected.2 It seems likely, on the other hand, that English exports 
of coarse cloth to Sweden were affected by the duty policy and that the 
English difficulties in trade with Sweden, S.P., For. 95/11, f. 48. The same volume 
includes a memorandum to Warwick from English merchants in Stockholm 5/1/ 
1681. There is a pro memoria from Warwick and one from the Eastland Company 
from the same period, C.O. 388/1. The latter volume, which contains original 
correspondence, etc., from the archives of the Council of Trade and Plantations, 
also contains a version of the French memorandum mentioned above (with original 
notes in English) read before the Council of Trade and Plantations 2/7/1679. An 
undated pamphlet from the end of the 1690's, Several Grievances oj the English 
Merchants in their Trade into the Dominions oj the King of Sweden etc., BM, 
816 m. 11 (121) has been reprinted by Hinton, 120-121. This undoubtedly ori-
ginated in connection with the anti-Swedish campaign in Parliament and City 
circles (see p. 49). Another list from a Board of Trade report (1710) has been printed 
with comments by J. F. Chance in "England and Sweden in the Time of William 
III and Anne." Eng.Hist.Rev. XVI (1901), the original of which found in S.P.,For. 
95/15 f. 149-150. 
Patrick LyeII, 'The Northern Ingrosser and Encroacher upon Navigation' (1697), 
C.O. 389/15, p. 311 ff. 
2 
 See my article "The English Navigation Laws and the Baltic Trade, 1660-
1700," Scand.Econ.l-list.Rev. VIII (1960), 12 ff. 
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price of Swedish tar was driven up and kept steadier on the English market 
by preventing competition.' Oscar Bjurling has also maintained that the 
method of collecting import duties in the more valuable rix-dollars and 
export duties merely in silver dollars may have impeded imports and encour-
aged exports.2 English complaints of difficulties in their trade with Sweden 
would appear to have more foundation when seen against this background. 
But there were other valid reasons, quite apart from Swedish economic poli-
cy, for the increasing difficulty in coming to agreement over commercial ques-
tions. The envy and fear of Holland at first united the anti-Dutch politicians 
in London and Sweden. English and Swedish interests had merged during the 
Protectorate through the common desire to force the Dutch out of the Baltic 
trade. There was new enthusiasm for this plan after 1660 and during the 
1675-79 war between Denmark and Sweden, but afterwards we hear no 
more about it. Both politically and commercially, Anglo-Dutch relations 
enter a new and friendlier phase. Both the Maritime Powers had earlier, if 
temporarily, been united by a desire to maintain 'free trade' in the Baltic in 
opposition to those countries which owned its coast line. Towards the end of 
the century, Swedish mercantile ambitions were increasingly directed to-
wards an active Swedish trade, and therefore the opposition both to London 
and Amsterdam became equally pronounced. Thus even in the 1680's the 
severe treatment of foreign trade agents in Sweden united English and 
Dutch diplomacy. Seen against the background of the strict Swedish policy 
towards foreigners, and the customs and shipping regulations in Sweden prop-
er, the danger of a Swedish monopoly of naval stores and Swedish control of 
West European trade with the Russo-Polish market must have seemed very 
real to both the Maritime Powers. During the naval war between England 
and Holland, it already became evident that Sweden might become a com-
mercial and maritime power both east and west of the Sound. The dream 
that Sweden might gain the upper hand in Baltic trade was, however, shatter-
ed by her collapse as a great power in the Great Northern War. 
It is true that after the 1670's we hear no more of Anglo-Swedish dis-
cussions with a view to sharing the profit from the lucrative and strategic-
ally important transit-trade of goods from the Russo-Polish market to 
Western Europe.3 In practice, however, Narva in particular remained one 
of the transit-ports favoured by the Swedish government for the traffic 
1  Cf. Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia [Sweden's economic history]  1:2, 
435, 509. 
2 0. Bjurling, Skånes utrikessjöfart 1660-1720 [Skåne's foreign shipping 1660 
—1720], Lund 1945, 186 ff., 243, 265. 
 
" Cf. above, p. 25, 93.  
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between Russia and England. During the years immediately before the out-
break of the Great Northern War in 1700, plans were put into operation to 
increase Narva's West European Trade.' But by then England had already 
renewed her direct contacts, both diplomatic and economic, with the Rus-
sian authorities and with the Russian market, and had by-passed the Swed-
ish middlemen. 
Sw. B. of 1'. to K. of Sw. 18/3/1697, RA. 
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The Russian and Polish attack on Sweden in 1700 was directed precisely 
at the Baltic transit-ports for Russo-Polish trade, Narva and Riga.1  The 
siege of these two towns was not successful, it is true, and the Swedish Baltic 
provinces were purged of their enemies; but the relations of both towns to 
their trading areas were disturbed, and this, as we have seen, could only have 
a detrimental effect on English trade in the Baltic. England itself was 
drawn into the European war in 1702 and the need for naval stores was again 
accentuated. Relations with Sweden were not of the best; Russian delive-
ries were late in starting. It was in this situation that the American colo-
nies' potential as a source of supply was actively encouraged. The English 
Naval Stores Act of 1705, which put premiums on the import of naval stores 
from the colonies, was, however, not able to remedy the notorious lack of ship-
building material in wartime. The Act was only of importance for supplies of 
tar and pitch, particularly for the merchant navy. The Baltic market, which 
came to be increasingly synonymous with the Russian one, continued to 
play an important part in English commercial policy and power politics 
after the political and economic changes in the Baltic world in the first half 
of the 18th century. Both economic and political relations with Sweden 
became correspondingly less important. Sweden no longer barred the way 
to the Russian market. After 1720 an increasing amount of products which 
had hitherto been almost entirely Swedish monopolies -- iron, tar and pitch 
— could be fetched directly from Russia. Soon Russia began to seem to the 
English as dangerous a Baltic power as Sweden had been in the latter half 
of the 17th century: dangerous both to commercial policy and to power 
politics through its newly-won control of certain naval stores and their ports 
of export. 
1 For the agreement of opinion amongst Swedish, German and Russian histo-
rians over the economic motives behind the Russian attack, see S. Svensson, "Czar 
Peters motiv för kriget med Sverige" 'Czar Peter's motives for the War with Swe-
den], Hist.Tidskr. 1931, 457 ff; R. Wittram, "Peter der Grosse und Livland. Zur 
Kernfrage des Nordischen Krieges". Deutschland und Europa. Festschrift fur Hans 
Rothfels, Dusseldorf 1951, 233 ff. L. N. Nikiforov, Russisch-Englische Beziehungen 
enter Peter I, Weimar 1954, 8 ff. Cf. Rosén, 82 ff. 
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Sir Thomas Roe, the English diplomat and intermediary in the Altmark 
armistice of 1629, had once pointed to the risks of the Baltic becoming 
a Swedish inland sea and of Sweden dominating Baltic imports. Like his 
contemporaries, he regarded this sector of English foreign trade as the basis 
of other trade routes. His well-known statement in the House of Commons in 
1640 shows this, "The most principal trades ... are the Northerne trades, 
which are the rooth of all other, because the Material brought ... from (Swe-
den), Muscowy, Norway, Prussia, and Livony are fundamentall and of abso-
lute necessity for from these trades wee get the Materials of Shipping ... 
which inable us to all the southern Trades ... By those Trades wee sayle to 
the East Indies, and may creat a company for the West Indies for the Golden 
Fleace ...". 
After 1700, the misgivings were over Russia's growing potential politically 
and economically. In 1721, Sir Gilbert Heathcote, the financier and leading 
merchant in the City of London, spoke in the following terms to the House of 
Commons: "That, besides, while we fetch'd our naval stores from Russia it 
was in the power of the Czar, not only to set what price he pleas'd upon them, 
but even to prevent our having them at all ... For whereas we now paid for 
the naval stores from Russia mostly in ready money, we might have them 
from New England, and other English plantations in America, in exchange 
for our own manufactures: whereby we should not only encourage His Majes-
ty's subjects abroad, and divert them from setting up and carrying on manu-
factures which directly interfere with those of Great Britain, ... but also 
employ our poor at home ..."1  
In the eighty years which elapsed between Thomas Roe's statement in 
Parliament about the importance of the Baltic market as a supplier of naval 
stores and that on the same topic by Sir Gilbert Heathcote, the situation had 
not changed except in one respect -- but that one was important enough. 
Instead of Sweden, it was Russia who was the chief trading partner in the 
Baltic. Both Sir Thomas and Sir Gilbert knew what they were talking about. 
The eyes of the former had been opened to 'the Swedish danger' while he was 
an English emissary accredited to Gustavus Adolphus. As a leading Baltic 
merchant, Sir Gilbert Heathcote had a thorough knowledge of the north-
eastern European market. He helped to bring about the Naval Stores Act 
of 1705 and now he rose to defend its extension. The Russian expansion in 
the Baltic after 1700 seemed as dangerous to the English as had the Swedish 
1 Stock, III, 1702--1727, Carn.Inst.Publ. 338:111, Baltimore 1930, 87, 446. Gilbert 
l-leathcote's biography can be found in the Dictionary of National Biography. 
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hegemony in the previous century. The English misgivings were fanned by 
Swedish propaganda. A political pamphlet of Swedish origin stressed that 3/4 
of the world's tar was controlled by the Czar.' 
After the tar crisis had been settled, uneasiness arose over the supply of 
hemp, since the Russians had gained the monopoly of hemp through their 
conquest of the Swedish Baltic ports.2 Apart from this, Russia had of old, as 
we have seen, a prominent position as a supplier of potash. The Board 
of Trade therefore received many proposals for the promotion of potash 
production in the American colonies. Postletwayt, too, whose trade dictionary 
was known throughout the English-speaking world, tried to promote the Rus-
sian method of producing potash, which he describes in detail and recommends 
to his American readers.3 Colonial resources and the possibilities of home 
production thus seemed of equal importance after Sweden had been brought 
down to second rank as a political and economic power? 
Support for the import of strategic bulk goods from the colonies therefore 
continued in the form of import premiums and preference tariffs. The tug-
of-war between home producers and importers also continued over the one 
important Baltic imports which England could produce herself: iron. It is 
characteristic that iron from North America, like the home iron industry, was 
principally promoted when the Baltic supply threatened to dry up or increase 
in price owing to restrictions imposed by war or by the trade and tariff 
policy of the Northern powers.5 In such situations the last resort — imports 
from Holland — remained as repugnant as always, despite the fact that the 
origin of Dutch tar was the Baltic. 
1  S.-G. Havering, "Huvuddrag i svensk och antisvensk propaganda i Västeuropa 
på 1710-talet," [The main features of Swedish and anti-Swedish propaganda in 
Western Europe during the 1710's]. Karol.Förb.Årsb. 1952, 90 ff. 
z See below, Appendix Il.  Murray, Baltic Commerce, 302 ff. Cf. also W. Byrd's 
memorandum to the Board of Trade 1717 (C.O. 323/7, K 79). 
3 T. J. Kreps, "Vicissitudes of the American Potash Industry," Journ.Econ.Bus. 
Hist. 111 (1930-31), 634 ff. Journals of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. 
January 1728/29 to December 1734, London 1928, 55. Ibid., January 1734/35 to 
December 1741, London 1930, 403. M. Postlethwayt, 7'lze Universal Dictionary of 
Commerce (I.ed.), London 1751, 532-535. 
4 Chance, George I, 177, 185. D. K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian commercial 
treaty of 1734. Yale I-list. Publ. Misc. XXXII, New Haven 1938,21 ff., 61 ff., 
73 ff. D. Gerhard, England und der Aufstieg Russlands, Munchen—Berlin 1933, 
7 ff., 38, 45 ff, Wittram, 264 ff. 
8 Cf. Board of Trade's reaction to the rise in Swedish duties and the restriction 
on exports to England, Journals of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. 
January 1728/29 to December 1734, 331 ff; Ibid., January 1734/35 to December 1741, 
19, 24, 29, 37, 41, 45-46, 63. 
From Stockholm to St. Petersburg 	 109 
The purpose of the Naval Stores Act of 1705 and the extensions of it in 
1721, 1729 and later years was not only to create an alternative to imports 
from Northern Europe. Gilbert Heathcote's statement in 1721 proves this.' It 
was also part of the plan to prevent the development of industries in the Colo-
nies so that they should continue to provide a market for English products. 
The Colonies must be trained to produce raw goods so as to be in a position 
to buy home industrial products. The laws, however, were also established 
and renewed with an eye to the situation in Northern Europe, either during 
the period of crisis or taking into consideration experience gained from such 
crises. The exemption from duty which American iron was given when import-
ed into London must be seen against a background of uneasiness over Swe-
den's favourable policy towards France.2 
11 
How successful were the attempts made after 1700 to find a substitute for 
the imports of bulky staple goods from Northern Europe in the Colonies, 
Ireland and even Scotland? We shall try to answer this by studying, commodity 
by commodity, the trends in the development of imports from 1700 to the 
middle of the 18th century. Owing to the differences in quality and price 
of the same commodity coming from different production areas (e.g. Spanish 
as opposed to Russian iron, Swedish as opposed to Russian tar), the percentage 
distribution according to areas has been calculated by means of the value of 
imports and not according to their quantity.3  
1 
 The parliamentary debate over the naval stores question is most easily follow-
ed in Stock (besides vols. II and III) also 1 and IV, Baltimore 1924 and 1937 
(Carn.Inst.Publ. 338:1 and 338:IV), see Index: Naval Stores. 
2 Cf. Ashton, Iron and Steel, 105-125, Nettels, 247 ff., Rees, Mercantilism 
587 and J. F. Rees, "The Phases of British Commercial Policy in the Eighteenth 
Century," Economica V (1925), 136-142. Osgood, 311 ff., 321. Joshua Gee's writings 
give important information about the arguments for, and attitude towards, the 
Colonies' potentialities (e.g. the memoranda drawn up by him in 1718, 1721 and 
1728 on behalf of the Board of Trade, C.O. 324/10, pp. 212-219, and Josuah 
Gee MSS, London Univ.Lib.) 
3 From a market aspect, the years chosen (1699-1700, 1725-26, 1746-47) 
are on the same level: they represent the start of a slump after a boom. See 
Scott I, Cambridge 1910, 361-365, 467. T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in 
England 1700-1800, Oxford 1959, 59-60, 93, 95, 121-122, 123, 140, 144, 148, 172. 
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The distribution of English imports of bar-iron into import areas from 1699-1747.1  
Import area 
1699 
% 
1700 
% 
1725 
% 
1726 
% 
1746 
% 
1747 
'Eastland'* 	  86.0 82.8 76.4 79.9 81.5 84.0 
'Spain' 	  9.8 14.1 11.5 10.1 0.4 - 
'Russia' 	  0.4 0.7 3.3 1.2 15.3 13.4 
'Germany' 	
 
0.7 0.2 2.2 1.5 1.1 2.2 
'Holland' 	  1.8 l.7 6.3 6.9 1.0 0.4 
'Ireland' 	  l.0 - 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 
'Plantations' 	  0.0 - - - 0.6 - 
Other areas 
	  
0.3 0.5 - 0.0 - - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The distribution of English imports of hemp into import areas from 1699-1717.1  
Import area 
1699 
% 
1700 
% 
1725 
°iö 
1726 
gö 
1746 
% 
1747 
°; 
'Eastland'* 	 .. 71.4 41.1 45.3 35.5 31.3 25.0 
'Russia' 	 .. , . 25.4 58.7 52.5 62.5 68.3 74.4 
'Germany'.... - - - 0.3 0.2 - 
'Holland' 	 .... 3.0 0.l 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.6 
'Scotland' 	 .. 0.2 - - - - - 
' l reland' 	 .... - - 0.l 0.1 0.2 
Other areas .. 0.1 0.3 - - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The distribution of English imports of flax into import areas from 1699-7717.1  
Import area 
1699 
°/ O 
1700 
% 
1725 
% 
1726 
% 
1746 
% 
1747 
°' O
'Eastlancl'* 	 .. 60.2 44.8 51.4 30.1 60.4 48.6 
'Russia' 	 .... 36.0 50.6 36.5 57,6 9.9 31.2 
'Germany'.... - - 0.2 0.3 -- 5.9 
'Holland' 	 .... 3.3 3.9 5.7 11.7 24.9 14.3 
'Scotland' 	 , . 0.1 0.6 - - - -- 
'Ireland' 	 .... - 0.1 6.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Other areas .. 0.4 0.0 - - 4.8 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Note. 'Eastland' equals 'Denmark-Norway' and 'Sweden' and 'East Country'. 
1 For sources and exact figures, see Table 2. 
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The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch into import areas from 1699-1747.1  
Import area 
1699 
% 
1700 
% 
1725 
% 
1726 
% 
1746 
% 
1747 
°% 
'Eastland'* 	 .. 98.3 94.3 23.8 34.0 26.5 43.2 
'Russia' 	 .... 0.0 4.2 3.0 2,2 -- 0.0 
'Germany'.... - - 0.1 - - 0.2 
'Holland' 	 .... 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 -- 0.0 
'Ireland' 	 .... 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.l 
'Plantations'.. 0.5 0.2 72.l 62.5 73.1 54.6 
Other areas .. 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 -- 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The distribution of English imports of potash into import areas from 1699-1747.1  
1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
Import area % % °ö % % % 
'Eastland'* 	 .. 41.l 15.0 66.7 64.1 2.9 43.1 
'Russia' 	 .... 58.9 85.0 33.1 35.0 96.6 56.3 
Other areas .. 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Note. 'Eastland' equals 'Denmark-Norway' and 'Sweden and 'East Country', 
A marked alteration in development can only be traced where tar and 
pitch are concerned. By the end of the period under review the Northern 
tar's hegemony had disappeared: in 1747 it amounted to only l/4-1/3 of the 
value of all tar imports, even though Russian tar also began to come on the 
market a little before the American tar. It is difficult to draw any more general 
conclusions from the tables above than these, especially when one considers 
that the years chosen, despite similarities in their economic settings, represent 
different political situations and combinations. War or peace could alter the 
rhythm and balance of trade from one year to the next: in wartime trade 
was taken over by neutral ports and ships.2 
Up to 1750 there were thus no significant results from the policy of find-
ing substitutes for, or supplements to, the import of the important bulk 
goods from Northern Europe. To form a just appreciation of Whitehall's 
policy and its effects it should, however, be remembered that the premiu m 
For sources and exact figures, see Table 2. 
2 From an English point of view the years 1699-1700 and 1725-26 were ones 
of peace. In 1746-47 England was engaged in war with France. 
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and preference system for the benefit of American or Irish products was in-
complete and continually opposed: the owners of iron-works, for instance, 
formed a group whose interests were hostile to the scheme; the Navy Board 
did not value the colonial raw material, their poor quality and high cost were 
frequently criticized.' 
The policy of self-support was also doomed to failure until new technical 
discoveries had made substitutes for the North European goods possible. A 
technical revolution of this kind was, for instance, the replacement of char-
coal by pit-coal. Only then was England freed from her dependence on North 
European iron. Later, experiments to make synthetic tar from coal and to 
replace potash by soda were to be successful. The former began in the 17th 
century but only obtained practical results in the 19th century. The method 
of extracting soda from salt, coal and chalk was a French discovery which 
was only exploited commercially after 1800. It was more difficult to find a 
substitute for plants used for spinning rope.2 In the Napoleonic wars a frenzied 
search went on in distant places for something to replace the Northern hemp 
and flax. There was an attempt as early as in the 1790's to make the cultiva-
tion of flax and hemp take root in India. A comparison between samples of 
Russian and Indian hemp was made at the Navy Board's expence.3  
Ill 
At the beginning of the 18th century a development began which shifted 
the centre of gravity for English imports of Baltic bulk goods away from 
Swedish-owned ports to Russian ports. The conservative trade statistics 
give no indication of this. It should also be remembered that, initially, the 
change was chiefly political in character and not economic. The tables given 
here therefore show, despite profound political changes, a remarkable sta-
bility where the distribution of imports into different areas is concerned. 
Riga was classed under 'East Country' during Swedish period as well as during 
the Russian in the English trade statistics. Narva had always been classed 
1 Albion, 240 ff. Williams, English Mercantilism, 181 ff. Lord, 38-39, 58, 66-67. 
Nettels, 256-260, Knittle, 116 ff., 226. Reading, 29 ff. Ashton, Economic Fluctua-
tions, 107 ff., 116 ff. The fluctuating English attitude to the colonial iron industry 
has been thoroughly dealt with by Billing. 
a J. U. Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industries II, 331 ff. Kreps, 231, 245, 
249 ff. A. Clow & N. L. Clow, The Chemical Revolution, London 1952, 65-115, 
389 —423. 
3 Home Misc. 374, 375, Commonwealth Relations Office, East India Company 
Records. 
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under 'Russia', even during the Swedish rule. But Narva, and in part also 
Archangel, lost its importance after 1700. 
It was the new trade metropolis of St. Petersburg, Narva's successor in 
the export of hemp and flax, which became the great port of export for iron 
and took its place as one of the leading ports in the Baltic. The growth of 
Russia's share in the statistics below is mainly due to this development. 
Total English imports of iron, hemp, flax, tar and pitch, and potash distributed into 
import areas from 1699-1747.' 
1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
Import area % 
'Russia' 17.2 32.l 23.8 28.9 33.2 36.8 
'Sweden' 	  46.5 41.5 26.6 29.8 29.2 26.5 East- 
land 
'East Country' 	  
'Denmark-Norway' 
27.4 
l.4 
16.7 
1.4 
27.5 
l.3 
20.8 
2.3 
21.7 
2.5 
21.7 
2.9 
Other areas (includ- 
ing the colonies) 
	  7.5 8.3 20.8 18.2 13.4 12.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The real turning-point must have occurred only after the middle of the 18th 
century, when the major share in the total English imports of iron, hemp, 
flax, pitch and tar, and potash came from Russian-owned ports. The change, 
not visible in the official trade figures, could have first taken place 
when Russian iron succeeded in reaching the level of the Swedish amongst 
English imports. The first time this happened as far as quantity was con-
cerned was in 1750; in the 1760's it become a general rule.2 At the same time 
the volume of Anglo-Russian trade increased enormously. From 1700 to 
1750 there had only been a slow growth in the 'Russian' section of England's 
total imports from the Baltic.3  
1  For sources and exact figures, see Table 3. 
2 K.-G. Hildebrand, "Foreign Markets for Swedish Iron in the 18th Century." 
Scand. Econ.Hist.Rev. VI (1958), 1-15. 
3 Total English imports from the Baltic from 1699-1747. 
1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
Import area °A % % % % % 
'Sweden' 	 .... 43.l 38.9 26.0 31.0 27.4 24.4 
'East Country' 39.4 26.5 33.7 27.6 32.2 31.4 
'Russia' 	 .... 17.5 34.6 40.3 41.4 40.4 44.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
For sources and exact figures, see Table 3. 
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The political development which began when direct trade between England 
and Russia was stimulated at the turn of the 17th century was economically 
completed only after the middle of the 18th. Stockholm was not only super-
seded as the capital of a Swedish Baltic empire but also as a staple for the most 
valuable Baltic commodity, both in its strategic and monetary aspect, during 
the 17th and 18th centuries: iron. 
This tendency for Russia to outdistance Sweden in all Baltic exports was, 
it is true, momentarily halted when Swedish tar reconquered the English 
market during the American War of Independence in 1775-83. Tar and 
pitch again took its old place amongst imports from Sweden-Finland into 
the harbours of the English realm.' From a monetary point of view, how-
ever, these cheap forest products represented far too small a share in Eng-
land's Baltic trade to be able to put the clock back. It was only when large-
scale timber exports to England from the Baltic began in the middle of the 
19th century that Sweden's and Finland's huge forest resources could be 
more effectively exploited. This brought a new stimulus to English trade 
connections with the old iron and tar export areas — but a new bulk com-
modity was the agent of change. For Baltic timber had slowly worked itself 
forwards, against strong competition from the Norwegian timber and then 
from the Canadian, into the position of a major bulk commodity in Eng-
lish trade with the Baltic area. 
The roots of this development lie far back in time. Different kinds of hard 
timber (besides oak planks, 'Wagenschoss', 'Pipenstäbe', 'Klappholz', 
etc.) had already played an important part in Danzig's exports to England 
towards the end of the 17th century.2 But it was about 1750 that Russian 
and Prussian Baltic timber ports first began to outdistance the Norwegian 
ones in respect of soft timber. Prior to this, the Baltic had only been im-
portant to the English as a main source of supply of large masts (Riga and 
Gothenburg) and heavy oak planks (Danzig). Otherwise, the Baltic ports 
were a supplementary market for the purchase of timber in years when 
supplies were difficult to come by, or when there was an exceptional demand. 
In 1737 the Board of Trade still considered that Norway was irreplacable as 
an area for the purchase of deals.3  
Furthermore, corn, the bulk commodity which in some respects can be 
1  Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia [The economic history of Sweden] 
11.l, 330 ff.  
2 W. Vogel, "Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiffahrt im 17. und 18.  
Jahrhundert 1  I. Danzig", Hansische Geschichtsbläter 57 (1932), 104 ff., 116, 131, 150.  
H. S. K. Kent, "The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury", Econ.Hist.Rev. 2nd ser. VIII, 62-65.  
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said to have been the most typical of the Baltic's exports to Western Europe 
up to 1650, was conspicuous by its almost complete absence from exports to 
England at this time.' Corn was to return only at the end of the 18th century. 
It is this fact, too, which gives uniformity to the period 1670-1750 in trade 
relations of the Baltic area with England. During this time the English im-
ports from the area were dominated by the five bulk commodities: iron, hemp, 
flax, potash, and tar-pitch. Their position on the English market remained 
practically unaltered 	 despite all plans to break the Baltic monopoly. Thus 
the trade pattern which, from the English point of view, arose in the Baltic 
after the middle of the 17th century remained relatively unchanged in its econo-
mic and geographic structure for a whole century, despite the growth in impor-
tance of the Russian market around 1700. But the transition from a Swedish 
dominated Baltic to a Russian one did not happen abruptly and without an in-
termediary link where trade was concerned. The link was Narva — not Nyen at 
the mouth of the Neva, nor Archangel on the Arctic Ocean. From about 1670,  
Narva was the place of residence for a colony of English merchants who were 
actively engaged in a growing trade with Russia. The Swedish government 
favoured the Englishmen in the town as well as the town's increasingly 
flourishing Russia trade. Narva's 'second period of greatness' is a striking 
episode in the history of Baltic trade in the latter part of the 17th century. 
lt is impossible to understand the rise in Narva's foreign trade without taking 
into consideration the Swedish policy towards Narva and especially the 
trade privileges enjoyed by the English colony there. It is significant that 
Narva later declined as a trading city when the new situation caused by the 
Great Northern War became stabilized and St. Petersburg became the 
favoured port of Russian commercial policy. 
IV 
From another point of view, the political one, we can divide the period 
from the 1670's to the middle of the 18th century into two phases. The turn-
ing-point coincides with the Great Northern War, after which Russia suc-
ceeds Sweden in English eyes as the 'monopolist' of Baltic bulk goods. The 
centre of gravity of English commercial interest began a parallel swing away 
from Stockholm towards St. Petersburg. Here the English diplomats and 
trade agents met similar problems that had occupied them in Stockholm a 
1  T. S. Ashton, An Economic History of England: The 78111 Century, London 
1955, 50. 
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generation earlier. But they were more successful in Russia. One result was 
that their position as 'the most favoured nation' was true not only in the 
narrow theoretical sense of a treaty but was actually so in economic fact. 
The insignia of success were tariff privileges for the English, a secure posi-
tion and freedom of movement for the trade factors in Russia, an assured 
supply of naval stores and a giant market for English industrial products. 
The first phase in England's successful commercial policy in Russia, culmi-
nating in the 1734 trade agreement, was succeeded by a new situation about 
the middle of the 18th century. The Russian statesmen then began to make 
skilful use of England's increasing dependence on the Russian market for her 
supplies. The 1766 trade agreement between the two powers is the first Russian 
attempt to exploit her position in England's foreign trade, which began to re-
semble the one that Sweden had possessed before the Great Northern War.1 
The importance which English trade policy in the late 17th century attach-
ed to being equal to 'the most favoured nation' should be seen in the Baltic 
against the background of the rivalry between the English and the Dutch. 
But there is another, more general factor involved in the English efforts. 
The formula about a position as 'equally favoured' as the 'most favoured' 
became the rule in the English trade treaties made with powers who were 
commercially passive and industrially less developed than England (e.g. Tur-
key, Portugal and Russia) and who had given special privileges in older 
treaties made with other commercial and maritime great powers (e.g. Hol-
land and France).2 Sweden belonged to the first group, but English efforts at 
gaining an equal footing nevertheless met stiff opposition there. The clause 
concerning treatment as 'the most favoured nation' was put into the 1654 
Anglo-Swedish treaty and remained in that of 1661 (article IV).3 Its retention, 
however, became one of the stumbling-blocks which prevented agreement in 
the later trade negotiations, as we have seen. It was then that the danger 
was seen of the effects of the clause, since it would automatically extend to 
the English concessions which Sweden had been forced to give to the Dutch 
in 1679. 
1 Gerhard, 41 ff. K. Rahbek-Schmidt, "The Treaty of Commerce between Great 
Britain and Russla 1766", Scando-Slavica I, Copenhagen 1954, 115-134. 
2 Ekegkrd, 15-17. The development of the 'most favoured nation' clause and 
the double meaning of the term is analysed by F. Borchardt, Eutwicklungsgeschichte 
der Meistbegiinstigung im Handelssystem, Königsberg 1906, especially 35 ff., and by 
J. Kulischer, "Les traitcs de commerce et la clause de la nation la plus favorisée 
du XVIe siecle", Rev.Hist.Mod. 6 (1931), 3-29. 
a" .. the People, Subjects, and Inhabitants of both Confederates shall have 
and enjoy in other's Kingdoms, Countries, Lands and Dominions, as large and 
ample Privileges, relaxations, liberties, and immunities as any other Foreigner at 
present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there." 
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But Sweden was later able to defend herself. Swedish diplomacy and com-
mercial and industrial life at the end of the 17th century had already reached 
such a pitch of maturity and development that Sweden was in a position to 
oppose any intrusive commercial penetration from a trade partner who was 
superior economically and politically. Some differences appear in treaty 
policy between the Sweden of the late 17th century and the Russia of the 
early 18th. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1734 gave both treaty partners the 
position of as 'equally favoured' as 'the most favoured nation' in their res-
pective countries. This was a position of extreme importance to English 
trade, although completely valueless to her inactive Russian trade partner, 
and it was defined and applied in nine different articles of the treaty.1  The 
Anglo-Russian relations offer an interesting comparison to the Anglo-Swedish 
ones with their opposing elements of English mercantile penetration and the 
Swedish policy of alliance and a balance of power. The pattern already 
emerges, even though in a rough form, in the first Anglo-Russian contacts 
in the 16th century. The English at that time were anxious for mercantile 
treaties and benefits, the Russian for an alliance and the purchase of arms.2 
This was repeated after 1700, when Anglo-Russian relations became more 
active. The 1734 trade treaty between England and Russian really contains 
everything England had desired in her proposals for a trade treaty with Swe-
den. The total effect of the treaty was in fact that England became 'more 
favoured' than any other nation trading in Russia. It was only later that the 
Russian diplomats succeeded in bringing about the political complement to 
this — a treaty of alliance.3  
When she was a great power, Sweden gave her statesmen more trump 
cards than the young Imperial Russian diplomacy held at the start. This was 
due to Sweden's more highly-developed political and economic structure 
despite her poor economic resources and shaky political foundations. Up 
to 1700 England, too, was a less important partner in political negotiations 
than she was after the turn of the century. These factors explain the limited 
opportunities which we found open to English trade diplomacy in Sweden 
in the last decades of the 17th century. The economic functions of the Eng- 
1  Reading, 156 ff. (Valuable analysis of the 1734 treaty). 
2 Willan, 17-18, 91-128, 161-165. 
3 The opportunity for this came five years later on England's initiative. The 
fear of an increase of French influence in Sweden after the rise to power of the 
'Hat' (aristocratic) party made England anxious for closer political contact with 
Russia in order to keep 'the balance of power in Scandinavia'. In 1748 the tension 
between England and Sweden finally came to a head with the severing of diplo-
matic relations between the two countries. See R. Lodge, "The first Anglo-Russian 
Treaty, 1739-42", Eng.Hist.Rev. XLI11 (1928), 354-375. Gerhard, 11. 
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lish trade agents in Swedish foreign trade, particularly exports, were, how-
ever, of such vital importance to Sweden that the situation foreshadows the 
position the English were to occupy in the export sector of Russian economy 
after the 1730's. England nevertheless failed to secure her position by a 
treaty in Sweden. 
One obvious reason for the difficulties in confirming the position of English 
trade in Sweden was the merchant fleet with which the Swedes equipped 
themselves, particularly in the 1690's. They tried to make use of it in the 
struggle to build up their direct trade with the countries to which their ex-
ports went and from which their imports came.' This problem did not arise 
in relation to Russia before the 19th century, when the Finnish merchant 
fleet sailed under the Russian flag and thus Russia in theory possessed a 
merchant navy. The Russian consul in London pointed out in 1814, five 
years after Finland's union with the Russian realm, that it would now be 
possible to transfer an important part of Russian foreign trade from English 
to Finnish ships.2 
The fact that trade talks between England and Sweden had come to a 
standstill in the 1720's had very different consequences for the two parties 
in the years to come. For Sweden, it was to lead to serious complications 
during the late eighteenth century wars in Europe. Sweden's role as an export-
er of 'naval stores' and a neutral sea power during the era of the Revolution-
ary and Napoleonic Wars was made more difficult by the narrow English 
interpretation of the contraband clauses concerning 'naval stores' in the 
old agreement of 1661, still the only treaty in operation between the two 
countries.3  
For England, the course of events took a very different form. Since trade 
with the Kingdom of Sweden had declined, England had not so pressing a 
peace-time need for a commercial treaty with this rather unimportant 
trading partner. In war-time, of course, the 1661 treaty, which was still 
1 Gerentz, 145-155, 162 ff. Binding, 175 ff. 
2 J. R. Danielson-Kalmari, Tien varrelta kansalliseen la valtiolliseen itsenäisyyteen 
II, [On the way to national and political independence], Porvoo 1929, 88-89. 
S The concept 'contraband' had given rise to serious conflicts of opinion. The 
English interpreted the term commeatus (provisions) in the text of the treaty so 
widely that it was held to include naval stores. Major Swedish export goods, such 
as iron, tar, hemp and timber, were thereby classified as contraband. Furthermore, 
on the subject of war-time trading, the treaties did not adopt the modern stand-
point, so advantageous to Sweden, that "free ships make free goods" — a concept 
that was gaining ground at that time. Therein too lay one of the seeds of the dissen-
sion between England and Sweden during the European crisis of the 1690's, when 
the Swedes were trying to maintain their direct trading with France. 
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considered to be in force, was purely advantageous to England. It was not 
until 1803, when a Franco-Russian rapprochement was imminent and a 
threat appeared to the 'freedom of trade' in the Baltic, that the English 
were willing to allow a revision of the narrow contraband rules in this 
almost one hundred and fifty year old trade treaty.) At this time, Sweden, 
though momentarily, enjoyed so strong a position in a Europe under the Con-
tinental Systern, that the English did not stipulate any advantages in the 
sphere of power politics in return for this concession. 
1  S. Johnson, Sverige och stormakterna 1800-1804 [Sweden and the Great Powers, 
1800-1804], Göteborg 1957, 6 ff., 119-147. Cf. also P. Hultqvist's review of this 
thesis in Hist.Tidskr. 1959, 122-123, where emphasis is laid on the importance 
of the trade agreement as the aim of Sweden's negotiations. 
APPENDIX I 
The Import of Copper and Brass into the English Market 
The best known and most worked copper deposits in 17th century Europe 
lay in Sweden. It was obviously of economic interest for Sweden to try and 
control the price on the export market and to export as much as possible of 
materials refined from copper, such as brass.' England was by no means cut 
off from the imports of Asiatic copper into Europe made by the Dutch East 
India Company, but the Asiatic copper had not yet gained a foothold in 
England. The English copper and brass market was therefore to a high degree 
dependent on supplies from 'Eastland' - i.e. chiefly from Sweden - until 
a new source of the raw material was found. 
Before 1700, 'outports' played an insignificant part as import harbours 
for these metals. There is no evidence of imports of copper or brass into 
them on any large scale in the decades before the turn of the century. The 
development of import of copper and brass from the 1660's onwards can 
therefore be read from the London figures. 
Imports of refined copper and copper sheeting into London 1663-1747, distributed 
into import areas.2  
1663 1669 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
Imported from % % % % % % % % 
'Eastland' 4.7 13.0 22.0 - 1.1 - 0.5 
'Germany' 	  45.2 85.2 31.2 26.9 - - - 
'Holland' 	  43.9 - 14.9 1.4 0.9 5.9 - 
'East India' 	  5.4 - 4.8 33.5 - - - - 
'Africa'* 	  0.8 l.8 27.l 37.0 82.9 86.5 96.3 100.0 
Other areas 
	  - - - 1.2 15.1 7.6 3.2 - 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* labelled 'Barbary' in 1663 and 1669. 
In the 1660's the majority of the copper still came from Germany and 
Holland. It is impossible to judge whether the Dutch copper was Asiatic 
or Swedish in origin; it may be regarded as certain that the Eastland copper 
was principally Swedish.3 The same should be true of the German copper 
(from Hamburg). The situation alters around 1700, when copper is chiefly 
imported directly from East India or from Africa. European copper is from 
then onwards only represented by the stamped Swedish copper sheeting  
(kopparplåtar) from Germany (Hamburg). Later in the century, African copper 
completely dominates the imports. 
1 E. F. Heckscher, "Den europeiska kopparmarknaden under 1600-talet" [The 
European copper market in the 17th century], Scandia XI (1938), 220 ff. The 
arguments concerning the position of Swedish copper in the European market 
are summed up in K. Glamann, "The Dutch East India Company's Trade in Japanese 
Copper, 1645-1736", Scand.Econ.Hist.Rev. I (1953), 41-43 and F. C. Spooner, 
L'economie Mondiale et les Frappes Mondtaires en France 1493-1680, Paris 1956, 
38 -43. 
2 For sources and exact figures, see Table 4. 
3 Norwegian copper played an insignificant part quantitatively speaking. 
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Imports of brass wire into London 1663-1747, distributed into import areas.' 
Imported from 
1663 
% 
1669 
% 
1699 
% 
1700 
% 
1725 
% 
1726 
% 
1746 
% 
1747 
% 0 
'Eastland' 16.0 48.3 75.9 75.0 9.6 39.0 — — 
'Germany' 84.0 51.7 21.8 23.0 90.4 60.5 100.0 100.0 
Other areas — — 2.3 2.0 — 0.5 — — 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The development in respect of brass wire is different. In 1669 the imports 
of brass from Germany were still somewhat higher than those from Sweden. 
Ten years later, Johan Leijonbergh was able to state that Sweden had beaten 
Aachen on the English market.2 But later brass imports on the whole sharply 
decreased — this was true of brass wire from both Sweden and Germany. It 
is obvious that the chief reason for this was the renewed expansion of home 
production.3  
The large demand encouraged the English copper industry, which had 
attained a certain amount of prosperity at the end of the 16th century. 
It had since declined under pressure from the foreign raw material.4 Exports 
were therefore prohibited in order to guarantee its supply. In the 1670's 
and 1680's a proposal was even discussed that money of small denominations, 
which was made from Swedish copper, should be replaced by a native metal:  
tina Tin was regarded as "a metall of the produce of this Kingdom, whose 
Price His Majte can gouerne, whereas Copper is a Metall, always lyable 
to the Enchancemt. of a forrein Prince, as experience hath already made 
appear. ..".° 
In the 1680's a new period of activity began for English copper and brass 
production. Coal was used in smelting to bring down the fuel costs. New 
deposits were found. A whole series of active companies were formed to utilize 
them in the war years of the 1690's after the old privileged Copper and 
Brass Company had been deprived of its monopoly in 1689.7 The price of 
Swedish copper sank sharply in 1694-97, but it was still used by the Royal 
Mint. In 1694, however, the Mint bought English copper for the first time, 
and in the same year the export prohibition on copper and brass was abolished. 
Behind all these measures a definite policy emerges with the object of en-
couraging home production. When Eric Odhelius, a young Swedish expert 
on mining and metals, travelled around England at the beginning of the 
1690's, he was still able to state that the majority of copper imports were 
Swedish. He saw no threat from the home production of copper. His country- 
For sources and exact figures, see Table 4. 
2 "Should be enquired into", Wachtmeister to K. of Sw. 1679, Dipl.Angl. 
3 H. Harhilton, The English Brass & Copper Industries to 1800, London 
(Norwich) 1926, 66, 108 ff., 137, 285 ff. 
A Hamilton, 1-64, 130, 276. 
6 Hamilton, 64 ff., 101 ff., 277 ff. R. Jenkins, "Coppersmelting in England: Reviv-
al at the End of the Seventeenth Century". Trans. Newcomen.Soc. XXIV (1943 
—45), London 1949, 73 ff. Scott II, 430-439. 
6 See the discussion on the minting of tin and copper in C.O. 389/3, p. 83-85; 
C.O. 391/l, p. 146, 177, 181, 182, 188 ff. and also Cal.S.P., Dom. 1676-1677,passim. 
7 Council of Trade and Plantations, Journals 19/6/1676 (C.O. 391/1). 
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man, Thomas Cletscher, came to the same optimistic conclusion a little 
later on in the 1690's. The Swedish copper usually came in sheets directly 
front Stockholm or via Hamburg. It was re-exported to Holland, Ham-
burg and the the West Indies, according to Odhelius, when the state of 
the market demanded or permitted it.' In the light of the import statistics, 
it seems as if both Swedes visited England just b e f ore the turning-
point, when European copper was definitely ousted by the native, the African 
and the Asiatic. After 1700 there was a sharp decline in imports of copper 
and brass from Europe, not least from Sweden. Instead, it was chiefly African 
copper which entered the field, and this was refined in England. 
Copper and brass played an unimportant part in English imports, both 
as to quantity and value. This, and the fact that the growth of home pro-
duction and imports from Africa gradually completely ousted the copper 
and brass from 'Eastland', has made it unnecessary to pay the same attention 
to these metals in this study as has been given to iron, flax, hemp, tar and 
pitch, and potash. The metals in question did not go directly to England 
from the Baltic in the latter half of the 17th century but went via German 
and Dutch middlemen. 
At the turn of the 17th century, bar-iron from Sweden therefore remained 
the only important metal import from the Baltic to England. In the absence 
of any reliable production figures in England, it is extremely difficult to 
evaluate the position of the Swedish iron on the English market in relation 
to the home product, so that unfortunately we cannot deal with it here.2 
APPENDIX Il 
The 'Great Tar Crisis', Russian Tar and the End of the Swedish Tar Monopoly 
Sweden's position as the supplier of an important strategic bulk product 
is seen most clearly and drastically where pitch and tar are concerned. 
In the latter half of the 17th century the Swedes had tried to exploit the 
1 E. Odhelius, 'Reseberättelser' [Travel reports]; T. Cletscher, 'Berättelse om 
de europäiska bergwerken' 1696 [An account of the European mines in 1696], 
Arch. of the Swedish Board of Mines, RA. Cf. Rydberg, 141-142, 149-150. 
2 See K.-G. Hildebrand, Sexton- och sjuttonhundratalen [The 17th and 18th 
Centuries]. Fagersta brukens historia [The History of the Fagersta Iron Works] I, 
Uppsala 1957, 45. Flinn has recently pointed out that, contrary to the prevailing 
opinion, the English iron industry did not stagnate or deteriorate after 1660. It was 
slowly expanding (M. W. Flinn, "The Growth of the English Iron Industry 1660 
—1760," Econ.Hist.Rev. 2nd Ser., XI (1958-59), 144-153). This growth of the home 
iron industry I would interpret as a regional expansion in areas most favourable to 
iron production (the inner districts of Western England.) Swedish iron was perhaps 
not such a strong competitor there, because of transport costs, as on the East 
Coast. The development of home production was possibly also helped by the customs 
policy. Though not deliberately protectionist, this policy did bring a rise in 
the duties on iron from the 1670's onwards. Finally, a contributory cause may 
have been the fact that English bar-iron was of a different type to the Swedish be-
cause of its softness. It is known that on this account it did not always compete 
with the Swedish as it could not be used for the same purposes. 
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economic situation, with the object of raising prices, by means of their 
export monopolies. The Tar Trade Association continued this policy: to act 
as a direct seller in the English market. There seemed to be an opportunity 
of finally attaining this for a few years after 1700. But though the circum-
stances seemed more favourable that at any previous time, the efforts were 
frustrated. The entry of the American colonial tar on the market has been 
regarded as having destroyed the conditions necessary for a Swedish mono-
poly of tar in England.' This is, in the present author's submission, too simple 
an explanation. The situation offers an excellent example for a study of the 
new conditions in the Baltic after the opening of the Russian market and 
of the English use of the changed circumstances. 
The time for the Tar Trade Association's offensive was well chosen. In 
1702 England had been drawn into the War of the Spanish Succession. 
The Navy had been refitted. At the beginning of 1703, John Robinson tra-
velled on his peace mission to Poland, both to the Swedish royal headquarters 
and to King Augustus of Saxony-Poland. England wished to restore peace in 
Scandinavia to free the Northern Crowns and the German princes for partic-
ipation in the war against France. His secretary, the factor Robert Jackson, 
who specialised in the purchase of tar, was therefore appointed English com-
missioner in Stockholm with, amongst other things, the task of watching 
over the navy's purchase of pitch and tar there.2 Robinson had already 
asked for a personal letter from Queen Anne to the Swedish King, Charles  
XII, in connection with his warning of 1702, to ensure regular supply of 
tar-pitch. He continued his efforts at the Swedish royal camp and in March, 
1703, succeeded in obtaining a royal letter addressed to the Swedish Board 
of Trade ordering the necessary assistance to be given to the English agents 
in Stockholm. But the 'rar Directors refused to deliver the pitch and tar 
to them.3 These directors saw that the moment was at hand to attain the 
old goal -- the sale of tar in London on their own account. The Tar Direc-
tors had their own agents working there, Messrs. Behrens and Nieman, 
who called upon the Navy Board in the late summer and autumn of 1703, 
offering over 700 lasts of tar and almost 200 of pitch. But in this tender 
the price of tar, which the previous year had been somewhere around 
£ 11-12, was raised to £ 17.5.0 a last.4 After long negotiations the Navy 
Board had to give in. Urban Hall and Nathaniel Gould, with whom the 
Navy Board had contracted, were not able to offer any pitch and tar, since 
the Company had sold nothing to Sykes and Welch, their agents in Stock-
holm. The Russia Merchants, on the other hand, had sold theirs to Holland. 
1  E. g. Lord, passion. 
2 Sir Charles Hedges to Robert Jackson 20/2/1703, S.P., For. 104/153. 
2 
 J. Robinson to Hedges 13/24 April, 22/9/1703, S.P., For. 95/15. Robinson 
to Hedges 4/8/1703, S.P., For. 85/15. Hedges to Robinson 7/5, 6/7, 26/8, 19/10 
1703, S.P., For. 104/1 53. 
The purchase of tar and pitch by the Navy Board 1696-1727 (price and 
origin of the goods) can be seen in Table 5. 
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The Admiralty was thus completely at the mercy of the Swedish Tar Com-
pany.' 
The Swedish minister in London, Leijoncrona, attempted to ward off 
official English complaints by blaming the tendency of the English purveyors 
to the Crown to sell the tar which was reserved for the Navy to private 
firms. In order to appease the English authorities and show that there 
was Swedish tar on the market, Leijoncrona put forward various offers 
from the merchants Jonathan Ellis and John Oriot. The Tar Company, 
attacked by the Swedish authorities more for its daring price policy than 
for its insubordination, exculpated itself for its part before the Swedish 
Board of Trade. The high prices the Tar Trade Association obtained for 
its goods in London were only apparently higher than the Amsterdam price, 
the directors argued, indeed they calculated that they gained less in London 
than in Amsterdam. The reasons for this were the higher freight from Lon-
don to Stockholm, higher duties, and other expenses.2 
To the English, the situation was alarming. Nevertheless, the Navy Board, 
for its part, stuck firmly to its old source of supply, the Baltic. To begin 
with, therefore, the Navy Board favoured a proposal to get tar from Königs-
berg. Norwegian tar, on the other hand, was regarded as being of poor quality. 
The Navy Board also recommended emergency imports from Hamburg 
and Holland, where the Russian tar had gone.3 But the Board of Trade, 
who examined the situation from other aspects, preferred the colonies. 
This was a natural attitude for a department whose task it was to super-
vise colonial administration. In its annual report to the House of Lords 
in 1704, the Board of Trade therefore requested premiums and customs 
exemption for American naval stores, 'more especially Pitch and Tar'.4 
Robinson had already made a similar proposal from the Swedish head-
quarters in Warsaw. 
At this same time the Brandenburg and Prussian tar again came into 
the picture. In 1704 Lord Raby, the English envoy -- afterwards ambas-
sador - in Berlin, was instructed to investigate the possibilities of im-
porting Prussian tar. The Prussian authorities proved extremely interested 
and ready to do business. Plans were made for deliveries via Hamburg of 
300 lasts of tar and 7-800 of pitch during the first year of a contract to be 
made. The English remained, however, sceptical of success; the Prussian 
demand for a long-term contract, cash payment and transport at the English 
crown's risk did not appeal to the Navy Board. Samples delivered to Dept- 
1 Navy Board to Admiralty 26/4/1703, Adm. 1/3595; 7/6, 30/6, 28/7, 13/8, 
18/8, 30/8/1703, Adm. 1/3596, 6/10, 8/10, 11/10, 13/10, 20/10/1703, Adm. 1/3597. 
2 Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 2/8, 8/8, 13/8, 20/8, 24/8, 31/8, 7/9/1703, Dipl.Angl. 
Sw. B. of T. and Treasary to Leijoncrona 28/5, 15/9, 10/12/1703. To Leijoncrona 
from the Authorities l, 1689-1710, Dipl.Angl. Declarations of the Tar Trade 
Association, 1703, with numerous appendices, in Public Authorities Corr. 800, 
The Tar Company, 1650-1713, and in Trade and Shipping 65, Trading Companies, 
the Tar Trade Assocition 1689-1715, all in RA. 
8 
 Navy Board to Admiralty 23/10, 14/12/1703, Adm. 1/3597, 5/l, 21/1, 10/3/ 
1703, Adm. 1/3598, 28/4, 9/5, 30/5/1704, Adm. 1/3599, 23/10/1704, Adm. 1/3600. 
4 See B. of T., representations 16/12/1703, 27/11/1704, C.O. 389/18, 137- 140, 
254 ff. 
125 
ford dockyard did, it is true, show that the Prussian tar was of the same 
quality as the Stockholm product which came from Finland and Norrland,  
but everything else augured against purchase from the Prussians. And there 
the matter rested.1 
But there was yet another European source of supply — the Russian 
one. In the years before the turn of the century great hopes were, as we 
have seen, entertained.2 Robinson, however, pointed out in 1702 what 
little prospect there was of getting tar from Russia on account of the war. 
The trade statistics show that he had estimated the situation correctly.3  
After the outbreak of war only insignificant amounts were received from 
Russia, a score or so of lasts. Yet the Dutch had bought a great deal on the 
Russian market in recent years. It was at this point that the English Govern-
ment in 1704 sent Charles Whitworth as envoy to the Czar. 
Whitworth's mission, which inaugurated the firm diplomatic relations 
between the two powers, had above all a commercial purpose -- to conclude 
a trade treaty. Whitworth therefore introduced the subject of trade at his 
first meeting with the Czar's favourite, Prince Golowin. The two Crowns 
might come together over commercial matters by removing obstacles to 
trade, "allowing her Majesties subjects to export the Products of the Czars 
dominions, particularly Pitch and Tar, and other naval stores". Thus Eng-
land's immediate needs coloured Whitworth's first contact with a Russian 
statesman. In the months following, Whitworth received many promises 
over the tar question. It was found, however, that the sale was also mono-
polistically organised in the Russian market, although not in the same way 
as in the Swedish one.4 Whitworth's mission therefore proved a very difficult 
one and the efforts to obtain tar and pitch finally failed. 
The export of certain Russian wares was a State monopoly. An agreement 
was generally made with a foreigner in favour in high places for their purchase 
and export.5 In 1705 the tar monopoly, which had long belonged to Dutch 
merchants, was possessed by Stiles, an Englishman. Stiles, however, exported 
the tar to Holland. Whitworth tried to put pressure on Golowin to abolish 
the monopoly and allow all English merchants in Russia to export tar and 
pitch. "I then particularly recommended to Count Golowin the procuring a 
free liberty to all English here to export Pitch and Tar, and endeavour'd to 
show what advantages the Czar and his subjects would find in having that 
Trade laid open, which being now monopolized by one person, was kept down 
at so low a rate in this Country that the people had no encouragement to 
work on that Commodity." Frightened by Whithworth's mission, Stiles 
1 Ca1.S.P.,Dom. 1702-1703, 623; 1703-1704, 573. Harley to Admiralty 25/5, 
3/7/1704, 17/l, 14/4, 13/7, 6/9, 11/9/1705, 16/5, 24/5, 10/11/1706, Adm. 1/4089, 
1/4090, 1/4091. Navy Board to Admiralty 30/5/1704, 25/4, 16/7, 18/9/1705, 14/6, 
28/11/1706, Adm. 1/3599, 1/3602, 1/3603, l/3606. 
2 See above, p. 96. 
3 See Table 6. 
4 Reading, 63 ff. 
6 See e.g. J. Kulischer, Russische Wirtschaftsgeschichte I. (Handbuch der W 
scha/tsgeschichte 10). Jena 1925, 347 ff., 443. Reading, 42 ff., C. Whitworth, An 
Account of Russia, Strawberry Hill 1758, 88. 
6 
 C. Whitworth to Robert Harley 7/18th March, 1705, S.P., For. 91/4. 
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promised to sell to England, too, despite the fact that he received, according 
to Whitworth, £ 16 for a last of tar in Holland, while the Navy Board only 
offered £ 13. To begin with Mr. Stiles was the stronger in the tug-of-war over 
the monopoly. He stood at this moment high in the Czar's favour. Finally 
tar, however, but not pitch, was released by cancelling Stiles' monopoly con-
tract. But the state monopoly of purchases continued and each year the Czar 
auctioned it to the highest bidder. 
Thus there was still a monopoly in the new system. In 1706 a Russian-
Dutch syndicate succeeded in seizing control of the Archangel tar by means of 
a generous tender. Whitworth, however, all the same obtained permission to 
export the tar needed by the Royal Navy and to transport it on the returning 
tobacco ships put at his disposal by Stiles.1 The Russians were extremely 
anxious that the tar trade should go via the newly-built St. Petersburg and 
for that reason agreed to Whitworth's and Stiles' arrangements. It proved 
difficult, however, to run the Swedish blockade in the Baltic. The English 
trade statistics therefore do not show that unusually large quantities of 
Russian tar were imported into England in 1706. Imports from Russia the 
previous year had shown a rise to over 200 lasts of tar and pitch. They now 
fell again.2 Whitworth had in the end not succeeded. He himself admitted 
this six years later, when the question of Russian tar came to the fore. 
At the same time as Whitworth had been sent on his mission to Russia, 
enormous efforts had been made to encourage imports from the colonies. 
In January 1705 both Houses passed an act putting premiums on imports 
of naval stores from the American colonies. The intention was to compensate 
in this way for the higher production and freight costs. The measure was 
not immediately successful.3 When attempts in Russia came to nothing and 
there was a delay in shipping the pitch across the Atlantic, matters were 
back at the starting-point. From 1703 to 1710 imports from Sweden still 
dominated the English market. Warned by experience, however, the Swe- 
des 	 kept the prices lower than before .4 The conservative Navy Board 
pointed out on various occasions that their instructions were to buy the 
best and cheapest wares. The situation was complicated by the fact that 
the premiums were payed in credit notes (Navy Bills) which did not accrue 
interest.5 In addition, there was as great a need of convoys across the At- 
1  C. Whitworth to Robert Harley 7th/18th March, 28th Feb./11th March, 
14th/25th March, 21st March/l st April, 11th/22nd April, 25th April/6th May, 
2nd/13th May, 16th/17th May, 23rd May/3rd June, 6th/17th June, 20th June/lst 
July. 1705, 18th/29th April, 1706, S.P., For. 91/4, 13th/24th March, 1706 (copies 
in S.P., For 91/7, the original in S.P., For. 91/4. W's dispatches are printed, nearly in 
full, in Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogi Obshchestovo, vol. 39). Navy Board to Admiral-
ty 16/4/1705, Adm. 1/3601, 3/8/1705, Adm. 1/3602. Harley to Admiralty 7/7/1704, 
Adm. 1/4089, 25/5, 7/7/1705, Adm. 1/4090. 
2 See Table 6. 
S Lord, 63 ff. 
A See Table 5. Hallberg, 147-148. Manuscripts of the House of Lords, New Ser.  
IX, London 1949, 115. 
5 Lord, 67. Navy Board to Admiralty 1/8, 4/8/1704, Adm. l/3599, 21/12/1704, 
Adm. 1/3600, 2/3, 14/3, 23/3/1705, Adm. 1/3601, 24/7, 13/8/1705, Adm. l/3602. 
See also copies of the Navy Board's correspondence with the Admiralty 15/9, 22/5/ 
1703, 12/5/1705, 12/2/1706 in S.P., For 42/7 as well as reports on correspondence 
with the Board of Trade 18/12/1706 in journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 
1704/09, pp. 303-304, 521. 
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]antic, owing to the danger from privateers and pirates, as there was in 
North European waters.' From 1707 to 1710, therefore, Swedish ships, 
neutral in the War of the Spanish Succession, took an even greater part 
than before in transporting tar.2 
II 
The turning-point came in 1710. It had nothing directly to do with the 
English premium systern. After the Swedes had been defeated at Poltava 
in 1709, Denmark re-entered the war. Swedish transit through the Sound was 
thus once more threatened and tar ships from Stockholm loaded with 1000 
lasts of tar and pitch on board did not dare enter the Sound.3 There was 
an additional obstacle which became increasingly serious as time went 
by: the loss of Eastern Finland (1710) and then the rest of the country 
(1713-14). The Russian occupation of the eastern part of the realm para-
lysed production in Finland and severed Stockholm from its chief production 
area 
It is true that the English envoy in Copenhagen, Pulteney, succeeded in 
negotiating with the Danish Government for a free passage for the Swedish tar 
ships from Stockholm in 1709, but the English were warned to use their own 
shipping in future.4 The greatest difficulties over transport were thus removed. 
Production, however, was threatened by the course of the war in Finland, 
from where most of the tar and pitch came. In June 1710, the Swedish 
Board of Trade stated that they were uncertain to what extent they could 
fulfil the year's contract for deliveries to both Holland and England. The 
tar directors resigned in December and made no application for the pro-
longation of the charter of the Tar Trade Association.5  
The drama of the 1703 tar crisis was now repeated. The Navy Board stuck 
to the Swedish production area for as long as possible. When the offer of 
Russian tar came from the English consul in Archangel, Goodfellow, and 
his partner, Meaux, in 1711, the Navy Board decided to "write to Mr Joy 
(a leading "Swedish Merchant" in London) to let us know what may be 
expected from Stockholm".6 The Board of Trade continued to push its 
suggestion of American tar, but the directors of English foreign policy had 
1 Navy Board to Admiralty 18/3/1707, Adm. 1/3606. Cf. J. D. Doty, The British 
Admirality Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration, Philadelphia 1930, 67 ff., 
89 and Neftels, 256 ff. 
2 Exactly how unchanged the situation still was in 1709 appears from Robert 
Jackson's expert opinion printed by J. J. Murray, "Robert Jackson's 'Memoir on 
the Swedish Tar Company', Dec. 29th, 1709." Huntington Libr. Quart. X (1946-47), 
421-428. 
3 Cf. Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations, 1709/10 to 1714115, p. 125. 
4 Henry Boyle to Admiralty 9/11 /1 709, 34/1/1710, Adm. 1/4093, 5/4, 12/4, 
24/5/1710, Adm. 1/4094. Admiralty to Boyle 4/4, 10/4/1710, S.P., For. 42/8. 
Hallberg, 148--149. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 21/6/1710, RA. 
3 
 Navy Board, minutes 18/11/1711, Adm. 106/2889. 
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the better solution.' Their interest in Russian tar now bore fruit. It was 
this and not the American tar which for a while entered the picture. 
When the difficulties accumulated in the Baltic market, eyes were again 
turned towards distant Archangel. In the matter of tar, Russian and English 
state interests were again opposed, as were English private interests. The 
official English policy continued to be that of allowing English merchants 
to purchase freely in Russia. There now began a tug-of-war between the 
English factors over the tar contract. In 1711-12 it was obtained by Good-
fellow and Meaux, but their rivals accused the partners of trying to send 
all the tar to Holland and of ignoring the English Navy .2 
Despite such disturbing intrigues, which Whitworth attempted to 
suppress, the miracle did in fact occur: in 1710 Russian tar for the first 
time arrived in large amounts in England.3 The amounts the following 
year were equally satisfactory - almost 1000 lasts. On the other hand, 
the attempts to ship tar to England from St. Petersburg were again 
unsuccessful owing to Swedish privateers.4 After 1715 privateering by both 
the Swedes and Danes increased, and direct imports from Sweden also sank 
to an insignificant amount. In 1717 a witness pointed out to the Board 
of Trade "that there is not at present two hundred barrels of Swedish tar 
to be bought in London ...".b Maister, a Hull merchant who was still selling 
Swedish tar to his customers in 1714, had stopped by 1718.° The vacuum 
left by the North European tar was now quickly filled by the American. It is 
from this point onwards that colonial tar really takes first place among Eng-
lish imports of this material. While the Swedes and Russians were tiring each 
other out, the colonial importers replaced them on the market. They kept this 
position until the North American colonies revolted and gained independence. 
What has been said concerns the English market as a whole. The Russian 
tar nevertheless dominated the Navy's purchase of tar in 1718-20. After 
1710 the Navy did have several permanent contracts with colonial suppliers 
of tar and pitch. In 1715 and 1717 in particular, the Navy, obviously com-
pelled by necessity, bought up large quantities of American tar. But even 
later than this it preferred to supply the shipyards with European; Russian 
The attitude of the Navy Board and the Board of Trade to the tar question 
in C.O. 389/21, p. 28-38 (memorandum from Jackson, the tar commissioner in 
Stockholm 29/12/1709), 51, 59, 61, 71 (the Board of Trade's memorandum on the 
question 14/2/1710), 95-96, 98-103 (the Navy Board's disapproval of expen-
sive convoys from America). Cf. Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1709110 
to 1714/15, p. 119, 120, 123, 125, 126, 135, 138. 
2 Whitworth to Henry St.John, 26th Feb./8th March, 26th March/6th, Apr., 
6th/17th May, 8th/19th June, 17th/28th June, 18th/l9th Nov., 1712, S.P., For. 
91/7 (also printed in Sbornik, etc., 41). Admiralty to St. John 8/12/1711, 12/3, 
20/3, 5/5, 17/7/1712, S.P., For. 42/11. St.John to Admiralty 3/4, 8/5, 12/7/1712, 
Adm. 1/4096. Material illuminating the conflict of interests between different 
groups of merchants can be found amongst Whitworth's papers, Vol. XII  (BM 
Add. MSS 37359, f. 289-379) as well as in S.P., For. 44/218, p. 17 ff., 3, 5, 17, 
28-34, 39-46, 53-54 (partly copies of the letters mentioned above). 
3 See Table 6. Manuscripts of the House of Lords, New Ser. IX, 13, 173, 343, 363. 
4 See, e.g. Lord Bolingbroke to Admiralty 16/7/1714, S.P., For. 44/218. Admi-
ralty to St. John 3/4/1712, S.P., For. 42/11, 20/7, 11/8/1714, S.P., For. 42/1 3. 
Admiralty to Lord Townshend 28/4/1714, S.P., For. 42/58. 
• Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1714115 to 1718, 213. 
• Maister's account book, Hull University Library. 
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and Swedish, tar.1 In 1720 the Navy Board bought more European than 
Colonial tar, despite the fact that the latter was half as cheap at that time.2 
There is thus an interesting discrepancy between the civil and military 
consumption which is not shown by the trade statistics.3 The Navy used 
comparatively small quantities of pitch, whereas it needed tar for its rope-
yards. The American tar was regarded as too hot for making rope and it 
burnt the cordage. It was because of this that the Navy Board later in the 
century, in 1777, was able to say of the bounty system, "... The benefit 
the Navy has received has been inconsiderable compared with that of the 
Commerce of the Kingdom at large, as but a small Quantity of Tar of Amer-
ican Growth upon which article the highest Bounty is given is used in 
making Cordage for His Ma:ts service, that imported from Sweden being 
preferred on account of its superior Quality."4 By then, the American War 
of Independence had begun and the English market returned to its former 
complete dependence on supplies from the Baltic area. 
III 
Thus it was not the appearance of large quantities of American tar on 
the market after the premium system had been put into practise that alone 
destroyed the Swedish tar monopoly. This already happened earlier owing to 
the disappearance of the unique production conditions. After 1710 Sweden 
was no longer the sole supplier in Northern Europe of large quantities of tar 
and pitch. The new supplier was Russia. The trade statistics show, however, 
that when conditions were stabilized after the Great Northern War Swedish 
tar again surpassed supplies from Russia. Swedish exports were given a new 
chance when the premiums were temporarily removed in 1725-29. Strange-
ly enough, tar from Sweden remained on the market after 1729. Its power 
of resistance lay in price and quality. Imports from Sweden had, however, 
stink considerably — from 2000-2500 lasts of tar and pitch to a paltry 
300-700 lasts, almost all of which was tar, the cheaper product.5  
The new situation on the West European market had important conse-
quences for the Swedes. 1t was no longer profitable to maintain a monopoly 
to control the price of tar when the market had three alternative production 
areas: America, Sweden and Russia. The Swedes realised this, and so did their 
Russian competitors in the 1730's, when Swedish plans for a new monopoly 
company were definitely relinquished and the Russian tar trade was thrown 
1  See contracts for colonial tar and pitch 1711-1715 (C.O. 5/866, V 145) and 
total purchases 1715-1720 (C.O. 327/7, K 121; Adm. 49/119). The figures from 
1717 onwards are as follows, in 1717: From Russia 216 lasts, Norway 75, Virginia 
63, Carolina 387, in 1718: Russia 101, Norway 4, Carolina 19, Sweden 20, in 1719: 
Russia 275, Carolina 79, 'Wyburgh' (Viborg in Finland) 25, in 1720: Russia 311, 
Bergen 8, Carolina 104, Sweden 67, New England 35, East Country 2 (Adm. 49/1 19). 
2 Corbett MSS, Naval Stores, p. 26, Admiralty Library. For the Navy Board's 
purchasing prices 1717-1728 see Table 5. 
2 
 See Table 5 and 6. 
4 Navy Board to Admiralty 17/4/1777, Adm. 106/2204. 
G 
 See Table 6. 
9 
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open.1  The Russian capacity for production had a great share in the course 
of events. The Swedes feared the Russian products more than the American 
ones, which all remained in England.2 For the Russian tar flowed into the 
Dutch market, still an important one, and ruined it, too, for the Swedes. 
There was over-production and a fall in the prices of both pitch and tar 
which culminated at the end of the 1730's.3 An account of Sweden's trade 
which the Board of Trade had sent to them from Sweden at that time gives, 
after first dealing with the Swedish gun trade, a discouraging picture of 
the situation of the tar trade .4 
The setting for the "decline" of Swedish tar exports can have been no 
other than the appearance of the new European competitor in the two 
main consumers' markets in Europe — the English and the Dutch. This 
happened at a critical period for Swedish exports. Despite the fact that 
Russian tar did not succeed in continuing on the English market, it neverthe-
less contributed to the serious disturbance of the position of Swedish tar on the 
English market as a whole and thus also to toppling the centralized Swed-
ish export organisation. It was something which the English premium policy, 
whose effect only extended to the English market and to a small degree 
to its chief consumer, the Navy, could hardly have managed alone. The 
prayer of the English merchants and statesmen had been answered, but 
in a manner which was unexpected and not altogether pleasant. The situation 
in the European tar market in the 1710's was one of many symptoms which 
indicated that there was a threat that the Swedish supremacy in the Baltic 
would be superseded by the Russian. 
1 Hallberg, 155-156. Alanen, 106 ff. 
2 Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 14/1/1724, RA. 
S N. W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland, Leiden 1946, 
473 ff. 
4 Harrington to B. of T. 20/7/1731, C.O. 388/30, V 78. 
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Table 2. 
Value of imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar/pitch to London, Outports, and 
all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Iron: 
Imports of iron to London, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	  126.797 95.963 77.100 96.678 91.716 66.673 
'Russia' 	  165 890 5.346 789 24.049 17.787 
'Spain' 	  9.805 11.258 4.854 5.614 780 - 
'Germany' 	  59 65 499 389 154 508 
'Holland' 	  121 - 2.517 3.310 329 135 
Other areas 	  - - 18 199 273 - 
Total £ 136.947 £ 108.176 £ 90.334 £ 106.979 £ 117.301 £ 85.103 
Imports of iron to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	  39.346 43.947 61.176 72.408 86.039 97.092 
'Russia' 	  797 291 674 1.729 9.156 8.384 
'Spain' 	  9.336 12.554 15.848 15.705 - - 
'Germany' 	  1.309 333 3.348 2.852 2.221 3.710 
'Holland' 	
 3.380 2.833 9.327 11.198 1.749 679 
Other areas 	  2.718 885 362 663 1.389 73 
Total £ 56.886 £ 60.843 £ 90.735 £ 104.555 £ 100.554 £ 109.938 
Imports of iron to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	  166.143 139.910 138.276 169.086 177.755 163.765 
'Russia' 962 1.181 6.020 2.518 33.205 26.171 
'Spain' 	  19.141 23.812 20.702 21.319 780 - 
'Germany' 	
 1.368 398 3.847 3.241 2.375 4.218 
'Holland' 	  3.501 2.833 11.844 14.508 2.078 814 
'Plantations' 
	  37 - - - 1.353 - 
'Ireland' 	  2.070 10 3621  8002 3093 73 
Other areas . . 611 875 18 62 - - 
Total £ 193.833 £ 169.019 £ 181.069 £ 211.534 £ 217.855 £ 195.041 
1 of Spanish origin 
2 	 „ 	 415, of Swedish origin 385 
a of Swedish origin 
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Hemp: 
Imports of hemp to London, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 81.797 20.276 40.821 38.096 12.826 28.938 
'Russia' 	 .... 24.549 33.866 58.979 68.530 93.292 108.769 
'Germany' .... 4 - - - - - 
'Holland' 	 .... 1.311 - 1.178 333 - 
Other areas .. - 57 361 - 3 
Total £ 107.661 £ 54.199 £ 101.339 £ 106.959 £ 106.121 £ 137.707 
Imports of hemp to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
1 mport area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 6.633 8.138 19.952 11.474 43.415 21.467 
'Russia' 	 .... 6.913 7.780 11.474 18.886 29.557 41.469 
'Germany'.... - - - 468 294 - 
'Holland' 	 .... 2.396 758 1.350 1.916 71 l.187 
Other areas .. 263 - 33 41 405 - 
Total £ 16.205 £ 16.676 £ 32.809 £ 32.785 £ 73.742 £ 64.123 
Imports of hemp to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 88.430 28.414 60.773 49.570 56.241 50.405 
'Russia' 	 .... 31.462 41.646 70.453 87.416 122.849 150.238 
'Germany'.... 4 - - 468 294 - 
'Holland' 	 .... 3.707 758 2.528 2.249 71 l.187 
'Scotland' 	 . . 263 - - - - - 
'Ireland' 	 .... - - 33 41 405 
Other areas .. - 57 361 - 3 
Total £ 123.866 £ 70.875 £ 134.148 £ 139.744 £ 179.863 £ 201.830 
Flax: 
Imports of flax to London, 1699-1747. (£) 
mport area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 7.006 18.954 5.028 13.787 19.853 43.323 
'Russia' 	 .... 9.273 35.903 11.698 26.924 4.425 19.105 
'Germany'.... - - - 327 - 9.509 
'Holland' 	 .... 1.282 2.532 1.714 1.983 1.526 2.380 
Other areas .. 112 5 3 - - 2 
Total £ 17.673 £ 57.394 £ 18.443 £ 43.021 £ 25.804 £ 74.319 
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Imports of flax to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 36.996 30.211 40.346 17.340 46.730 39.808 
'Russia' 	 .... 17.048 19.621 20.547 32.741 6.435 34.193  
'Ge many'.... - - 154 - - 568 
'Holland' 	 .... 1.148 1.833 3.321 10.157 25.949 22.028 
Other areas .. 236 660 5.436 268 5.307 18 
Total £ 55.428 £ 52.325 £ 69.804 £ 60.506 £ 84.421 £ 96.615 
Imports of flax to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 44.002 49.165 45.374 31.127 66.583 83.131 
'Russia' 	 .... 26.321 55.524 32.245 59.665 10.860 53.298 
'Germany'.... - - 154 327 - 10.077 
'Holland' 	 .... 2.430 4.365 5.035 12.140 27.475 24.408 
'Scotland' 	 .. 56 598 - - - - 
'Ireland' 	 .... - 62 5.439 268 57 18 
Other areas .. 292 5 - - 5.250 2 
Total £ 73.101 £ 109.719 £ 88.247 £ 103.527 £ 110.225 £ 170.934 
Potash: 
Imports of potash to London, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 13.910 5.918 31.507 25.722 846 8.672 
'Russia' 	 .... 19.897 33.537 16.713 14.655 29.084 11.898 
Other areas .. 1 - 39 369 130 - 
Total £ 33.808 £ 39.455 £ 48.259 £ 40.746 £ 30.060 £ 20.570 
Imports of potash to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. - 6 l.854 1.191 50 456 
'Russia' 	 .... - - - 65 - - 
Other areas .. - 4 - - 10 124 
Total - £ 10 £ 1.854 £ 1.256 £ 60 £ 580 
Imports of potash to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 13.910 5.924 33.361 26.913 896 9.128 
'Russia' 	 .... 19.897 33.537 16.713 14.720 29.084 11.898 
Other areas .. 1 4 39 369 140 124 
Total £ 33.808 £ 39.465 £ 50.113 £ 42.002 £ 30.120 £ 21.150 
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Tar/pitch: 
Imports of tar/pitch to London, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 23.838 12.586 12.649 17.452 5.767 18.249 
'Russia' 	 .... 11 799 - 682 - - 
'Germany'.... - - - - - 108 
'Holland' 	 .... - - - - - - 
'Plantations'.. 105 28 37.966 32.976 24.117 17.876 
'Ireland' 	 .... - - - - - - 
Other areas .. - 32 359 752 - 13 
Total £ 23.954 £ 13.445 £ 50.974 £ 51.862 £ 29.884 £ 36.246 
Imports of tar/pitch to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 8.975 10.331 7.260 9.708 8.309 10.906 
'Russia' 	 .... - 225 2.503 l.080 - 21 
'Germany'.... - - 81 - - - 
'Holland' 	 .... 4 24 - 28 - 9 
'Plantations'.. 41 25 22.353 16.902 14.808 18.918 
'Ireland' 	 .... 345 232 415 265 235 54 
Other areas .. 64 31 95 18 - 1.298 
Total £ 9.429 £ 10.868 £ 32.707 £ 28.001 £ 23.352 £ 31.206 
Imports of tar/pitch to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 .. 32.813 22.917 19.909 27.160 14.076 29.155 
'Russia' 	 .... 11 1.024 2.503 1.762 - 21 
'Germany'.... - - 81 - - 108 
'Holland' 	 .... 4 24 - 28 - 9 
'Plantations'.. 146 53 60.319 49.878 38.925 36.784 
'Ireland' 	 .... 345 232 415 265 235 54 
Other areas .. 64 63 454 770 - 1.311 
Total £ 33.383 £ 24.313 £ 83.681 £ 79.863 £ 53.236 £ 67.452 
Sources: 1699 PRO, Customs 3/2 
1700 „ „ 3/4 
1725 „ „ 3/27 
1726 „ 3/28 A 
1746 „ „ 3/46 
1747 „ „ 3/47 
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Table 3. 
Value of England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash, and tar/pitch, 1699- 
1747 . (£) 
Import area 	 1699 	 1700 	 1725 	 1726 	 1746 	 1747 
'Russia' 	 .... 78.653 132.912 127.934 166.081 195.998 241.626 
'Sweden' 	 .... 213.056 171.580 142.760 171.172 172.684 173.917 
'East Country' 125.836 69.186 147.799 119.739 128.163 142.177 
'Denm.-Norway' 6.406 5.564 7.123 12.945 14.704 19.490 
Other areas .. 34.303 34.149 111.477 106.733 78.970 79.197 
Total £ 458.254 £ 413.391 £ 537.093 £ 576.670 £ 590.519 £ 656.407 
Value of England's total imports of all commodities from the Baltic, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 1699 1700 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Russia' 	 ... . 99.845 176.620 250.315 235.869 261.575 321.015 
'Sweden' 	 .... 245.802 198.825 161.884 177.093 177.486 176.912 
'East Country' 224.546 135.338 209.149 157.154 208.156 228.131 
Total £ 570.193 £ 510.783 £ 621.348 £ 570.116 £ 647.217 £ 726.058 
Sources: see Table 2. 
<44 
N I I I I7- I d— 
ti 
~ 
E 
~ 
�  
~ 
0 0. 
E 
~ tg. I I 	
c> 
N 
N I I NC' I 4 O 
~ N ^ I ~ ~ N 	 O~ 
cD N 
ä 
~ 
N M 1 I ,n 
L 	 ~ ~ 	 ~ CO
• 	 'aa a> 
c 	 ^ 
tl 
~-. 0 	 tf~ .~-. .--' Cpppp  M • o 
• 	 ~ 0  ' ~ d" 00 VN' 
• ^
o 
• N  ~~ 
 N N  4  E  
kr>
'  
N 
4d 
oo 
~ 
4d 
0 CO 00 
cip 
N ~N~ 
cö 	 06 N 	 r. 
C‹.) 
ua 
v 
0 
.o 	 o 	 >-) 
h C C 7 :: L " N 
0. w w a"• 	
E 
Ce) 
4d 
M 
N 
Cc) 
4d 
N M 
oo 
~ 
4a 
In co 
g ~ 
— CV 
O CO 
N ~ 
~ M  CD N  
00 tl' 
~ 
~ 
~ 
144  
145 
Imports of unwrought copper to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 	 1699 
'Eastland' 	 - 
'Germany' 	 32 
'Holland'  	 - 
'Africa'  	 - 
Other areas  	 - 
1700 
181  
- 
- 
- 
- 
1725 
43 
143 
14 
- 
64 
	
1726 	 1746 
	
- 	 10 
	
- 	 64 
	
14 	 l0 
141 
2.257' 
1747 
2 
447 
50 
Total 	 £ 32 
plus copper plates 18 
£ 18 £ 264 £ 2.412 	 £ 84 £ 499 
' from Ireland 
Imports of 'unwrought copper' to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 	 1699 1700 1725 1726 	 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 795 18 254 - 	 80 2 
'Germany' 	 32 - 143 - 	 64 447 
'Holland'  	 540 84 204 793 	 10 50 
'East India' 	 . . 	 173 2.092 - - 	 - - 
'Africa, Barbary' 	 982 2.311 16.441 11.623 	 12.949 11 
Other areas  	 - 77 3.054 3.269 	 431 - 
Total 	 £ 2.522 £ 4.582 £ 20.096 £ 15.685 	 £ 13.534 £ 510 
Brass wire: 
Imports of brass wire to London, 1663-1747. (£) 
Import area 	 1663 	 1669 1699 1700 1725 	 1726 	 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 2.558 	 3.364 12.748 7.499 117 	 576 	 - - 
'Germany' 
	
13.409 	 3.607 3.658 2.295 1.097 	 894 	 884 719 
Other areas 	 - 	 - 380 210 - 	 7 	 - - 
Total 	 £ 15.967 	 £ 6.971 £ 16.786 £ 10.004 £ 1.214 	 £ 1.477 	 £ 884 £ 719 
Imports of brass wire to Outports, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 	 1699 1700 1725 1726 	 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 1.463 650 241 408 
'Germany' 	 603 1.330 227 252 
Other areas  
	 - 3 52 34 
Total 	 £ 2.066 £ 1.983 £ 520 694 
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Imports of brass wire to all England, 1699-1747. (£) 
Import area 	 1699 	 1700 	 1725 1726 1746 1747 
'Eastland' 	 14.211 	 8.149 
	 358 984 — — 
'Germany' 	 4.261 	 3.625 	 1.324 1.146 884 719 
Other areas  	 380 	 213 
	 52 41 — — 
Total 	 £ 18.852 	 £ 11.987 	 £ 1.734 £ 2.171 £ 884 £ 719 
Sources: BM, Add. MSS 36755 (1663, 1669) 
PRO, Customs 3/2, 3/4, 3/27, 3/28 A, 3/46, 3/47 (1699, 1700, 1725, 1726, 
1746, 1747) 
Table 5. Navy Board purchases of pitch and tar, 1697-1727. 
(Source of supply and prices in Pounds and Shillings) 
1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 
Pitch (per ton) 
'Stockholm' 	  12/5 9/15 10/10 10/— 16/10 (14/—) (11/10) (12/—) 10/— 10/— 12/— 
'Gothenburg' 	  
'Sweden' (11/—) 
(11/—) (11/—) (10/—) 
6 10 (/ 	 ) 4/17 5 5 / 3 17 / 4 5 / 4 14 / 
'Finland & Courland' 	  12/— 11/— 
'Russia' 	  11/— (11/—) (9/7) (10/10) 
'Poland' 	  11/— 
'Carolina' 	  (12/—) 11/— (10/—) (10/—) 9/— 6/16 5/10 5/— (4/—) 
'New England' 	  (10/—) (10/—) (10/—) (9/10) 10/— (11/—) (7/5) (4/15) 
'New York' 	  (10/10) 
'Virginia' (11/10) 6/16 
'Plantations' 	  (6/5) 
Tar (per last) 
'Stockholm' 	  14/5 11/15 15/— 14/— (18/—) 15/— (14/15) 12/— 11/10 11/10 16/ — 
'Gothenburg' 	  11/15 11/15 (12/—) (14/—) 
'Sweden' 	  (18/—) (13/—) 
'Viborg' 	  (22/—) (15/—) 14/17 
'Bergen' 	  (14/10) 
'Norway' 	  (15/10) (15/10) 
'Russia' 	  (15/—) 10/10 (11/—) (16/—) 10/— 8/— 12/— 12/— 14/— 12/— 13/15 13/— 
'Russia & Norway' 	  9/5 9/17 8/19 8/— 
'East Country' 	  (12/—) 
'Carolina' (15/—) 10/— (12/—) 9/— (11/10) 6/10 (4/—) 
'New England' 	  14/— 9/10 10/10 (16/—) 11/— (12/—) (5/8) 
'Virginia' 11/5 
'Plantations' 
	  
8/— 5/2 7/5 8/— 7/5 7 17 
Sources: PRO, CO 323/9, L 89; CO 388/19, 0 159; Adm. 49/119. If no figures can be found for the Home Yards (Deptford, Woolwich and Chatham) those for Portsmouth and Plymouth are given in brackets. Cf. Navy Board to Admiralty 2/6/1704 (Adm. 1/3598). The Home Yards prices were always lower. 
Table 6. 
The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch according to exporting areas, 1697-1739. (lasts) 
from: - 	 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 
'Sweden'  	 4420 906 3605 2171 2510 908 3369 3572 2730 2114 2006 2221 2050 1949 1806 1808 1778 1568 215 260 	 1 	 2 	 103 	 183 	 62 207 	 139 	 90 884 813 442 793 1379 1117 290 690 299 602 657 510 232 363 	 543 
'Denmark-Norway' 	 159 	 83 303 331 309 (209)* 271 602 464 353 271 261 326 576 243 409 685 724 766 1031 1092 685 422 346 278 307 226 297 540 898 275 355 741 455 331 357 645 394 231 373 286 221 	 262 
'East Country'  	 1231 	 3 	 20 	 45 	 33 	 (1)* 97 207 	 83 	 32 	 8 118 	 2 	 3 	 3 	 36 	 66 	 8 	 85 	 6 	 76 185 	 46 	 22 	 1 	 - 	 - 	 1 866 1306 	 58 	 - 	 - 	 55 	 - 	 7 	 - 	 - 	 1 	 1 	 - 
'Russia'  	 18 42 13 114 - 14 	 1 18 213 11 298 44 	 2 338 857 901 195 44 1056 1398 462 457 23 361 553 260 410 - 278 196 26 21 	 3 	 2 33 112 256 153 - 70 	 1 	 - 
'Germany'  	 24 - - 	 - 	 1 	 - 116 106 46 - 	 2 	 1 	 - 	 - 	 2 	 1 	 1 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 1 	 - 	 - 	 - - 	 - 	 9 - 	 - - 	 2 - 	 - 	 - 	 - - 	 - - 	 - 
'Holland'  	 - 	 - 	 1 	 3 	 - 	 10 	 6 358 258 164 	 - 	 - 	 1 	 2 	 11 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 6 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 1 	 4 	 - 	 1 	 - 	 29 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 1 	 - 
'Ireland' & 'Scotland' 	 - 	 31 	 40 	 26 	 11 	 17 	 38 	 160 	 83 214 	 24 	 84 	 113 	 66 	 154 	 71 	 104 	 64 	 35 	 92 	 20 	 32 	 44 	 31 	 10 	 - 	 6 	 35 	 46 	 29 	 40 	 45 	 35 	 15 	 4 	 2 	 2 	 11 	 13 	 6 	 10 	 - 	 4 
'American colonies'  	 3 	 16 	 6 	 15 	 16 	 39 	 73 196 485 741 	 512 591 	 457 370 439 402 975 2107 4755 6017 6489 5741 3905 2937 4198 5444 6923 6753 5556 2859 1031 1775 2745 3995 5887 6125 8532 6205 10835 5409 4871 3162 
Other areas  	 - 	 12 	 5 - 	 - 	 - - 	 1 - 	 14 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 10 	 9 - 	 - 	 13 	 1 	 1 	 - - 22 - 	 - 	 12 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 
Total 	 5855 1065 4010 2701 2878 (1176) 3821 5106 4134 3419 3362 3240 3087 3392 3444 3674 3241 3384 4265 7561 7669 7851 6380 4843 3863 4972 6225 7358 9376 8798 3701 2249 3935 4390 4653 7084 7327 9692 7107 11795 5937 5457 3971 
* The volume for 1702 is damaged. 
The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch according to exporting areas, 1697-1739. (%) 
1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 
from: - 	 % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % °/ö % % % % % % % % % 
'Sweden'  	 75.5 85.1 	 89.9 80.5 87.2 (77.2) 88.2 70.0 66.0 61.8 59.7 68.5 66.4 57.5 52.4 49.2 54.9 46.3 	 5.0 	 3.4 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 1.6 	 3.8 	 1.6 	 4.2 	 2.2 	 1.2 	 9.4 	 9.2 11.9 35.3 35.0 25.4 	 6.2 	 9.7 	 4.1 	 6.2 	 9.2 	 4.3 	 3.9 	 6.7 	 13.7 
'Denmark-Norway' 	 2.7 	 7.8 	 7.6 	 12.3 	 10.8 (17.8) 	 7.1 	 11.7 	 11.2 	 10.4 	 8.1 	 8.1 	 10.6 	 17.0 	 7.1 	 11.2 	 21.1 	 21.5 	 18.0 	 13.6 	 14.2 	 8.7 	 6.6 	 7.1 	 7.3 	 6.2 	 3.6 	 4.0 	 5.8 	 10.2 	 7.4 	 15.8 	 18.8 	 10.4 	 7.1 	 5.0 	 8.8 	 4.1 	 3.3 	 3.2 	 4.8 	 4.0 	 6.6 
'East Country'  	 21.0 	 0.3 	 0.5 	 1.7 	 1.1 (0.0) 	 2.5 	 4.1 	 2.0 	 0.9 	 0.2 	 3.6 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.8 	 2.0 	 0.2 	 2.0 	 0.1 	 1.0 	 2.4 	 0.7 	 0.5 	 0.0 	 - 	 - 	 0.0 	 9.2 14.9 	 1.6 	 - 	 - 	 1.3 	 - 	 0.1 	 - 	 - 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 - 	 - 	 - 
'Russia'  	 0.3 3.9 0.3 4.2 - (1.2) 0.0 0.4 5.2 0.3 8.9 1.4 0.1 10.0 24.9 24.6 6.0 1.3 24.8 18.5 6.0 5.8 0.4 7.4 14.3 5.2 6.6 - 3.0 2.2 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.6 3.5 1.6 - 0.6 - 0.0 
'Germany'  	 0.4 	 - 	 - (0.0) 	 - 2.3 2.6 1.3 	 - 	 - 0.1 0.0 	 - 	 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 	 - 	 - 	 - 0.0 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 0.1 	 - 	 - 	 - 0.1 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 
'Hollan d'  	 - 	 - 	 0.0 0.1 	 - (0.9) 	 0.2 7.0 6.2 4.8 	 - 	 - 	 0.0 	 0.0 0.3 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 0.1 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 -- 	 - 	 0.0 0.2 	 - 	 0.0 	 - 	 0.4 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 0.0 	 - 
'Ireland' & 'Scotland' 	 - 	 2.9 	 1.0 	 1.0 	 0.4 (1.5) 	 1.0 	 3.1 	 2.0 	 6.3 	 0.7 	 2.6 	 3.7 	 1.9 	 4.5 	 1.9 	 3.2 	 1.9 	 0.8 	 1.2 	 0.3 	 0.4 	 0.7 	 0.6 	 0.3 	 0.1 	 0.5 	 0.5 	 0.3 	 1.1 	 2.0 	 0.9 	 0.3 	 0.1 	 0.0 	 0.0 	 0.1 	 0.2 	 0.1 	 0.2 	 - 	 0.1 
American colonies  	 0.1 	 - 	 0.4 	 0.2 	 0.5 (1.4) 	 1.0 	 1.4 	 4.8 14.2 22.0 	 15.8 19.0 13.5 	 10.7 	 12.0 12.4 28.8 49.4 62.9 78.5 82.7 90.0 	 80.6 76.0 84.4 87.5 94.1 	 72.0 63.2 77.3 45.8 45.1 	 62.5 85.9 83.2 83.6 88.0 87.3 91.8 91.1 	 89.3 79.6 
Other areas  	 - 	 - 0.3 	 - 	 - - 	 - 	 - 0.0 - 0.4 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 0.3 0.3 	 - 	 - 0.2 0.0 0.0 	 - 	 - 0.5 	 - 	 - 0.2 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 	 - 
Total 	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (100.0) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: PRO, Customs 3/1-39 (1697-1704, 1706-1711, 1713-1726, 1728-39) 
C. O. 390/6 (1705, 1712), C. O. 390/7 (1727) 
